

ASEF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY HANDBOOK

HOW TO WIN HEARTS AND MINDS



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Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF)

ASEF promotes understanding, strengthens relationships and facilitates cooperation among the people, institutions and organisations of Asia and Europe. ASEF enhances dialogue, enables exchanges and encourages collaboration across the thematic areas of culture, economy, education, governance, public health and sustainable development.

ASEF is an intergovernmental not-for-profit organisation located in Singapore. Founded in 1997, it is the only institution of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM).

Together with about 750 partner organisations ASEF has run more than 700 projects, mainly conferences, seminars and workshops. Over 20,000 Asians and Europeans have actively participated in its activities and it has reached much wider audiences through its networks, web-portals, publications, exhibitions and lectures.

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Asia-Europe Meeting

Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)

ASEM is an intergovernmental forum for dialogue and cooperation established in 1996 to deepen relations between Asia and Europe, which addresses political, economic and socio-cultural issues of common concern.

ASEM brings 53 partners (21 Asian and 30 European countries, the ASEAN Secretariat, and the European Union).

For more information, please visit www.aseminfoboard.org

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FOREWORD

Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF)

Public diplomacy involves strategies and activities aimed at influencing both the foreign and domestic public, understanding their attitudes towards foreign policy and shaping their views on related issues. These efforts help establish a dialogue across borders that improves understanding of each other, and shapes more positive perceptions of a country's foreign policy priorities or an organisation's international relations. For this reason, it is important that those actors responsible for improving the image of their country or organisation have a well-informed understanding of how they are currently perceived. This ensures that new initiatives can be implemented to build on strengths, address any perceived misunderstanding and improve the overall relationship.

As a contribution to public diplomacy efforts of the 53 Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Partners, the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF) established the Asia-Europe Public Diplomacy Training Initiative in 2013, in partnership with the DiploFoundation (Diplo) and the National Centre for Research on Europe (NCRE). Partners have since conducted 4 tutored online courses and 3 face-to-face workshops; nearly 200 participants have benefitted from the training. The training materials of the initiative utilise the findings of the ASEF dual perceptions studies, *“The EU through the Eyes of Asia”* and *“Asia in the Eyes of Europe”*. The findings are drawn from the results of public opinion surveys, the analysis of news items in major media outlets, as well as insights from face-to-face interviews with influential people from 21 different countries across Asia and Europe.

The ASEF Public Diplomacy Handbook presents this scientifically verifiable data and feedback tailored to a practical training tool. Each chapter combines theories on a relevant topic with useful information obtained from an author's hands-on experience. The accompanying interviews with high-profile professionals provide insightful knowledge on the role of public diplomacy in enhancing Asia-Europe cooperation. It is hoped that this handbook provides unique insights for diplomats and civil society actors to develop a deeper understanding of public diplomacy and to help them inform their work in promoting Asia-Europe relations.

FOREWORD

DiploFoundation (DIPLO)

In today's global environment, characterised by a large degree of interdependence and interconnectivity, perceptions of, and from, different countries and their populations have become an important resource. Perceptions can crystallise into concrete attitudes and actions, and they can result in tangible gains and losses. Positive mutual perceptions can bring nations and regions closer together and can be important ingredients for fruitful and peaceful cooperation.

In the current digital era, there is great potential to know more about each other and to interact more intensively with people from different areas around the world. Yet, digital media also has the potential to polarise, endorse stereotypes and misinform. How can Asian and European diplomats best operate public diplomacy campaigns in today's context, building optimal, yet realistic country brands, engaging in fruitful partnerships and ultimately enhancing perceptions and connectivity within and between Asia and Europe?

With this question in mind, the Asia-Europe Public Diplomacy Training Initiative was set up in 2013. DiploFoundation, as an experienced provider of diplomacy-related capacity building programmes, has been the core facilitator of the courses and workshops that are part of this initiative. In cooperation with ASEF, we organised four online courses and three face-to-face trainings, bringing together more than 200 Asian and European participants. Furthermore, we have used our expertise in the digital elements of diplomacy to strengthen the course curriculum by offering information about the optimal use of social media in public diplomacy campaigns.

This handbook compiles the theoretical background and practical tools to construct a successful public diplomacy campaign and embeds it into the context of Asia-Europe relations. DiploFoundation edited and updated the texts, transforming the online course modules into usable handbook chapters. The harmonisation of offline and online elements of the training initiative broadens the potential for capacity development and aims to optimally prepare practitioners for their public diplomacy activities.

FOREWORD

National Centre for Research on Europe (NCRE)

NCRE is New Zealand's leading academic think tank devoted to the examination of the European Union's impact within the Asia-Pacific region. Its expertise has been widely acknowledged, and in 2015 the NCRE was engaged by the European External Action Service to help to inform the European Union (EU)'s new 2016 Global Strategy. It is this link between academic research and public diplomacy, relevant to EU policy-makers, that the NCRE brings to this training programme.

The hallmark research activity of the NCRE is the study of external perceptions towards the EU. The Asia-Europe Public Diplomacy Training Initiative introduces early career ASEM diplomats to this unique and now widely replicated methodology that combines EU perceptions from three perspectives: the media, public opinion and stakeholders. Since 2002, the NCRE has conducted EU perceptions projects in more than 30 countries spanning five continents, and it is this rich data that participants in the Asia-Europe Public Diplomacy Training Initiative (both face-to-face and online) study, discuss and employ. The two main datasets used in the training are: *After Lisbon: The EU as an Exporter of Values and Norms through ASEM* (undertaken in 2011 and involving Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Russian Federation, Singapore, and Thailand); and most recently, *EU Perceptions in 10 Strategic Partners: Analysis of the Perception of the EU and EU's Politics Abroad* (completed in 2015 involving Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Russian Federation, South Africa, the USA).

Through its contribution, the NCRE hopes to raise the awareness of the evolving nature of perceptions for early career diplomats who participate in the Asia-Europe Public Diplomacy Training Initiative by providing both expertise and tools that each participant can take away and apply in their own diplomatic contexts.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACSG	ASEM Chairman's Support Group
AEBF	Asia-Europe Business Forum
AEC	ASEAN Economic Community
AEPF	Asia-Europe People's Forum
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEF	Asia-Europe Foundation
ASEIC	ASEM SMEs Eco-Innovation Centre
ASEM	Asia-Europe Meeting
ASEM DF	ASEM Dialogue Facility
ASEP	Asia-Europe Parliamentary Partnership
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
Diplo	DiploFoundation
EEAS	European External Action Service
EEC	European Economic Community
ENVforum	Asia-Europe Environment Forum
ETS	Emission Trading Scheme
EU	European Union
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FTA	Free Trade Agreements
GMF	German Marshall Fund of the United States
ICT	Information and Communications Technologies
IFOP	Institut Français d'Opinion Publique
IR	International Relations
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MFAs	Ministries of Foreign Affairs

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCRE	National Centre for Research on Europe
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NPOV	Neutral Point of View
NSA	National Security Agency
OSA	Organisation of the Swiss Abroad
PD	Public Diplomacy
PR	Public Relations
REDD+	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SMEs	Small and Medium Enterprises
SOM	Senior Official Meetings
TNS	Transatlantic Trends Survey
UNESCO	United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNRIC	United Nations Regional Information Center
WSSD	World Summit on Sustainable Development
WTO	World Trade Organization
WWW	World Wide Web

INTRODUCTION

Public Diplomacy, a Powerful Tool to Bring Asia and Europe Closer

After 20 years of existence, the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process still lacks the visibility it deserves. This handbook, drawn from the successful Asia-Europe Public Diplomacy Training Initiative, tries to put the accent on the instruments available to promote this unique partnership differently.

Ambassadors and Ministers beware! The ASEF Public Diplomacy Handbook intends to promote innovative ways to foster the visibility of the ASEM Process. A group of contributors, including long-time veterans of educational, cultural, and sports diplomacy, communication/advertising professionals and media experts, hereby present the best tools available for a more efficient outreach. In the current social media dominated era, brand and image cannot be discarded. Countries, corporates, universities need to market themselves better on the global stage if they want to attract support, and therefore remain competitive. The same applies to ASEM, entering adulthood after its 20 years of existence: though connectivity is nowadays an appealing word, ASEM needs more than a slogan and an attractive concept to continue to foster and serve its purpose of bringing those two continents closer. It needs a dedicated, long-term public diplomacy strategy shared by all of its 53 partners.

Think of what we have in hand: an organisation bringing together 53 partners, among whom are some of the most dynamic emerging economies. Potential is there. Economic opportunities are stunning. Historical bonds between the two regions, from the ancient times of Marco Polo, Admiral Zheng He or the Silk Road, offer a superb background on which promising scripts could be

“ AFTER 20 YEARS OF EXISTENCE, THE ASIA-EUROPE MEETING (ASEM) PROCESS STILL LACKS THE VISIBILITY IT DESERVES. ”

written for the future. For this handbook, a number of diplomats, some of whom have been involved with the ASEM Process since 1996, were consulted, and nearly all of them came up with the same conclusion: more can be done outside of the traditional summits, ministerial meetings and official gatherings if ASEM is properly marketed and manages to catch more media attention and public support.

The main purpose of this handbook is to offer diplomats and professionals involved in the domain of Asia-Europe relations new ideas and inputs to make ASEM more engaging and forthcoming. The handbook also provides practical information on strengthening public diplomacy by engaging and interacting effectively with various stakeholders. Through a series of chapters, check-lists and high-profile interviews in this handbook, it is hoped that the readers will find plenty of ideas for what we could do better for the mutual benefit of all ASEM Partners.

CHAPTER 1:

THE CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Kishan S. RANA

Abstract

This chapter introduces the topic of public diplomacy. It provides a short overview of the evolution of the definition and use of public diplomacy. Whereas public diplomacy was originally seen as an effort to influence foreign publics, later definitions include outreach to domestic publics, the relationship to soft power and interaction to other fields of diplomacy.

After introducing the elements of public diplomacy, the chapter describes its objectives in relation to both domestic and foreign publics. Public diplomacy contributes to ‘the best realistic country brand’, which is comprised of a multitude of facets, each rooted in the country’s reality. The chapter then divides public diplomacy into three elements: advocacy, cultural diplomacy and relations building.

Using examples from different countries in Asia and Europe, the practical application of public diplomacy and image management is subsequently examined, noting their strategies based on their needs and interests. The chapter then introduces different public diplomacy methods, with a focus on the potential of partnerships with a wide range of stakeholders.

Finally, the limits of public diplomacy and the challenges in the context of Asia and Europe are discussed, asking whether there is a specific ‘Asian’ or ‘European’ approach to public diplomacy. In conclusion, we examine key requirements for successful public diplomacy, stressing the use of dialogue, flexibility, patience and partnerships.

Please check the 5-point summary as well at the end of this chapter.

1. The evolving definition of public diplomacy

Dean Edmund Gullion of the Fletcher School of Diplomacy coined the term ‘public diplomacy’ in 1965, but the notion of reaching out to foreign publics and influencing them is much older. In an essay written in 1939, Edward Hallett Carr spoke of propaganda as an instrument of power in international politics; he felt that this was important because of greater mass participation in politics and the development of techniques that reflected economic and technological changes.¹

The phrase ‘public diplomacy’ entered common usage barely two decades back. It is the fastest growing branch of diplomatic studies. One possible reason: public diplomacy is a wide, portmanteau term and people use it to mean what suits them. The fact that even specialists do not agree on a single definition reflects this. Public diplomacy links international affairs with communications, image and information and communications technologies (ICT), thus appealing to many disciplines.

Public diplomacy is also much older than we may think. The Alliance Française was set up in 1883 to promote the French language and culture outside France. Japan created a department of information at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1921 devoted to news for foreign policy objectives. In 1934, Japanese Foreign Minister Koki said in a speech:

“If each country could make its own culture and civilization understood, this will promote international understanding strongly. The government will coordinate official and private efforts, and equip them with appropriate external and domestic institutions.”²

¹Carr, E. H. (1939) Propaganda in International Politics. Oxford: Clarendon.

²Akami, T. (2008) ‘The emergence of international public opinion and the origins of public diplomacy in Japan in the inter-war period’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 3, no. 2, p. 119

A Canadian scholar wrote in 2002 that, after 9/11, public diplomacy, “once the stepchild of diplomats has assumed its rightful place at the centre of diplomatic relations”.³ He added:

“Public diplomacy is...distinct from (but related to) a foreign ministry’s public affairs role, with the latter often using similar activities and techniques but directing them at its own citizens to help them interpret the outside world from a national perspective and to raise awareness of their country’s international role and that of their diplomatic service.”⁴

The extent to which home publics should be addressed remains one of the key issues in public diplomacy (PD) policy.

2. How has public diplomacy evolved? How is it used?

Public diplomacy originally referred to attempts by governments to influence foreign publics, to shape their views on issues and to take a favourable view. It has been called: “*efforts by the government of one nation to influence public or elite opinion in a second nation for the purpose of turning the foreign policy of the target nation to advantage.*”⁵ This led to the observation that public diplomacy was a form of government-directed propaganda.⁶ From this perspective, public diplomacy covered external activities. Consequently, parallel activities by governments to secure the understanding and support of home publics in relation to external policy were called ‘public relations’ or domestic outreach, since diplomacy is not generally conducted at home. The USA uses this definition, making a sharp distinction between the two. The UK definition of public diplomacy is similar: “*work aiming to influence and engage individuals and organisations overseas, in order to improve understanding*

³Potter, E. H. (2002) ‘Canada and the new public diplomacy’, Clingendael Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, No. 81, p. 1. Available at: http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2002/20020700_cli_paper_dip_issue81.pdf (Accessed March 2016).

⁴Ibid, p. 4.

⁵Manheim, J. B. (1990) *Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy: The Evolution of Influence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

⁶Berridge, G. R. and James, A. (2003), *A Dictionary of Diplomacy*, 2nd ed. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

of and influence for the United Kingdom.”⁷ Subsequently, this definition was expanded, mainly because the public diplomacy activity directed abroad or at home is almost identical. Thus ‘Canada International’ (the short name of the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development) handles both these activities. It is a trend leader in sophisticated domestic outreach, conducted via the Internet.⁸ Modern democratic countries cannot achieve foreign policy goals without involving the domestic public, as shown by the example of Croatia’s path to membership in NATO and the EU.⁹

Joseph Nye has taken a completely different approach ¹⁰, almost equating public diplomacy with ‘soft power’.¹¹ Following this approach, Jozef Batora defines public diplomacy as “*the development and maintenance of a country’s soft power of persuasion and attraction.*”¹² This circumvents the contradiction between home and external publics, and it is all-encompassing in that it covers all forms of activities that add to such power, ranging from the country’s image, to its culture, education and media sectors, and to some extent even its economic influence. For Nye, soft power should be deployable, i.e. used to a purpose. But in most situations such ‘power’ cannot be mobilised at will. British royalty and the glitz of Paris add to tourism pull, but neither helps much in selling the perspective of these countries in world affairs.

Mark Leonard, who heads The Foreign Policy Centre in London offers a different approach, segmenting public diplomacy into three sets of activities: news management, strategic communication and relationship building.¹³ This is a practical approach, but leaves out other areas such as culture, education and the image. But for Leonard, two-way interaction between the disseminator and the

⁷ Wilton Park Conference, Report of Wilton Park Conference WPS06/21 (2006) Public Diplomacy: Key Challenges and Priorities. 10–12 March 2006. Available at: <https://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/wps06-21-report.pdf> (Accessed March 2016).

⁸ Garson, R. (2007) ‘Canada’s Foreign Ministry: Online and Interactive’, in Rana, K. S. and Kurbalija, J. (eds.) Foreign Ministries: Managing Diplomatic Networks and Optimizing Value. Geneva: DiploFoundation, pp. 212–24.

⁹ Andrić, M. et al. (2012) ‘Public diplomacy in Croatia: Sharing NATO and EU values with domestic publics’, *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 7, no.12, pp. 483-497.

¹⁰ Gregory Payne, “Public Engagement Essentials,” PowerPoint Presentation, edited by Robin Low. [<http://www.slideshare.net/robinlow/public-engagement-essentials>], accessed June 2016

¹¹ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2005).

¹² Jozef Batora, “Public Diplomacy in Small and Medium-Sized States: Norway and Canada,” *Clingendael Discussion Papers in Diplomacy*, 2005. [http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20050300_cli_paper_dip_issue97.pdf], accessed March 2016.

¹³ Mark Leonard, et al., *Public Diplomacy* (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2002)

audience is key. US scholar Nicholas J. Cull takes a practical approach and sets out five components of public diplomacy, namely: a) listening b) advocacy c) cultural diplomacy d) student exchange and e) international broadcasting.¹⁴ This kind of definition provides a basis for action.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND PROPAGANDA : Propaganda is seen today as a pejorative word, but that was not always the case. Communist states had 'propaganda departments' in their ruling parties that handled what we would today call public communications. Even today, some public diplomacy actions take on the character of propaganda. We noted above the definition employed by Prof. Geoff R. Berridge, who treats all government-directed public diplomacy actions as propaganda, but that view is not widely endorsed. Some hold that a key difference between the two is that public diplomacy listens to feedback from its target audience, foreign or domestic.¹⁵ But can we really say that all public diplomacy actions by democracies, such as state-funded radio or TV broadcasts, live up to that axiom?

We thus see that public diplomacy has several elements:

- * It covers activities that address publics and other non-state entities, at home and abroad, advocating the home country's viewpoint on external issues.
- * The initiators of public diplomacy may be governments, but also non-official actors that contribute to external activity, be it tourism, media, education organisations or other fields.¹⁶
- * Public agencies have a special responsibility to understand their audience and pay heed to what they wish. The BBC is a good example via its many feedback channels. Civil society agents are good channels.
- * The way the country is perceived abroad is its external image; countries are increasingly concerned over their 'brand image' and work to improve it.
- * The broadest definition includes the country's foreign relationships and outreach to all non-state partners. This covers most contemporary mainstream diplomatic activity, which perhaps over-expands the concept of public diplomacy.

¹⁴ Nicholas J. Cull, "Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616 (March 2008), pp. 31-54.

¹⁵ John Brown, "Public Diplomacy and Propaganda: Their differences," *American Diplomacy*, September 2008. [http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2008/0709/comm/brown_pudiplprop.html], accessed March 2016.

¹⁶ An interesting example of a non-governmental action is an India-Pakistan campaign conducted by the largest print media groups of the two countries, Aaman ki Asha, now about five years old.

Simple definitions work best. An Australian think tank says: “Public diplomacy is diplomacy directed at the public, rather than governments of foreign countries, to shape opinion in those countries in a way that furthers policy objectives.”¹⁷

In comparative terms, public diplomacy has received limited attention in Asian countries, with the exception of Australia¹⁸ and China¹⁹, though the situation is improving. In Beijing, Professor Wang Yiwei delivered a lecture at the Foreign Ministry in September 2003 which established a Public Diplomacy Division in March 2004, “to guide and win the understanding and support of the public for foreign policies”, in the words of Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing.²⁰

A Thai scholar has noted that her country’s PD works on “*nation’s branding in order to compete in the competitive global marketplace. The Branding Thailand project was initiated by the Thai Government to find out how people worldwide view the nation’s strengths and weaknesses.*”²¹ Japan devotes USD 500 million on PD: “*some of this budget will go toward establishing what will be called Japan Houses in London, Los Angeles and Sao Paulo... It would seem, however, that the Japan House initiative is the work that embassies and Japan Foundations are already doing, cultivating pundits and politicians and ensuring that they get the correct history and proper maps.*”²²

Indonesia provides an example of a country struggling to utilise public diplomacy effectively. According to Benjamin Davis, “*Indonesia is losing the public diplomacy battle. You only need to look at how most Australians view Indonesia – through the prism of security, beef sagas, terrorism, natural disasters, and drug smugglers – to see the vacuum left when a country does little to promote itself to the outside world. What Indonesia should do is take*

¹⁷ Lowy Institute, *Australia’s Diplomatic Deficit: Reinvesting in our instruments of international policy* (Sydney: Lowy Institute, 2009): 30

¹⁸ For example, the Australian government has published its Public Diplomacy Strategy (Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2014) and maintains a web page about the topic (Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, n.d.).

¹⁹ For more information, see Yiwei Wang, “Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power,” *ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616, no. 1 (2008): 257-273.

²⁰ Yiwei Wang, “Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power,” *ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* 616, no. 1 (2008): 257-273.

²¹ Krittinee Nuttavuthisit, “Branding Thailand: Correcting the negative image of sex tourism,” *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* 3 (2007): 21-30.

²² Jeff Kingston, “Japan’s public diplomacy is expensive and errant,” *The Japan Times*, 14 February 2015. [<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/02/14/commentary/japans-public-diplomacy-expensive-errant/#.VvPDVceih0I>], accessed March 2016.

a leaf out of China's book and join the charm offensive war being battled out by other global and regional powers.”²³

UNINTENTIONAL PUBLIC DIPLOMACY : The idea of 'unintentional' public diplomacy was advanced, for instance when Korean K-Pop artists or the cuisine of Thailand become hallmarks of identity and re-frame a national image. Some thought that not all ministries in a government are aware of their PD function; improved horizontal communication is needed to ensure their inclusion. We learnt that Poland had created a regional network of centres where international affairs are discussed. Ireland's 2015 'Global Irish' programme was an instance of outreach to its diaspora. Mongolia appoints leading sports figures as cultural envoys for the country. At the ground level, embassies could work with their diaspora for effective low-cost PD. ICT also provides methods for low-cost PD.

3. Objectives of public diplomacy

The two principal targets of public diplomacy are home publics, and the publics and non-state agencies of foreign countries. Let us first consider the home targets.

At home, public diplomacy has several inter-linked objectives.

* The government wants people and different home institutions, including think tanks, academia and other stakeholders, **to support the country's foreign policy goals**. This can become important if a delicate negotiation is underway. The foreign ministry then wants to pre-empt the other side from winning over home publics, to favour the other country's position. There is thus both an offensive and a defensive purpose.²⁴ All the official and non-official agencies that contribute to external affairs can be seen as a '**national diplomatic system**'.²⁵ It may also be useful to get the support of those engaged in track-two or track-three activities directed at foreign countries, often

²³ Benjamin Davis, "Is Indonesia losing the race?" The Jakarta Post, 25 September 2014. [<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/09/25/is-indonesia-losing-race.html>], accessed March 2016.

²⁴ Gregory Payne, "Public Engagement Essentials."

²⁵ Brian Hocking et al. "Futures for diplomacy: Integrative Diplomacy in the 21st Century," Clingendael Report, no. 1 (2012). [http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20121030_research_melissen.pdf], accessed March 2016.

at neighbours.²⁶ This also helps to attract candidates for the foreign service.

* The government in power seeks **public support to win elections** and remain in office. This can bring controversy to domestic public diplomacy; bringing non-state actors into framing policy can reduce this.

* Foreign ministries also need **support for their budgets** from parliament, public opinion and the finance ministry. Here, too, domestic image becomes important.

* When projecting a particular **image to external publics**, it is vital to first ensure that this image matches the self-perception of the people within the country, for credibility's sake.

Externally, public diplomacy addresses foreign publics in several ways.

* First, it tries to appeal to the **important non-state agencies** - and **individuals** - that influence foreign policy, especially those involved in policy towards one's country. These are: think tanks, political parties, chambers of business and industry and civil society activists. It also includes the scholars who specialise on one's country and region, newspaper commentators and the like.

* The **foreign media** are in a special category, always important as the window through which the foreign publics see the world. Media management and diplomacy has long been a specialised genre of diplomacy.

* The **foreign publics at large** are affected by the stereotyped images that they hold, and they are perhaps the hardest to influence because of their diffused nature and size. Image management is important for tourism and for business relations with external partners.


* **Niche targets** are important, such as students that were educated in the home country, investors to the home country, travel agents, cultural impresarios and members of bilateral friendship societies.

Taken together, the above activities contribute to the external image of the country, which in turn is also connected with the image that the citizens at home have of their own nation and of themselves. Public diplomacy aims to project the best realistic country brand. That brand, in turn, is also an amalgam of the product brands of the country; its rating as a destination for tourism

²⁶Track-two is the non-official process of dialogue with foreign partners, aimed usually at problem resolution. It differs from track-three, which is completely independent of the government, and may even sometimes act in defiance of the government. In contrast track-two is often harmonized with the government and may even be discreetly funded by it.

and business; the stereotypical notions in the minds of foreigners and of the people of the home country; and the different attributes of the country, such as its culture, cinema, writing and all the rest, which all reach out to the external audience. Thus, the image has multiple facets, each rooted in some aspect of the reality of the country. Given international affairs' volatility and vulnerability to crisis, natural or man-made, countries have to be alert to events that may dent their external image.

One can visualise public diplomacy in terms of three classes of elements: 1) advocacy 2) culture and other kinds of functional diplomacy 3) building relationships, which is the most basic component of all. These elements have impact profiles that range from short to long term, as shown in Figure 1.



Culture is a key element of public diplomacy, but many prefer to view it as a stand-alone activity, long an essential component of diplomacy. Integrating it into public diplomacy does not minimise its importance, but offers a holistic perspective to assess its value and impact. It includes exchanges of performing artistes, exhibitions and a wide range of actions among agents working in this area. Two relatively new elements are 'festivals' that are held over several months or even a year (pioneered by India and the UK with a 'Festival of India' held in 1982-83), and long-term exchanges between museums (as established in 2015 between China and Italy).

What of the economic dimension of foreign policy? Globalisation has meant that world economic issues figure prominently in domestic debates. Whether it is the topics under discussion at the World Trade Organization, or the signing of free trade agreements, double taxation and investment protection agreements, or even air traffic accords with foreign countries, these can all attract notice in the national media. At the same time, all these subjects also

involve inter-ministry dialogue in which think tanks, the media and business associations take keen interest. Moreover, most countries now treat trade and investment as the central task of their diplomatic missions.

This requires that officials handling economic issues develop a keen awareness of the public dimension, both to reach out to a wide array of actors to sensitise them on the country's position and also to bring these non-state actors into the consultation process, listening to them in the formulation of decisions. Many ministries now treat public diplomacy as integral to their work. Further, when decisions are to be made, it becomes essential to factor into the potential options the probable public impact of the proposed action. That in turn involves active engagement with the above non-state actors in order to obtain favourable support for these actions. By the same token, it is also useful to engage the publics of these countries on major issues involving foreign countries.

4. Application of public diplomacy and image management

We may examine the way different governments and foreign ministries handle their public diplomacy activities and extrapolate from this a good working definition of public diplomacy:

- * Foreign ministries often take the lead in working with other agencies in projecting a coherent and consistent image and message, be it in relation to tourism promotion or mobilisation of trade and investments. Governments that do not practise this miss the opportunity to synergise and get a bigger bang for the buck.

- * Image projection works best when many non-state actors join the marketing effort. The foreign ministry can provide leadership and coordination even when such agencies are not answerable to the government; they can usually be persuaded to see the holistic task and their self-interest in cooperation. The foreign ministries in France and UK run public diplomacy boards where different agencies meet periodically to coordinate actions. This deserves emulation.

- * When a branding or re-branding is carried out, public private partnerships are very useful. This was India's experience, overcoming the problems in

running such a state-financed fund when it handed over the fund's operation to a leading industry association.²⁷

* The USA is the leading user of public diplomacy as an instrument to reshape the way foreign publics respond to US foreign policy, in particular in the Arab and Islamic worlds. It devotes vast resources to its public diplomacy campaign and includes in its arsenal TV networks such as Al Hurrah, radio stations and a range of other outreach activities. A missing element in the US effort initially was that it did not sufficiently listen to foreign publics.

* China has long used public diplomacy as an instrument of domestic outreach, primarily using its impressive Internet penetration. For this country, multi-layered dialogue with the Chinese people is a way of conveying to them the official interpretation of international affairs and giving publics a safety valve for venting their views in the expectation that these would be taken into account in shaping official policy. One example is the highly sensitive relationship with Japan. Some believe that with over 40% of the population very active in using blogs, tweets and other social media – and the number continues to grow – netizens have emerged as a powerful new element that exerts pressure even on its own government. Recent policy actions indicate that the Chinese government sometimes listens to its publics.

* India set up a Public Diplomacy Division in its Ministry of External Affairs in 2006, but it was only in 2009 that this unit swung into effective public outreach, both in the foreign and domestic spheres. It organised the country's first ever conference on public diplomacy issues, to which major international public diplomacy scholars were invited to sensitise public opinion.²⁸ The Ministry of External Affairs uses the Internet and social media tools creatively to engage in domestic public diplomacy.²⁹ Its special strength is the extensive use of social media via platforms that China shuns, e.g. Facebook and Twitter. The ministry's app guide to embassies and passport offices has 100 000 downloads. Indian universities do not, as yet, offer any courses on public diplomacy, unlike China, where academic backing for public diplomacy studies is strong.

²⁷ The India Brand Equity Fund is a partnership between the country's leading industry body CII and the Indian Ministry of Commerce. Until this partnership was established in 1999, the Fund, set up four years earlier, had remained non-operational.

²⁸ Kishan S. Rana, "Re-setting India's public diplomacy," *Business Standard*, 16 January 2011. [http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/kishan-s-rana-re-setting-india-s-public-diplomacy-111011600021_1.html], accessed March 2016.

²⁹ For more information, see its website: www.indiandiplomacy.in.

* Iran has a public diplomacy unit in its foreign ministry. It has been especially active in countering social media actions by its dissidents with its own online stream of counter-actions. That (and comparable experiences in Egypt and the Philippines, of course each in their own context) shows that social media or ICT is not a magic bullet that automatically empowers the masses against bad governance or dictatorial regimes.

* Sri Lanka, which exterminated the LTTE movement in 2010 with harsh military action and has yet to find balance in dealing with its disaffected Tamil ethnic minority, shows a different picture: a regime that faces strong international criticism over its actions and yet does not turn to public diplomacy to explain its own stance, either because public diplomacy does not find favour with its government, or because of other inhibitions.³⁰

We thus note that countries pursue public diplomacy in different ways to suit their own requirements, or misuse it, or sometimes even seem ignorant of its potential. We see that foreign ministries tend to define public diplomacy narrowly, covering the activities, often in partnership with other agencies that reach out to foreign and home actors in the non-governmental sectors. These ministries seek to tell their stories and influence the ways in which they and their countries are perceived. The very wide definition of public diplomacy to cover all forms of outreach aimed at non-state actors is probably too encompassing to be of practical utility in the conduct of concrete activities.

Country images are sometimes polarised, between exaggerated positives or an excess of negatives, while the reality is often in between. Another related idea was that listening is not enough, and that upon receiving a message or a set of impressions from foreign publics one should engage in action to produce a response. Some emphasised a need to analyse how we ourselves approach 'the other', i.e. our need to reflect deeper on our own self-image.

5. Public diplomacy methods

Is it essential for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to have a special unit

³⁰ This observation is based on remarks by a senior retired Sri Lankan diplomat at a 2013 conference; she said that no one seems interested in either public diplomacy actions or image management to project the country in better light.

for public diplomacy activity? In all but the very smallest foreign ministries, it makes sense to have a dedicated unit for this work, which often involves no more than regrouping and re-labelling of the unit and its tasks.

When we look at the operational methods for public diplomacy we also observe that public diplomacy departments typically handle the work in terms of the Manheim or Nye definitions with which we began this chapter.³¹ Public diplomacy divisions do not typically handle cultural diplomacy or education outreach; an official spokesperson and a support unit usually handle foreign affairs media management, which may be separate from the public diplomacy unit. At the same time, the foreign ministry may have a mechanism for handling outreach to the home partners that handle tourism, education and radio/TV broadcasts – this is image management in the sense of the Leonard definition.³²

All foreign ministry officials need public diplomacy orientation, regardless of the tasks they handle. This entails training in public diplomacy work for all officials, as a branch of diplomatic skill development. Special practice-oriented courses at the mid-career level are especially worthwhile.

Feasible public diplomacy actions include:

- * Mobilising one's think tanks and other institutions for outreach to counterparts; they often need financial support, as well as good interconnections with the MFA, so as to improve their work. In many developing countries, new think tanks have to be built up, often with government support. But to be effective, they need autonomy in functioning and eventually other means of financial support. ASEAN has done well in helping its new members to develop think tanks specialising in international affairs.

- * Reaching out to potential non-official allies in foreign countries through networked diplomacy, as a mirror to the above. Eminent person groups are a good method for such bilateral networking, as used by China, India, Singapore, Thailand and others.³³

³¹ See Jarol B. Manheim, *Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy: The Evolution of Influence*; and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*.

³² See Mark Leonard, et al., *Public Diplomacy*.

³³ Kishan S. Rana, "Beyond diplomacy 101," *Business Standard*, 25 December 2010. [http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/kishan-s-rana-beyond-diplomacy-101-110122500001_1.html], accessed March 2016.

* Parliamentary groups abroad are especially important targets, though such a policy can be pursued only in relation to major countries when issues of major importance are involved. Nurturing such contacts attracts increased attention and involves careful planning.

* The Internet is as useful to home as to foreign audiences. The management of the MFAs web page is too important to be left to specialists, but this, too, is a lesson that spreads rather slowly. A good webpage is not only informative but invites visitors to comment and engage in dialogue. As mentioned above, the Canadians have done especially well in structuring such exchanges, first of all aimed at home audiences. China does the same. We see this at MFA websites such as: Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada,³⁴ Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the UK,³⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore.³⁶

* ‘Town meetings’ and speaking personally to audiences is another useful activity where ministers and senior officials can reach out to publics and explain to them how foreign affairs issues affect them. South Africa is a leader in the use of new methods of home outreach as a result of its unique experience in managing the post-Apartheid transition. They call this process ‘imbizo’, when the government goes to the people to inform them of international developments.

* Reaching out beyond the capital, to different regions and cities in order to achieve a truly national footprint for the MFA.

* Inviting foreign scholars to the home country and looking after them well is especially effective for building long-term relations. China does this through its ‘Thousand Talents’ programme.³⁷

Image management also involves multi-layered home partnerships, for the simple reason that much of the action lies outside the MFA; it may even face difficulty in acting as an overall coordinator. For instance, the tourism brand is much too important to that industry to be handed over to an outside agency,

³⁴ Government of Canada, “Global Affairs Canada,” [<http://www.international.gc.ca/international/index.aspx?lang=eng>], accessed March 2016.

³⁵ Government of the United Kingdom, “Foreign & Commonwealth Office,” [<https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/foreign-commonwealth-office>], accessed March 2016.

³⁶ Singapore Government, “Ministry of Foreign Affairs Singapore,” [<http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/index.html>], accessed March 2016.

³⁷ See <http://1000plan.safea.gov.cn/>.

especially since it is now increasingly seen as one of the biggest producers of employment at home when it is of significant size. The best the MFA can hope for is a seat at the decision-making table and a possibility of integrating tourism marketing with other aspects of country marketing. This means:

- * Tying in together the way the country is marketed for other purposes, be it for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) mobilisation, as a trade partner, or as a destination for education services for foreign students. The goal should be to have balanced coherence between these themes, and to try and synergise them to improve their impact.

- * Getting the notion of service and customer value ingrained in the MFA's own public contacts, i.e. the visa and consular services it delivers. One new phenomenon is that consular services are now seen as a matter of strategic value for the MFA.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND DIASPORA : Harnessing ethnic communities in foreign countries to play a role in their local context in favour of the home country is a method first employed by Israel and emulated by others in the developing world, including India.³⁸ While this may not be feasible as overt activity in all situations – outside the Western countries such communities often cannot play a political role – diasporas are often influential and are excellent sources for information on the local scene. Diasporas can also provide a marketing ‘springboard’ for companies from the home country, eventually opening up new markets.³⁹

Some Western countries are now learning to use ‘reverse diplomacy’ to use ethnic communities in their country to better connect with their original home countries, adding to the diversity of their diplomatic services and appointing them as ambassadors. Visiting India in January 2015, US President Obama announced an ‘Indian Diaspora Initiative’ with this aim.⁴⁰ Since 1916, Switzerland has had an Organisation of the Swiss Abroad (OSA) that runs a series of programmes and also focuses on connecting the youth with the home country.⁴¹

³⁸ See Kishan S. Rana, “Diaspora Diplomacy,” *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 4, no. 3 (2009): 361-372.

³⁹ Nirmalya Kumar and Jan-Benedict E. M. Steenkamp, “Diaspora Marketing,” *Harvard Business Review*, October 2013. [<https://hbr.org/2013/10/diaspora-marketing>], accessed March 2016.

⁴⁰ USAID, “New initiative announced to enable diaspora investment in India’s development,” [press release] USAID, 26 January 2015. [<https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/jan-26-2015-new-initiative-announced-enable-diaspora-investment-indias>], accessed March 2016.

⁴¹ Organisation of the Swiss Abroad, “Home,” [<http://www.aso.ch/en>], accessed March 2016.

Domestic engagement of public attracts attention. The best kind of PD begins at home and domestic support for foreign policy is crucial. In the process of listening, one must establish a mechanism for receiving responses from publics on PD actions; one method is analysing trends on the social media; this becomes active listening. But one also has to be cautious in this, taking into account the profile of social media users, especially in developing countries, and consider alternative ways of accessing the opinion of those that do not access the Internet. Officials dealing with domestic PD partners also need sensitivity in how they handle contact with them. The diaspora should be viewed as important stakeholders in the country's PD, and countries should be sensitive to their viewpoints and interests.

6. Limits of public diplomacy

Public diplomacy is not a magic bullet that can overcome the deficits of bad foreign policy, as perceived by foreign publics, or transform the image of a pariah dictatorship. The Vienna Convention of 1961 lays down basic rules of international discourse and, while its limits are today being stretched, aggressive public diplomacy directed at foreign publics runs the risk of being viewed as interference in internal affairs of foreign states. Consider the following:

Not all home non-state actors are amenable to following official public diplomacy guidelines; they have to be treated with respect for their autonomy – that applies especially to the media.

- * Major public diplomacy campaigns can be expensive. Some countries are content not to have an elaborate public diplomacy strategy.

- * Country image marketers resemble advertising and PR companies, or are in fact marketers that are intent on selling their services with lavish promises.

- * Public diplomacy cannot change basic attitudes of others, unless what is being projected is in alignment with the interests and/or the needs of the target audience. Voice of America, with its attacks on communism and even its legendary 'jazz hour,' managed to undermine the Soviet empire mainly because of the internal failure of that system.

- * Hard public diplomacy may blend into propaganda. The USA failed to neutralize the success of Al Jazeera with its own Al Hurrah; its complaints to Qatar (Al Jazeera's home base) also did not work.

* Involving one's diaspora in public diplomacy can backfire if one transgresses diplomatic norms to the point where such activity is viewed as interference in another country's domestic affairs, such as during an election in that foreign state. Some diaspora groups may not be sympathetic to the policies of their countries of origin.

Noted public diplomacy guru Philip Seib writes:

"...emphasising a brand for a country can be self-defeating. A nation is not a soft drink, and public diplomacy planners will find themselves getting little return on their efforts if they are satisfied with mere imagery. ...The purpose of public diplomacy is to advance the strategic interests of the country that is employing it. Goals must be precise and well-defined."⁴²

Thus **good public diplomacy will have a clear sense of achievable goals and a strategy to attain these, involving a full range of home and foreign stakeholders based on their capacity and willingness to contribute.**

7. Asia and Europe: public diplomacy challenges

What are some of the public diplomacy issues in Asia-Europe relations? Is there an Asian approach? One might consider the following:

* Asia knows individual European states well, by virtue of historical legacy, and contemporary images of the leading states. But awareness of the smaller states and of a collective European identity is muted, especially among publics, leaving out the elites.

* Unlike the USA and even the Russian Federation, Europe as a whole is not perceived to attach high political value to Asia, whereas the other two great powers are in effect Asian powers as well, the USA by virtue of its trans-Pacific identity, while the Russian Federation attaches increasing weight to its Far East territories.

* In the media, considerable potential exists for more exchanges in both

⁴² Philip Seib, "Public Diplomacy's branding trap," The World Post, 19 March 2014. [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/philip-seib/public-diplomacy-branding_b_4615791.html], accessed March 2016.

directions. Public understanding needs to be deepened.

* In the education sector, exchanges between individual Asian and European countries have grown, but there exists untapped potential for more students to go from one region to the other, building long-term links. Asian youth perceive language problems, sometimes unaware that continental European universities increasingly offer courses in English, and that tuition fees there tend to be lower than at comparable foreign institutions.

* Tourism exchanges are very strong in both directions, but can be expanded further. Not all Asian countries are as effective as they could be in their tourism promotion.

8. Public diplomacy in international affairs

What are the key requirements for successful public diplomacy? It should include:

* Dialogue entails listening to others, not just pushing one's own message. Public diplomacy simply does not work if listening is left out.

* That also means that one should be prepared to undergo change; it is not enough to imagine that my side will transform the others. With great powers, that element is often missing.

* Public diplomacy advisers should be brought in at the policy-making stage, not just to 'sell' a pre-cooked policy. This is because the language of decisions, and some of the content, may need adapting to take into account the public diplomacy angle. In the UK, every proposal going to the minister must spell out the likely public impact of the proposal.

* Public diplomacy is a long-term process and calls for patience.

* Public diplomacy actions operate in a wide framework of perceptions and images that are influenced by multiple factors — many of which are outside the influence of governments — which conditions the result.

The emergence of public diplomacy as a subject of study acknowledges the importance of multiple actors, especially non-state agencies, in relation to foreign affairs. These non-state agencies were never absent, but their influence and legitimacy have grown. The diplomatic process has therefore become more open and inclusive. That is one key dimension of this sub-discipline and the lesson that public diplomacy offers.

5-POINT SUMMARY

1

The uses and definition of public diplomacy have evolved since the early 20th century into a complex concept with linkages to domestic publics, soft power and interaction with other fields and actors in diplomacy.

3

Every country's public diplomacy strategy is unique and depends on its requirements.

5

Ultimately, the success of public diplomacy hinges on dialogue, flexibility, patience and partnerships.

2

An important goal of public diplomacy is to project an optimal country brand.

4

An important element in public diplomacy is to work with a wide range of non-state actors.

INTERVIEW

“HISTORY, TRADE, MEMORIES ARE ON OUR SIDE”

Mongolian Foreign Affairs Minister Lundeg Purevsuren has brought a lot of energy into the ASEM process, since his country offered to host the 11th ASEM Summit (ASEM 11) in Ulaanbaatar. But can such a summit be a successful public diplomacy operation? And how to make sure Mongolia will benefit from it? On 8 May 2016, he answered Richard Werly's questions at his ministry, after a three-day training on Asia-Europe public diplomacy.

Q: Public diplomacy-wise, can ASEM be managed more effectively, shedding more light on the Asia-Europe dialogue beyond formal summits or ministerial meetings?

A: That is certainly Mongolia's calculation and ambition. Don't forget we are sitting here, in Ulaanbaatar, on one of the most ancient links between Asia and Europe: the famous Silk Road. That makes us, Mongolians, particularly prone to promote exchanges between the two continents. Our ancestors, a long time ago, reached Europe and transformed the whole continent. They established trade routes, trade links. A flow of cultural goods followed through. Ongoing archaeological excavations continue to prove that Asia and Europe have been trading and exchanging forever. So why can't we make a good public diplomacy campaign out of this? History,

PUREVSUREN Lundeg
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Mongolia

trade, memories are on our side. We have a formidable cultural arsenal! The Asia-Europe dialogue and the ASEM process perpetuate a very long and productive tradition.

Q: ASEM is a forum and can also serve as a tool to promote more exchanges. Don't you think civil societies can be more involved?

A: The involvement of civil societies in Asia and Europe shall certainly be a key component of a concerted ASEM public diplomacy effort. What matters is, at first, to make sure people on both continents are properly informed on what the ASEM process is all about, and do understand what their respective countries can get out of this informal process. Another field where I believe the ASEM process could prove useful, is the religious dialogue. We live at a time of severe religious turbulences. Mongolia, where all religions co-exist peacefully, is determined to help foster a better understanding between religious communities. But your question raises, as well, the importance of a follow-up mechanism. Involving civil societies means holding events, organising forums, holding exhibitions, reaching out to universities, students, media... and that can only be done adequately if ASEM keeps track of all these initiatives.

Q: In short, more active coordination is needed?

A: Certainly. Once again, advocacy and outreach campaigns need coordination. If you want to be efficient, you need a professional follow-up. Let me try to clarify also here what could be done in terms of public diplomacy. If we want to promote the Asia-Europe dialogue, and the ASEM process, we should aim at the future. Slogans, logos, initiatives, festivals, symposiums should focus on what ASEM can bring in the coming decades, and how this ASEM mission is a continuation of centuries of Asia-Europe cooperation. ASEM will be more visible if we manage to present it as something different than a traditional multilateral forum. Public diplomacy needs solid grounds to take-off. So let us ask the main question: What do we have to “sell”? More trade, a long history of Asia-Europe relations, fantastic heritage, mutual tourism attraction, universities exchanges...Peace remains, also, an asset we have to promote. One more recommendation: we shall never forget the word “public” in public diplomacy. Let us focus more on what we, governments, can do to deliver concrete Asia-Europe goods to our people.

Q: The ASEM summit format, with a leaders retreat and a focus on informal dialogue, is nevertheless not easy to sell, communication-wise. How can this obstacle be overcome?

A: The simple fact that leaders from 51 countries and two regional organisations accept to meet every two years to sit and discuss behind closed doors is a huge achievement! I would say that our public diplomacy efforts should focus on this «human interaction» side of ASEM. ASEM is about representatives of Asia and Europe talking, sitting, exchanging, eventually disagreeing. The ASEM retreat format is essential. Where else can Asia and Europe meet and frankly

share their concerns about the world? We have also discussed, at the recent Luxembourg ministerial meeting, the idea of an ASEM day to ensure public awareness through events, ceremonies or open discussions. We all know that there are plenty of official days, commemorating this and that. But celebrating the Asia-Europe dialogue can be an excellent way to promote mutual understanding. From music to cooking, from architecture to technology innovation. Our two continents have a lot to offer.

Q: There is one fashionable term these days: connectivity. Does it summarise well the challenges and the bonds between Asia and Europe?

A: If connectivity means the need for more dialogue, more infrastructure and a greater flow of information, goods and knowledge between our two continents, I would answer, yes! Connectivity also reminds us of the need to open our doors, not to take shelter behind our borders. I like this word because it summarises the need to remain mutually open, without abdicating our own national spirit and personality. Plus, connectivity means concrete changes for people. Once the highway between Asia and Europe will be in operation, the world economy will change. Maritime trade between Rotterdam and Shanghai presently takes around a month and that duration could be cut down to two weeks. Tourism will also benefit. But let us be careful not to associate connectivity too much with the digital economy. Connectivity between Asia and Europe shall not be about screens and software. It shall go through people. ASEM is definitely about people to people connectivity.

CHAPTER 2:

THE CHANGING FACE OF ASIA-EUROPE RELATIONS

Ronan LENIHAN

Abstract

This chapter focuses on the changing face of Asia-Europe relations and provides the broader context within which public diplomacy in the two continents operates. It first explores the history of relations between Asia and Europe, from the ancient Silk Road to the post-World War II period. Asia-Europe relations are entrenched in a long history that has had a significant impact on the perceptions held by the publics of the two continents. This history therefore needs to be considered when designing a public diplomacy strategy. The recent process of regional integration in both Europe and Southeast Asia, as well as China's opening up, has further changed the context of Asia-Europe relations.

The chapter pays specific attention to the establishment and evolution of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process. ASEM is an informal process of dialogue and cooperation that aims to bridge the two continents. The chapter dives into ASEM's background, structure and its growing membership. Ultimately, the future direction of ASEM will depend on membership decisions, discussions on the need for a secretariat, and efforts to make the institution more dynamic and visible.

Finally, the chapter provides an overview of three key areas of cooperation: trade, security and the environment, to give readers the tools to better understand the public diplomacy scene in and between Asia and Europe. Economic concerns are currently dominating relations between Asia and Europe, while domestic and international pressure on security issues is growing. Environmental cooperation is also an emerging area of relations between the two continents.

Please check the 5-point summary as well at the end of this chapter.

1. A brief history of Asia-Europe relations

Asia and Europe are inextricably linked: first and foremost through their rich historical ties; geographically through the sharing of the vast Eurasian continent; and culturally through the deep cross-cultural ties that have sustained and enriched the relationship over time. These relations encompass periods of expansion and conquest, economic opportunity and interdependence, colonial influences and conflict, and present day relations. The history of the Asia-Europe relationship is essential in understanding the motivations that bring Asia and Europe closer today.

The most obvious place to start examining the rich connections between these two regions is the ancient Silk Road, where commerce and culture mixed for many centuries along the vast network of trading routes crossing the Eurasian continent.¹ These meeting points over land were coupled with the ports along the maritime Silk Route that stretched from China through Southeast and South Asia into the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Goods, cultures and ideas were exchanged at meeting points along the Silk Road, known as caravanserais.² Long before the creation of the Westphalian system of states, the Silk Road was controlled, influenced and operated by various powers, from the Han Dynasty, through the Hellenic and Roman eras, to the Muslim Caliphate and the Mongols.

During the Mongol era, renowned Italian explorer Marco Polo's experiences

¹ In fact, the Chinese government is attempting to re-invigorate the Silk Road with the 'One Belt, One Road' infrastructural initiative. The project ultimately aims for "closer coordination of economic development policies, harmonisation of technical standards for infrastructure, removal of investment and trade barriers, establishment of free trade areas, financial cooperation and people-to-people bonds involving cultural and academic exchanges, personnel exchanges and cooperation, media cooperation, youth and women exchanges, and volunteer services." (Hofman, 2015).

² See UNESCO, "Caravanserais," [<http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/dialogue/routes-of-dialogue/silk-road/caravanserais/>], accessed March 2016.

on the Silk Road were documented in the much-discussed work, *Wonders of the World*, published around 1300. Marco Polo was by no means the only European to venture across Asia, but his stories were widely read, and to this day his name is synonymous with Asia-Europe relations. There are fewer records of Asian powers and explorers from that time experiencing Europe. This is due in part to the fact that the Europeans were motivated in their explorations by the desire to profit from better ties and understanding of Asia. Despite the influence of the Mongols in Eastern Europe, the ventures of famous East Asian explorers such as Zheng He and later Tamaka Shosuke into contemporary Europe were limited.

Between 1 CE and 1820 CE, the world's economic centre of gravity was fairly balanced between east and west, moving slowly between the modern-day South Asian and Central Asian states of Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and into Kazakhstan in close proximity to two key trails on the Silk Road.³

As shown in Figure 1, wealth began to shift dramatically towards Europe and North America during the 19th and early 20th centuries. This was due in part to the Industrial Revolution and the rapid urbanisation brought about by the industrial age in Europe and North America. It was not until the post-World War II period in 1950 that the centre of gravity began to shift back from west to east. This shift began a rapid acceleration that is predicted to bring the world's economic centre of gravity back to Asia by 2025.

From 1000 CE to 1800 CE, Asia was an economic powerhouse with, on average, almost two thirds of global GDP.⁴ This period saw immense trade between Asia and Europe; in particular, the spice and silk trade between the two continents resulted in major competition and expansionary visions from the European powers to get greater access across Asia. European powers exerted their influence throughout Asia with the Spanish, Portuguese and Dutch setting up trading routes and posts across South and Southeast Asia. France, Great Britain, Germany and others stretched their trading interests towards Northeast Asia. As many as eight European powers retained concession areas in the city of Tientsin in China following the end of the Boxer Rebellion in 1901.

³Richard Dobbs et al. *Urban Worlds: Cities and the Rise of the Consuming Class*. (McKinsey & Company, June 2012). [http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/urbanization/urban_world_cities_and_the_rise_of_the_consuming_class], accessed March 2016.


⁴Richard Dobbs et al., *Urban Worlds: Cities and the Rise of the Consuming Class* (McKinsey & Company, June 2012). [http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/urbanization/urban_world_cities_and_the_rise_of_the_consuming_class], accessed March 2016.

FIGURE 1: EVOLUTION OF THE EARTH'S ECONOMIC CENTRE OF GRAVITY, 1 CE TO 2025 CE⁵

Exhibit 3

By far the most rapid shift in the world's economic center of gravity happened in 2000–10, reversing previous decades of development

Evolution of the earth's economic center of gravity¹
AD 1 to 2025



1 Economic center of gravity is calculated by weighting locations by GDP in three dimensions and projected to the nearest point on the earth's surface. The surface projection of the center of gravity shifts north over the course of the century, reflecting the fact that in three-dimensional space America and Asia are not only “nest” to each other, but also “across” from each other.

SOURCE: McKinsey Global Institute analysis using data from Angus Maddison; University of Groningen

The European interest in East Asia continued until just before the turn of the last century with the end of the United Kingdom’s 148-year lease of Hong Kong and the end of the Portuguese administration over Macau in 1999. France, the Netherlands, Portugal and the UK faced anti-colonial and pro-independence conflicts in the years following World War II. The colonial memory in Southeast Asia continues to play a role in modern Asia-Europe relations.

2. Moving towards the modern era

The post-World War II period across Asia saw changes in leadership, with many countries going through an era of nation and institution building. In

⁵ Dobbs et al., 2012, p. 17.

terms of Asia-Europe relations, this period was marked by the increasing role of regional organisations and groupings. Some major factors in modern diplomatic relations between Asia and Europe originate from this period, including the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958, the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1968, and the opening of relations with the People's Republic of China. Here we look more closely at ASEAN-EEC relations and wider Europe-China relations in the lead up to the establishment of ASEM.

2.1. ASEAN-EEC/EU relations

Regular institutional contact between ASEAN and the EEC was established between 1968 and 1980. The first formal meeting between ASEAN and the EEC took place on 16 June 1972. In September 1974, both partners released a statement following an informal meeting between the European Commission and ASEAN's trade ministers agreeing to develop and intensify the dialogue between the two sides and explore areas of cooperation. The relations between the two groups further developed during the 1970s, culminating with the signing of the ASEAN-EEC Cooperation Agreement in March 1980, which was a comprehensive framework to cover commercial, economic and technical assistance.⁶

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, ASEAN-EEC relations were characterised by disputes regarding human rights issues among others. These diplomatic tensions often raised the 'Asian Values' debate, as espoused by prominent ASEAN leaders of the era. The situation in East Timor and Portugal's objection to Indonesia's occupation of the island led to further tensions until the issue was converted into a bilateral one between Indonesia and Portugal outside of ASEAN-EU, with the UN as a mediator.⁷

2.2. Europe-China relations

Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the

⁶ For a concise history of EU-ASEAN relations see Paul Lim, "ASEAN's Relations with the EU: Obstacles and Opportunities," *EU External Affairs Review* (July 2012): 46-58. [http://www.global-europe.org/articles_pdf/9287567-review-issue02_lim_july2012.pdf], accessed March 2016.

⁷ David Camroux, *The European Union and ASEAN: Two to Tango?* Notre Europe Studies and Research, no. 65, 2008. [<http://www.notre-europe.eu/media/etude65eu-asean-en.pdf?pdf=ok>], accessed March 2016.

relationship between Asia's largest country and its European partners has experienced a number of changes. Between 1949 and 1978, European countries gradually resumed diplomatic relations with China; Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland and Finland all established diplomatic relations as early as 1950. Other landmark events included French President Georges Pompidou's visit to China in 1973, the first such visit by a Western head of state. Shortly after, in 1975, following the visit of European Commissioner Sir Christopher Soames, the EEC and China established diplomatic relations. China's opening up in the late 1970s and early 1980s under Deng Xiaoping saw relations move from strength to strength with numerous bilateral meetings and agreements, culminating in the Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation signed between the EEC and China in 1985.⁸

Relations were strained in 1989, following the Tiananmen incident, as the EEC froze relations with China and imposed a number of sanctions, including an arms embargo. By 1992, relations started to improve once again with the establishment of the 'new bilateral political dialogue'⁹, preparations for the first ASEM summit in 1996, and the EU-China Summit meetings that started in London in 1998. In late 2013, the EU and China started negotiating a landmark investment treaty, and these negotiations are still ongoing.

3. ASEM background

ASEM is an informal process of dialogue and cooperation bringing together the 28 EU member states, 2 European countries, and the European Union with 21 Asian countries and the ASEAN Secretariat. The ASEM dialogue addresses political, economic and cultural issues in a spirit of mutual respect and equal partnership, with the overall aim of strengthening the relationship between the two regions. Although the joint statements and recommendations produced

⁸ More information about European-Chinese relations can be found in David Shambaugh, *China and Europe: 1949-1995* (London: School of Oriental & African Studies, 1996); and Michael Yahuda, "The Sino-European Encounter: Historical Influences on Contemporary Relations," in David Schambaugh, Eberhard Sandschneider and Zhou Hong [eds.], *China-Europe Relations* (London: Routledge, 2008): pp. 13-32.

⁹ The EU-China dialogue is based on political dialogue, economic and sectoral dialogues, and people-to-people dialogue (launched in 2012). In addition, the Human Rights Dialogue was launched in 1995. The architecture of the EU-China Dialogue can be found here: [http://eeas.europa.eu/china/docs/eu_china_dialogues_en.pdf] (European External Action Service, n.d.), accessed March 2016.

by ASEM are non-binding, and therefore have limited legal value, ASEM does facilitate dialogue as a platform for continuous discussion among governments. As a result, ASEM is known for its unique informality, multi-dimensionality and its dual focus on both high level and people-to-people dialogues.


Established in 1996, ASEM originally consisted of 15 EU member states and 7 ASEAN member states plus China, Japan, Korea and the European Commission. It was set up as a means to provide an informal dialogue platform for Asian and European countries to meet. Its origins lay in a mutual recognition, in both Asia and Europe, that the relationship between the two regions needed to be strengthened, reflecting the new global context of the 1990s and the perspectives of the upcoming new century.

Initial steps towards establishing ASEM included the European Commission policy paper *Towards a New Asia Strategy* published in July 1994, which stressed the importance of modernising Europe's relationship with Asia, and of reflecting properly its political, economic and cultural significance.¹⁰ Following this, at the World Economic Forum of November 1994 in Davos, Switzerland, Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong proposed that an EU-Asia summit meeting should be held to consider how to build a new partnership between the two regions. French President Jacques Chirac emerged as a European champion for ASEM, given his close relationship with Goh Chok Tong and the support of the proposal among fellow EU members.

The motivations for the call to establish ASEM have been much debated, but many have pointed to the global shift towards multi-polarity in the post-Cold War era and the need for the three major 'poles' of global power – the USA, Europe and Asia – to engage with one another. Transatlantic relations between the USA and Europe had been traditionally strong, with the establishment of a formal EU-US summit in Madrid in 1995, not to mention the longer-term dialogue platform of the G7/G8, established in 1975. Meanwhile, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), established in 1989, linked the other two poles across the Pacific.¹¹ The link between Asia and Europe remained to be bridged, thus ASEM helped to complete the triangular system of global power (see Figure 2).

¹⁰ European Commission, *Towards a New Asia Strategy*. Communication from the Commission to the Council. Com (94) 314 final, 13 July 1994. [<http://aei.pitt.edu/2949/1/2949.pdf>], accessed March 2016.

¹¹ The more recently established Trans-Pacific Partnership has further strengthened the Asia-US connection.



From a European perspective, the motivation was the lure of access to the Asian ‘tiger economies’ at the time and the opportunity to improve diplomatic relations with China in particular in a multi-lateral setting, following the fall-out over sanctions imposed post-Tiananmen. On the Asian side, there was an interest in accessing ‘Fortress Europe’ and benefitting from greater connections to the single market. Many scholars of that era argued that the move would also aid Asian powers to push the ‘Asian Values’ debate in external engagement.

Following the initial proposal from Singapore, the first ASEM Summit was held in Bangkok, Thailand in March 1996, marking the beginning of the ASEM process.

3.1. ASEM expansion

Since its inception, ASEM has seen a number of enlargements, summarised in Figure 3. The first enlargement took place during the 5th ASEM Summit in 2004 in Hanoi, Viet Nam, where the ten new EU member states (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) and three new ASEAN countries (Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar) became official parties to the ASEM process.

The introduction of Myanmar was controversial for Europe: EU sanctions over Myanmar's human rights record threatened to derail Myanmar's membership of ASEM. This could have caused a major rift, with ASEAN members calling for the inclusion of all or none of the new members. A compromise was reached with Myanmar's head of state being restricted from attending the summit; instead, Myanmar was represented by Foreign Minister Nyan Win. The EU used the occasion to increase pressure on Myanmar to improve its human rights record and to free Aung San Suu Kyi, who was under house arrest at the time. Mr Bernard Bot, Foreign Minister of the Netherlands (EU presidency holder at the time) said: *"I think it is [...] very important not only to give a political signal to Myanmar itself, but also to other countries participating in this ASEM meeting that the European Union does not condone this behaviour."*¹²

The next round of enlargement took place in 2008 during the 7th ASEM Summit in Beijing, China. This brought in Bulgaria and Romania as new EU members on the European side, while India, Mongolia, Pakistan and the ASEAN Secretariat joined on the Asian side. This increased ASEM membership to 45.

The 7th ASEM Summit came at a pivotal time, during the global financial crisis of 2008. The summit focused on economic stability, and leaders met on the sidelines to discuss the path forward in stabilising the global economic situation. It is widely regarded that ASEM leaders used the opportunity to meet and prepare a joint Asian and European position ahead of the inaugural G20 summit in Washington the following month.¹³

3.2. ASEM's net widens

The next round of expansions took place in October 2010, at the 8th ASEM Summit, where host Belgium welcomed three more member states: Australia, New Zealand and the Russian Federation. This third round of enlargement represented a quandary for ASEM leaders: Should these new members be placed on the Asian side, the European side, or in a separate category? A temporary 'third category' of membership was established for the three new members. The issue was later addressed at the Senior Officials' Meeting in March 2012 in Copenhagen, Denmark, where officials proposed abolishing

¹² BBC News, "EU threatens new Burma sanctions," BBC, 7 October 2004. [<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3723430.stm>], accessed March 2016.

¹³ Mathew Doidge, *The European Union and Interregionalism: Patterns of Engagement* (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2011).

the ‘third category’ in favour of welcoming the three members on the Asian side of the dialogue.¹⁴

The 2010 expansion marked an interesting departure for ASEM, as it further blurred the EU-East Asia geographic basis on which it was originally established. Australia and New Zealand – geographically Oceania, Australasia or Asia-Pacific countries – and the Russian Federation – a country whose land mass makes up around a third of the Eurasian continent – posed problems. All are members of respective Asian regional groupings and dialogue platforms¹⁵, yet each presented interesting options for the future of ASEM and the scope of Asia-Europe relations via ASEM. With the Russian Federation joining, much of the discussion focused on the potential it represented for improving transport between the regions, a point that Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev reiterated at the 2012 ASEM Summit, citing the Russian Federation’s “huge and as yet underdeveloped transport and transit opportunities.”¹⁶

The inclusion of Australia and New Zealand was a little more problematic. Culturally close to Europe, but geographically at Asia’s doorstep, both countries offered the ASEM process interesting new perspectives given their unique circumstances. Australia, in particular, hopes to reinvigorate the process, as argued in a recent review of Australia’s membership of ASEM:

“As a new member, Australia has made clear that there are areas in which ASEM can be improved. It has encouraged improvements in the way the meeting is conducted, for example in changing the format of discussions to reduce prepared statements in order to promote freer dialogue to improve exchange and interactions between members. As a new player, Australia is likely to try to bring new ideas and inject enthusiasm where it can.”¹⁷

¹⁴The inclusion of Australia and New Zealand raises the question of ‘the myth of continents’: are geographical characteristics still the best way to distinguish countries? For more on this debate, see Martin W. Lewis and Karen E. Wigen, *The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography* (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 1997).

¹⁵These include the East Asia Summit (Russia only), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN+6 (excludes Russia), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (Russia only) and many others.

¹⁶Siberian Times, “Siberia is the route to the future, says the PM,” *The Siberian Times*, 4 November 2012. [<http://siberiantimes.com/business/investment/news/siberia-is-the-route-to-the-future-says-the-pm/>], accessed March 2016.

¹⁷Melissa Conley Tyler and Eric Lerais, “Australia and ASEM: The first two years,” *Monash European and EU Centre Working Paper Series*, 2013/1, 2013. [<http://artsonline.monash.edu.au/europecentre/download/Working%20Papers%202013%2001%282%29.pdf>], accessed March 2016.

3.3. Partners only no more

During the 9th ASEM Summit of Heads of Government and State, which took place in 2012 in Vientiane, the Lao PDR, ASEM was further expanded with the inclusion of Bangladesh, Norway and Switzerland. This round of enlargement brought the total ASEM membership to 51 partners.

While Bangladesh joining the Asian side was a welcome and expected addition, the expansion on the European side provided a more interesting development. Norway and Switzerland's ASEM membership broke the EU monopoly on European membership that had – as some commentators claimed – pushed the Russian Federation onto the Asian side.

The most recent expansion, at the 10th ASEM Summit in 2014 in Milan, Italy, included Croatia (due to its EU membership) and Kazakhstan on the Asian side. These additions brought ASEM membership to 53.

FIGURE 3: TIMELINE OF ASEM MEMBERSHIP

Year	Milestone	No. of Members
1996	Inaugural Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Summit with 26 partners	26
2004	13 new partners: Cambodia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lao PDR, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Myanmar, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia.	39
2008	6 new partners: Bulgaria, India, Mongolia, Romania, Pakistan, ASEAN Secretariat	45
2010	3 new partners: Australia, New Zealand, Russian Federation	48
2012	3 new partners: Bangladesh, Norway, Switzerland	51
2014	2 new partners: Croatia, Kazakhstan	53

With these latest expansions, ASEM has been revitalised in many respects: the new members have entered the process with enthusiasm, and they breathe new life into the dialogue. New member countries bring new issues and expertise to the table. For example, at the 9th ASEM Summit, Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg discussed some of the opportunities that Norway sees in its engagement with Asia and Europe via ASEM: energy security, sustainable development and climate change, as well as the opportunities for Asian and European transport and trade via the opening of the Arctic Sea Route, which reduces sailing time and fuel costs between Europe and Asia by around 40%.¹⁸ New issues such as these can potentially deepen the cooperation and inter-regional interdependencies between Asia and Europe.

The entry of Norway and Switzerland on the European side represents a new openness with regard to European membership of the ASEM dialogue, and both countries have been proactive in engaging with ASEM and its affiliate institutions and platforms. Though it may be too early to be seen, the most recent entry of Kazakhstan creates valuable inter-Asian and European connections to the central Asian state. Croatia also has the opportunity to step up its Asian engagement via ASEM.

4. Structure of ASEM

ASEM has three pillars: political, economic and socio-cultural. The political pillar tackles global political issues such as security, arms control, terrorism, migration, human rights, rule of law and democracy from an Asia-Europe perspective. The political pillar brings together government representatives for leader, ministerial, senior official and working group level dialogues.

The political pillar includes dialogue overlapping that of the economic sphere such as meetings on trade, investment, finance, development, sustainability and innovation. The economic pillar itself features the biennial meeting of the Asia-Europe Business Forum (AEBF), which takes place close to the ASEM summit and engages business leaders from both Asia and Europe. This forum has been criticised in the past as being of inconsistent value and influence,

¹⁸ Jens Stoltenberg, "Speech at ASEM Enlargement Ceremony," Norwegian Government, Laos, 5 November 2012. [<http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Government/Office-of-the-Prime-Minister/taler-og-artikler/2012/speech-at-asem-enlargement-ceremony.html?id=706851>], accessed March 2016.

given the two-year gap between events and the lack of a secretariat.

The socio-cultural pillar includes the only permanent institution of the ASEM process, the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF), established in 1997. ASEF is mandated to improve mutual understanding and knowledge between Asia and Europe and to enable exchange between the civil societies (at both individual and institutional levels) of Asia and Europe. ASEF also plays an important role in feeding civil society priorities and concerns into the inter-governmental process.

In addition to ASEF, the Asia-Europe People's Forum (AEPF), a non-governmental organisation, has held a biennial 'People's Forum' to promote solidarity and dialogue across the two regions since 1996. The AEPF is a volunteer-run forum that meets before the Summit every two years. Similar to the AEBF, it suffers from inconsistency, a lack of funding and a visibility/credibility deficit.

The Asia-Europe Parliamentary Partnership (ASEP) brings together parliamentarians to discuss key issues of governance, biennially and in the lead-up to the Summit. ASEP provides the parliamentary diplomacy dynamic to the ASEM dialogue process.

Finally, the youngest of the ASEM associated bodies/organisations is the ASEM Dialogue Facility (ASEM DF), a project set up in 2008 by the European Commission to support ASEM's functionality. This is achieved by supporting the organisation of certain working group level initiatives, carrying out research and mapping of policy issues, as well as promoting ASEM's visibility.

Interestingly, the political pillar connects with both the economic and socio-cultural pillars of ASEM through overlapping topics, including finance, trade and investment, education and culture, and through providing access and interaction for civil society in official ASEM dialogue through consultations.

Figure 4 outlines the working mechanisms and the official and unofficial levels of dialogue. Official dialogue takes place from Summit level to the Chairman Support Group (ACSG), consisting of two Asian and two European members¹⁹, which rotate twice a year. On the non-official level, there are the AEBF and AEPF meetings mentioned above, while the ASEP meeting is yet another level of dialogue of the ASEM system.

¹⁹The European External Action Service (EEAS) holds a permanent seat on the ACSG and the other European country is based on the rotating presidency, however this may change with the inclusion of Switzerland and Norway.

FIGURE 4: THREE PILLARS OF ASEM

1 st Pillar (Political)	2 nd Pillar (Economic)	3 rd Pillar (Socio-Cultural)
Bi-Annual Summits	Asia-Europe Business Forum (AEBF)	Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF)
Ministerial meetings: Foreign Affairs, Finance, Environment, Labour, Culture, Education and others		Asia-Europe People's Forum (AEPF)
Working group level: Senior Official Meetings (SOM), ASEM Dialogue Facility (ASEM DF)		
Issue-based leadership: Interfaith dialogue, urbanisation, water management and many more		
Asia-Europe Parliamentary Partnership (ASEP)		

Interestingly, ASEM does not have its own secretariat. This decision was to keep ASEM informal and to avoid heavy bureaucracy. It also allows for deeper involvement among its partners, as there are more responsibilities to be filled by them. Nevertheless, the question of introducing a secretariat resurfaces regularly, as it is argued that a secretariat would give ASEM significantly more structure.

5. Key areas for Asia-Europe relations

5.1. Economic and trade relations

Trade and economic concerns dominate the relations between Asia and Europe, both at a bilateral and a multilateral level. In terms of sheer numbers, ASEM

member countries make up over 60% of global trade and over 60% of global commerce, while 12 of the G20 members are also ASEM partners.

Recent fortunes of both regions have played a significant role in shaping their economic relations with each other. Asia has risen from the depths of its financial crisis in 1997 and has established itself as a global driving force for growth, while European countries are climbing out of the recent 'Western' financial crisis.

In terms of trade policy and trade figures, the Asia-Europe relationship is significant. Outside of Europe, China is the EU's second largest trading partner and ASEAN as a whole represents the third largest partner for the EU. The EU is also the biggest investor in ASEAN countries.²⁰ For Central Asia, the EU is the most important trading partner, representing one-third of its external trade. The region is seen by Europe as a bridge to East and Southeast Asia and an important source of energy imports for the EU.²¹

The levels of investment between Asia and Europe are significant, with each being a major investor in the other. According to 2010 figures, the EU was the major investor in Asia, accounting for 17.2% of the EU's outward investment, while Asia accounted for 24.7% of total external investment in the EU. The stalling of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha round has led to a significant change in global trade policies with a greater focus on bilateral- over multilateral-level negotiations. Asian countries and the EU have embraced extensive FTAs over the last six years, with further agreements in negotiation.

It is also worth noting that in January 2014, the EU opened negotiations with China on the EU-China Investment Agreement. Though not an FTA, this would be a landmark agreement to improve economic relations and conditions between the two powers.²² A number of Asian countries are engaged with Switzerland on FTAs, namely China, Japan, Korea and Singapore. In addition, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Viet Nam, India, the Philippines and the Russian Federation are all in negotiation with Switzerland on FTAs.²³

²⁰ European Commission, "Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)," [<http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/asean/>], accessed May 2016.

²¹ European Commission, "Central Asia," [<http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/central-asia/>], accessed May 2016.

²² European Commission, "China," [<http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/china/>], accessed March 2016.

²³ Swiss Confederation State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, "List of Free Trade Agreements of Switzerland," [<http://www.seco.admin.ch/themen/00513/00515/01330/04619/?lang=en>], accessed March 2016.

5.2. Security

Although Asia has become a rising economic power, it has also been the focus of global attention due to tensions between countries over territorial disputes and rising nationalist and religious sentiments. These tensions have led major powers to focus attention on the region, for example, the US 'pivot' toward Asia. On its side, Europe has suffered from the fallout of the sovereign debt crisis with the rise of right wing and anti-EU sentiments in certain countries, which has been aggravated with the recent increased threats of extremism and terrorist activities.

This current climate does not only generate domestic and international pressure on security issues, it also brings non-traditional security threats into focus, widening the understanding of human security. Global challenges, such as climate change, energy security, cybercrime, environmental protection, organised crime, terrorism and pandemics are emerging as cross-border and cross-regional threats to security and stability.

Both the *Global Peace Index 2015*²⁴ and a recent report by The Asia Foundation – *The Contested Corners of Asia*²⁵ – confirm that the world is shifting from large-scale inter-state wars to organised internal conflicts. According to the *Global Peace Index 2015*, the world has become less peaceful since 2008, primarily due to 'non-traditional' factors, including the number of refugees and internally displaced persons, internal conflict and terrorism. On the other hand, the number of deaths from external conflicts has declined from 1982 to 410 over the last eight years.

Europe remains by far the most peaceful region in the world with six countries featured in the top ten of the 2015 Global Peace Index. However, the impact of military expenditure and terrorism worsened the scores of Denmark, France and Belgium. According to the index, Asia-Pacific is the third most peaceful region. Yet, the report distinguishes South Asia as a separate region and has ranked it second to last, with only the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region being

²⁴ Institute for Economics & Peace, *Global Peace Index 2015* (Sydney: Institute for Economics & Peace, 2015). [http://static.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/Global%20Peace%20Index%202015%20Highlights_0.pdf], accessed March 2016.

²⁵ Thomas Parks, Nat Colletta and Ben Oppenheim, *The Contested Corners of Asia : Subnational Conflict and International Development Assistance* (San Francisco, CA : The Asia Foundation, 2013). [<http://asiafoundation.org/publications/pdf/1226>], accessed March 2016.

less peaceful. In addition, countries within the Asia-Pacific region rank very differently. While New Zealand ranks 4th and Japan 8th in the world, Myanmar, in spite of progress in democratisation, ranks 130th, and the Philippines has the lowest rank of all ASEM partners, in 141st place out of 162 states, mainly due to an escalation of internal conflicts.

In the last few years, there have been a number of developments related to Asia-Europe cooperation in the security field. The EU has taken a greater interest in the Asia-Pacific region for its security cooperation. In July 2013, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton attended the 20th Ministerial Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)²⁶ in Brunei Darussalam. In a statement released before the meeting, she stated: *“The EU’s longstanding commitment to supporting ASEAN is a reflection of our determination to play a constructive role in the new regional architecture of Asia.”*²⁷

In an interview for the Friends of Europe, Viorel Isticioaia Budura, then Managing Director for Asia and the Pacific at the European Union’s External Action Service (EEAS) and now EU Ambassador to Japan, stated: “Asia still has to deal with security issues that have been settled in Europe.” He added:

*“We admire Asia’s economic rise. But many Asian countries still face the challenges associated with nation and state-building. They are burdened by disputes and security flashpoints, which need proper handling and solutions. If left unattended, these disputes could cause trouble for everyone.”*²⁸

A similar sentiment was expressed by Kevin Rudd, former Prime Minister of Australia, in a speech to NATO:

²⁶ The ARF brings together the foreign ministers of the 10 ASEAN member states (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam), as well as Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, China, the EU, Japan, India, Mongolia, New Zealand, North Korea, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Russian Federation, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, and the USA. The ARF remains the main security forum in Southeast Asia where the EU is present on behalf of its member states.

²⁷ European Commission, “High Representative Catherine Ashton at the ASEAN Regional Forum,” European Commission Press Release, 1 July 2013. [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-631_en.htm], accessed March 2016

²⁸ Viorel Isticioaia Budura, cited in Shada Islam, “Asia-Europe increase focus on security,” Delegation of the European Union to Australia, 19 July 2013. [http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/australia/more_info/asem/news_en.htm], accessed March 2016.

“In Asia we face the prospect of the 21st century global economy resting on the shoulders of a 19th century set of security policy realities. And the challenge for our hemisphere, the Asian hemisphere, is to manage the latter so it does not destroy the former.”²⁹

Interestingly, the EU has been slowly trying to involve itself in the East Asia Summit – an important dialogue platform for leaders to discuss key strategic, political and economic issues, including maritime security, by requesting observer status in 2006.³⁰ Thus far, it has not been invited as a full member despite the inclusion of the USA and the Russian Federation in 2011. This suggests that the EU is still not a major player in the region. Despite its willingness to track the process, some analysts argue that it needs to rethink its approach to the region in order to be considered a major actor.³¹

5.3. Environmental cooperation

Environmental policy is by nature a global issue that tends to transcend borders, territories and maritime delineations between states. When examining the issue from a global policy standpoint, one can see that Asia-Europe cooperation on this key existential issue is pivotal to brokering effective global deals and building regional capacities.

In terms of direct cooperation at the multilateral level, ASEM provides a number of platforms where environmental issues are raised and discussed at an Asia-Europe level. The ASEM Environment Ministers’ Meeting convened for the first time in Beijing, China, in 2002, and ministers outlined a comprehensive range of issues for Asia-Europe cooperation on the environment. The list included:

“...poverty eradication, energy and environment, water, combating desertification, forest degradation including land and forest fire and illegal

²⁹ Kevin Rudd, “Europe, Asia and Australia: New imperatives for cooperation,” Address to the North Atlantic Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Brussels, 20 January 2012. [http://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/Pages/2012/kr_sp_120120.aspx?ministerid=2#sthash.S0ESqN3Q.dpuf], accessed March 2016.

³⁰ Benita Ferrero-Waldner, “New Visions for EU-Japan Relations,” Opening of Joint EU-Japan Symposium, Brussels, 6 April 2006. [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-06-227_en.htm?locale=en], accessed March 2016.

³¹ Jonas Parelló-Plesner, “Europe’s pivot to Asia,” East Asia Forum, 12 November 2012. [<http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/11/12/europes-pivot-to-asia/>], accessed March 2016.

logging, release of chemicals into the environment, urban environment, bio-safety, coastal and marine protection, cleaner production technologies, and ecological conservation, climate change, and environmental policies and legislation, and promoting sustainable livelihood.”³²

The declaration emerging from that first meeting supported Asia-Europe coordination and cooperation on a global level in forums such as the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), the Kyoto Protocol and other UN forums.

Subsequent meetings of the ASEM Environment Ministers in 2004 and 2007 called on Asia and Europe to cooperate on a wide spectrum of environmental issues, while ASEM summit declarations followed suit. During the 2012 ASEM Environment Ministers’ Meeting, Asian and European delegates focused in particular on the pertinent issues of sustainable water and forest management, pushing for greater cooperation on REDD+ (reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation) ahead of Rio+20.

At the technical or working group level of Asia-Europe cooperation, ASEM has provided platforms to discuss key issues of sustainable development, with particular attention to water management, conservation and tackling the impact of climate change. One interesting case where unique Asia-Europe cooperation can make a positive impact to environmental protection and regional policies is the dialogue on water and river basin management, championed by member countries of bodies protecting the Danube and Mekong rivers.

Another interesting development is the improving infrastructure for Asia-Europe cooperation on environmental issues, both at the official level and at civil society level. Spearheaded by Korea, the ASEM SMEs Eco-Innovation Centre (ASEIC) was established in 2011 to support exchanges and create opportunities for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Asia and Europe to develop eco-innovation technologies to contribute towards green growth in both regions.

A more established element of Asia-Europe environmental cooperation is ASEF’s long-standing Asia-Europe Environment Forum (ENVforum) project, which has existed since 2002. Similar to the official dialogue, the programme

³² ASEM Environment Ministers’ Meeting, “Chairman’s Statement of the ASEM Environment Ministers’ Meeting,” Beijing, 17 January 2002. [<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/asem/conference/emm0201.pdf>], accessed March 2016.

has tackled a wide range of environmental policy issues since its inception, bringing together top think tanks, government bodies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international organisations. More recently, the ENVforum has embarked on an ambitious programme to add joint Asia-Europe perspectives to the Post-2015 Development Agenda debate focusing on sustainable development goals (SDGs).

Outside of ASEM cooperation, some areas of environmental policy have been problematic for Asia-Europe relations. Binding obligations for industrialised countries to reduce emissions in order to fight climate change, as set down by the Kyoto Protocol, have provoked debate. While the EU and Australia agreed to take on new second-round commitments from 2013 to 2020, Japan, New Zealand and the Russian Federation, having participated in Kyoto's first round, decided against taking on these on new targets.

The EU also caused controversy with its Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), in particular relating to aviation, where airlines flying to EU destinations are required to purchase 'credits' if they exceeded strict carbon limits. The EU's partners across Asia did not react positively to these new regulations, with India, the Russian Federation, Singapore and most notably China speaking out against the policy.³³

One way in which Asia and Europe can improve their cooperation in environmental policy relates to the unprecedented and large-scale urbanisation taking place across the Asia-Pacific region. Economic growth and shifting of value chains have caused a massive shift in inward migration to cities across Asia. The World Bank found that between 2000 and 2010, almost 200 million people moved to urban areas in East Asia, leading to eight additional 'megacities' with more than 10 million inhabitants.³⁴ Furthermore, it is estimated that "by 2030, more than 55% of the population of Asia will be urban."³⁵

³³ The Telegraph, "China bans airlines from EU's Emissions Trading Scheme," The Telegraph, 6 February 2012. [<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/news/China-bans-airlines-from-EU-s-Emissions-Trading-Scheme/>], accessed March 2016.

³⁴ World Bank Group, *East Asia's Changing Urban Landscape: Measuring a Decade of Spatial Growth* (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2015). [http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2015/07/20/090224b082ffc771/2_0/Rendered/PDF/East0Asia0s0ch0de0of0spatial0growth.pdf], accessed March 2016.

³⁵ Kyeong Ae Choe and Brian H. Roberts, *Competitive Cities in the 21st Century: Cluster-Based Local Economic Development* (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2011).

This rate of urbanisation will require new solutions to key environmental issues such as air quality and pollution, waste management, sanitation, access to essential resources, disaster risk reduction and many more issues. The more Asia and Europe can share experiences and develop solutions through cooperation, the better they can both learn to manage public spaces in a sustainable and environmentally friendly way.

6. What's next for ASEM and Asia-Europe relations?

ASEM has been criticised for a number of long-standing issues. These include its lack of a secretariat (virtual, physical or otherwise), its lack of visibility (ASEF's perceptions studies attest to this. See chapter four) and its informality (no concrete decisions need to be made or policies negotiated/implemented). There have been internal and external calls to make ASEM more action-oriented, and for it to move from dialogue to more concrete cooperation. Concrete outcomes, it is suggested, may reduce the risk of stagnation and reinvigorate the dialogue.

Many of the themes and topics put forward in ASEM chair statements and at the ministerial level reflect the changing realities in both regions, for example a growing focus on sustainability and balanced economic growth in the wake of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis. Issues such as unemployment, migration and demographic issues and security, especially non-traditional security issues, are also entering the agenda as priorities. Following the H1N1 scare in 2008-2009, pandemic preparedness entered the ASEM agenda.

As mentioned previously, new members bring new issues and new vigour to the ASEM table. The ability of ASEM to maintain its unique value, while starting to provide more concrete cooperation, is a challenging task. As well-known ASEM commentator, Shada Islam, remarked, *"The challenge is to maintain ASEM's unique informality, networking and flexibility but also make it more pragmatic, effective and result-oriented – and more relevant to partners' economic and social priorities."*³⁶

³⁶Shada Islam, "Exploring Ideas on ASEM's Future," EU-Asia Centre, 5 June 2013. [<http://www.aseminfoboard.org/2011-12-20-06-03-03/announcements/item/1258-exploring-ideas-on-asem-s-future.html>], accessed March 2016.

Certain issues have divided ASEM. One such divide is the need for a secretariat, which is “essentially driven by Asian partners of ASEM who feel the need for such an institution on their side.”³⁷ The European side is content with the current situation as EEAS plays an important coordination role for European partners, although it represents only the EU ASEM partners.

In terms of ASEM meetings, there has been a concerted effort to shorten chairs’ statements and messages, so that the discussion and delivery of long, detailed documents is no longer the major outcome of meetings. The 2014 summit featured a ‘retreat session’, which was considered a major step towards boosting discussions and making the process more dynamic. The change in format puts greater emphasis on energising discussions with a stronger focus on content.

Through its expansions and its current need for reinvigoration, ASEM is at a pivotal point. Undoubtedly, we will see further discussion on how it can evolve. For now, it is safe to say that the ASEM process has definite value for its growing number of partners. With Croatia and Kazakhstan joining, this process remains the ‘only show in town’ linking the wider Asian and European regions together on an equal and regular footing.

Discussions during the many consultation conferences before the 10th ASEM Summit in Milan in October 2014 centred on two aspects to invigorate the process. The first was a positive political commitment; this meant governments needed a fervour for the process that is similar to the enthusiasm seen in the early years. Second, engagement beyond government to government is essential. This means more regular engagement between Asian and European business leaders, key civil society representatives, and core people-to-people interaction.

Speaking in September 2014, outgoing EU Council President Herman Van Rompuy stated: “Can you really criticise a dialogue process for providing a platform for meetings, for discussions? ... It is no secret that the many bilateral meetings in the margins of the (actual summit) are very important and I am happy with that.”³⁸

This chapter has spoken about the importance of the tri-polar linkages in global

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Deutsche Welle. “Asia and Europe meet in Milan.” Deutsche Welle, 16 October 2014. [<http://www.dw.de/asia-and-europe-meet-in-milan/a-179986333>], accessed March 2016.

power today and has questioned the validity of this notion, as multi-polarity becomes more commonplace, with more and more actors brokering power. The Europe-Asia tie undoubtedly holds weight, as the majority of actors in this multi-polar system, be they established or emerging powers, are Asian and European. The obvious question is whether the institutions and infrastructure in place are the best option for servicing these important ties. Is ASEM effective in enabling dialogue between both sides as it expands and broadens its scope? Does it need significant change, or does it already provide an adequate platform for Asia and Europe to meet?

The context of Asia-Europe relations is diverse and in a state of flux. Understanding the architecture can help to navigate them more effectively, but there is much more to Asia-Europe relations than the institutions and platforms that enable it. The supplementary reading examines several particular areas of Asia-Europe relations – economics and trade, security cooperation and environmental cooperation – to help paint a better picture of the context in which the skills developed in this handbook will be used.

5-POINT SUMMARY

1

Relations between Asia and Europe are embedded in a long history, and this history has influenced the perceptions held by the publics of the two continents.

3

The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) is an informal process of dialogue and cooperation that aims at bridging the two continents.

5

Economic concerns are currently dominating relations between Asia and Europe, while domestic and international pressure on security issues is growing. Environmental cooperation is an emerging area of relations between the two continents.

2

After World War II, regional integration in Europe and Southeast Asia has changed the context of their mutual relations, and China's opening up has changed the scene of Europe's engagement with Asia.

4

ASEM's future will be determined by membership decisions, discussions on the need for a secretariat and efforts to increase the dynamism and visibility of the institution.

THINKING DIFFERENT: MAIN CHALLENGES OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Public diplomacy is neither public relations, nor pure communication. Recipes are different. A good script is essential. An original script, surprising and convincing, is even far better writes Richard Werly.

This was Hong Kong in the 1990's: one of the last colonial outposts where East was meeting West under the watch of centuries old traditions and colonial manners. British national Philip Tose was then a leading financial operator. His investment fund, Peregrine, was grabbing headlines throughout emerging Asia with its wave of acquisitions in Viet Nam and Indonesia. But what Tose was looking eagerly to achieve was a reputation. How to blend the best of Europe and Asia: *"Asia and Europe need to reinvent themselves as we enter a new era,"* he explained to me, when we met at the Foreign Correspondents' Club. *"You cannot continue to rely on traditions only when you are entering the 21st century. Traditions are there to serve as an inspiration, but your prime goal, to project the best image, shall always be to catch the future mood. The more you are in tune with modernity, the more you can grab attention."*

Back to our Internet dominated decade. A prominent multinational has made fortune with its slogan "Think different", reinventing the use of technology. Public diplomacy

challenges lie there: how to think different and re-package the image of your country or organisation? How can you reinvent yourself in the eyes of the others? Giles Merritt is a former journalist and veteran correspondent with the Financial Times. He has founded in Brussels Friends of Europe, a unique platform experienced in organising symposiums on Asia-Europe matters: *"It is true more than ever for Europe"* he argues over his new book Slippery Slope, and *"in that regard, public diplomacy plays a crucial role. The message you are crafting and projecting is essential because it is forging new mentalities"*. I remember asking the same question, by the way, to Indonesian presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto, a former-general-turned politician, defeated in 2014 by current Head of State Joko Widodo: can a former Special Forces General re-invent himself? "Yes," he answered in his Jakarta campaign headquarters. *"But what matters is not how different I am, but how different people see me."*

Think different, for ASEM, means putting at the forefront new activities, new frontiers to explore and new type of actions. ASEM has, for too long, focused on trade only, trying to reap the benefits of a globalisation process which appears less and less convincing for ordinary people. To make it short, ASEM has become a process understood and

supported by governments and is enjoying favourable views from multinationals and globalised actors of the economy. Those left behind, remaining within the borders of their countries, stay nevertheless doubtful. Thinking different supposes you pay attention to this original flaw. ASEM shall not be only an outward looking process, but also an inclusive one. ASEM shall bring people on board and be more user-friendly. What does it mean to be an ASEM partner? What can a country get from this membership? Those are the questions diplomats shall be capable of answering.

First advice is, when it comes to thinking different, forget about what has been done until now in terms of public diplomacy. You have heard slogans in the past. You may have images in mind. But push the reset button. Malaysia is now known for “Truly Asia”, but frankly, this was not the case 20 years ago. Thailand is still “Smooth as Silk», but time has come for new messages. Simplicity. Authenticity. Clarity. Forget about the old-fashioned slogans based on traditions or well-known monuments. Focus on your living heritage. What are the values your country harbours best? Disruption is needed, and not only when it comes to the new digital economy. Disruption is even more needed when it comes to leaders’ mind-set.

Second advice is not to engage in so many races at a time. Choose the one you want to run and expect to win. Think different means embracing choices and sticking to them. Try to sharpen your message and craft it in a way which will give you a real advantage over your competitors. Public diplomacy is a very competitive sport. Try to promote new faces. Try to present the unknown but appealing side of your country. Try to sound

different and not to be too mainstream. Getting attention is the first step to success.

Coming back to Asian politics. South Korea is a prime example of a country that has managed to project an excellent image, thanks to the dynamism of its economy and the quality of its artists, especially in the cinema industry. What caused this change? Who would have placed a bet, 30 years ago, on Korean cinema being capable of reaching international audiences? More creative invention is needed, courage as well to break the waves of administrative rigidity and dare to challenge traditional views. Public diplomacy shall remain, before all, a source of inspiration.

**“WHEN IT
COMES TO
THINKING
DIFFERENT,
FORGET ABOUT
WHAT HAS
BEEN DONE.”**

CHAPTER 3:

IMAGES AND PERCEPTIONS IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY¹

Natalia CHABAN

Abstract

This chapter addresses the importance of studying images and perceptions as a precondition for a successful public diplomacy strategy. The chapter starts with discussing the role of images and reputation in the new diplomacy and multi-stakeholder diplomacy, arguing that reputation has become a prerequisite for a state's international and domestic successes, and that changes in reputation can result in substantial gains and losses.

A country's reputation and image are heavily dependent on the perceptions held by domestic and foreign publics, and these perceptions can be affected by effective place branding and communication strategies. Such strategies are therefore essential components of a public diplomacy campaign. The chapter furthermore considers different modes and levels of public diplomacy, highlighting that communications and public diplomacy strategies need to be credible and should result from listening and engaging with foreign and domestic publics.

Finally, the chapter discusses how to approach the study of perceptions and images within the framework of public diplomacy. A public diplomacy practitioner can opt for a top-down approach – by primarily listening to trusted authorities and established institutions – or a bottom-up approach, which focuses on assessing public opinion. This handbook will discuss both approaches in subsequent chapters.

Please check the 5-point summary as well at the end of this chapter.

¹This chapter is based on research conducted by the EU Global Perceptions Team at the National Centre for Research on Europe (NCRE) of the University of Canterbury. For more information about our projects, methodology and publications, visit <http://www.euperceptions.canterbury.ac.nz>.

Introduction

International relations in the 21st century take place in a rapidly changing world. In today's globalising environment, states are no longer the only significant global actors. State and non-state actors are intertwined in a multitude of networks, and numerous 'poles' of power are prominent. This swiftly changing multipolar architecture challenges modern-day diplomacy, both traditional diplomacy and **public diplomacy** in its effort to *"understand, engage, and influence publics on a wide range of other issues relating to governance, economic growth, democracy, the distribution of goods and services, and a host of cross-border threats and opportunities."*²

Heine suggests that to survive in this new context, international actors practice the **new diplomacy**³ – i.e. diplomacy that accounts for globalisation and technological innovations, which navigates relations through networking between diverse targets: state actors; non-state civil society actors; the media; elites and experts; and ordinary citizens.

Hocking describes **multi-stakeholder diplomacy**, where – in addition to states – non-state actors contribute to diplomatic outcomes. While international policy is still predominantly shaped by governments, Hocking suggests that the roles of those involved in diplomacy are *"likely to depend on the dynamics underpinning trisectoral interactions between governments, NGOs and business."*⁴

² Bruce Gregory, "Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616, no. 1 (2008): pp. 274–290, p. 276.

³ Jorge Heine, "On the manner of practicing the new diplomacy." Working Paper 11, October 2006, Centre for International Governance Innovation. [http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/shared/executive_education/summer_international-affairs_faculty-IA_professors/new%20diplomacy%20Heine%20paper%20CIGI%255B1%255D.pdf], accessed March 2016.

⁴ Brian Hocking, "Multistakeholder diplomacy: Forms, functions, and frustrations," In Jovan Kurbalija and Valentin Katrandjiev [eds], *Multistakeholder Diplomacy - Challenges and Opportunities* (Malta: DiploFoundation, 2006), p. 17. [<http://www.diplomacy.edu/resources/general/multistakeholder-diplomacy-forms-functions-and-frustrations>], accessed March 2016.

Thus, even in traditional, state-led diplomatic activities, stakeholders from other sectors increasingly contribute to diplomatic outcomes. In fact, states can no longer ignore these stakeholders in shaping international politics, and increasingly states engage in public-private partnerships, as well as in collaboration with media entities.

In order for a state to conduct effective diplomacy, it must create and secure networks with other actors at state and non-state levels.⁵ Successful networking rests on good **communication skills** and on the **reputation** of the state; this makes understanding existing images and perceptions, as well as building **the image of a powerful, capable, credible and attractive international actor**, very important.

This chapter:

- * discusses the role of images and reputation in the new diplomacy and multi-stakeholder diplomacy;
- * identifies key elements of communication, including the role of images and perceptions in communication;
- * considers different modes and levels of public diplomacy and in particular the importance of listening; and
- * discusses how to approach the study of perceptions and images within the framework of public diplomacy.

1. The role of image and reputation in the new diplomacy

The new diplomacy, as a response to the world of global governance and networking, practises **proactive strategies on communicating image and reputation**, stressing values, ideas and identities. Images and reputation have

⁵ For an example of how multistakeholder cooperation could shape ASEAN, see Suzanne Kelly-Lyall, "Multi-Stakeholder Cooperation Should Shape the Future of ASEAN Integration," cogitASIA, 12 March 2015. [<http://cogitasia.com/multi-stakeholder-cooperation-should-shape-the-future-of-asean-integration/>], accessed March 2016. Another example of multi-stakeholder diplomacy is examined in the case of EU-BRICS energy diplomacy (Chaban, N. and Knodt, M. "Energy diplomacy in the context of multi-stakeholder diplomacy: The EU and BICS". Cooperation and Conflict 50, no. 4 (2015): pp. 457-474).

taken a central role: in the battle for power and resources in a new interconnected yet competitive world, it is difficult to win using 'hard' power alone.

Hard power, through threats of violence and economic sanctions, forces others to do what they do not want to do. In contrast, the new diplomacy prioritises **soft power** – “*the ability to affect others to obtain the outcome one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment*”⁶ – combining it with hard power when necessary.

Importantly, the concept of soft power is broadly recognised by and welcomed in diplomatic strategies in Asia and Europe. The EU and other European states often stress their commitment to soft power. At the same time, the appeal of soft power is very strong in Asia, and ministries of foreign affairs across Asia are treating the development of public diplomacy capabilities as a priority. Asian states are well aware of the centrality of public diplomacy in international relations and are competing to build and leverage their soft power using public diplomacy.⁷

In recent years, a number of specific official diplomatic strategies have appeared in Asia. These are distinct from Western strategies, and include, among others:

* 'major power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics'⁸ / 'periphery policy'⁹ from China;

⁶ Joseph S. Nye Jr, “Public diplomacy and soft power,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616, no. 1 (2008): pp. 94–109.

⁷ For more information on the struggle for soft power in Asia, see Ian Hall and Frank Smith, “The Struggle for Soft Power in Asia: Public Diplomacy and Regional Competition,” *Asian Security* 9, no. 1 (2013): pp. 1-18

⁸ 'Major power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics' is a proactive policy with greater responsibility for addressing regional and global problems, global governance and greater leadership in the international community. It claims practicing the “independent foreign policy of peace,” adhering to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, opposing hegemony, respecting sovereignty and refraining from interfering in another country's internal affairs... building a 'harmonious world' and achieving 'win-win progress.' China will be “a friend and partner of the developing world,” and its relationships will “contain elements of 'mutual respect, win-win cooperation, no conflict and no confrontation.’” See Bonnie S. Glaser and Alison Szalwinski (2013). [[http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=41253&tx_ttnews\[backPid\]=25&cHash=a5216a9cfe8baa1f122fe1689df686ad#.VuKZUsehOL](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=41253&tx_ttnews[backPid]=25&cHash=a5216a9cfe8baa1f122fe1689df686ad#.VuKZUsehOL)], accessed March 2016.

⁹ 'Periphery policy' refers to “improved relations with all neighbours through a long-term strategic vision, summarised through principles expressed in four Chinese characters: intimacy, honesty, benefaction and tolerance.” See Lanxin Xiang (2013).

- * ‘middle power diplomacy’¹⁰ from Japan; and
- * ‘preventive diplomacy’¹¹ from Southeast Asia.

These three strategies have their unique tools to reach out on soft power grounds, in addition to projecting hard power profiles. This elucidates that the concept of soft power, and interactions based on dialogue and peaceful measures, is not a European invention. Nevertheless, further examination is needed to better understand the various combinations of hard and soft power messages in these Asia-Pacific diplomatic strategies.

A comprehensive discussion on the diplomatic ideas and practices of Asian and European states is beyond the scope of this chapter, yet a brief look suggests that the aspects of mutual respect based on communication and negotiation, cooperation, partnership and a no-conflict approach are shared. This underlines the importance that both Asian and European states assign to the practices of dialogue, collaboration and listening in the conduct of traditional and public diplomacy regionally and globally.

The main concepts of the new diplomacy align well with the concepts of **multi-stakeholder diplomacy**: multi-stakeholder diplomacy’s central premise is “inclusiveness and partnership in policy processes, rather than exclusiveness.”¹² Figure 1 compares traditional diplomacy (state-centred) and multi-stakeholder diplomacy, and suggests that notions of **dialogue and collaboration** within networks and multidirectional flows of information become fundamental for successful multi-stakeholder diplomacy.

¹⁰ “The concept of a ‘middle power’ embraces three aspects of diplomacy: behaviour, status and strategy.” “The virtue of middle powers is internationalism, where cooperation with like-minded states in order to strengthen a liberal and open international order is key to any aspect of strategy.” See Yoshihide Soeya (2012).

¹¹ ‘Preventive diplomacy’ is “any diplomatic or political action taken by states to prevent disputes or conflicts that could threaten regional peace and stability, to prevent such disputes from escalating into armed confrontation, or to minimize the impact of such conflicts on the region. The eight key principles of preventive diplomacy are that it (i) uses peaceful methods such as negotiation, enquiry, mediation, and conciliation; (ii) is noncoercive; (iii) is timely; (iv) requires trust and confidence; (v) involves consultation and consensus; (vi) is voluntary; (vii) applies to direct conflict between states; and (viii) is conducted in accordance with international law.” See Jim Della-Giacoma (2011).

¹² Brian Hocking, “Multistakeholder diplomacy: Forms, functions, and frustrations.”

FIGURE 1: TRADITIONAL (STATE-CENTRED) AND MULTI-STAKEHOLDER DIPLOMACY¹³

	State-centered model	Multistakeholder model
Context	State as unchallenged terminal authority	Multiple spheres of authority
Forms	Government-led using bilateral and multilateral channels	-Diffuse: may be led by government or other stakeholder -Developing and fluid forms
Participants	-Professional diplomatic guild -Diplomats whose credentials are based on principles of sovereignty -Non-state actors as consumers of diplomacy	-Multiple participation based on varying models -Frequently based on trisectoral model incorporating governments, NGOs, and business -“Stakeholders” whose credentials are based on interests and expertise -Non-state actors as producers of diplomacy
Roles	Diplomat as gatekeeper	-Diplomat as boundary-spanner: facilitator and entrepreneur -Stakeholders performing multiple roles: stakegivers vs. staketakers
Communication patterns	-Government focused Relations with stakeholders defined as “outreach” -Hierarchical information flows focused on governments; Exclusive but with recognition of need for outreach	-Networks. Open and inclusive; Can be fluid and unstable -Multidirectional flows of information
Functions	-Managing relations between sovereign entities -Defining and promoting national interests	-Compensate for deficiencies in diplomatic processes by exchanging resources through policy networks

¹³ Hocking, 2006, pp. 18–19

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Information exchange -Monitoring processes -Defining and promoting global interests
Location	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Outside domestic arenas -Diplomatic sites: intergovernmental 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Crosses domestic-international arenas -Multiple diplomatic sites
Representation patterns	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -State-focused -Mixed bilateral and multilateral with growing emphasis on mission diplomacy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Multilateral and mission oriented -Variable permanent representation
Rules	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Clear normative expectations of behaviour -Derived form sovereignty-related rules -Centrality of protocol -Immunity of diplomatic agents -Confidentiality 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Underdeveloped rules -Clash of sovereignty and non-sovereignty based rules -Openness, accountability and transparency -Institutional tensions -Clash of expectations between stakeholders

1.1. Image, and domestic and international gains and losses

An actor using soft power achieves what it wants by enticing others to want the same thing. The global popularity of the soft power approach pushes state and non-state actors to compete for “*political authority and loyalty in a dense and highly competitive market, embarking upon a quest for the hearts and minds of people both at home and around the world.*”¹⁴ **Image and reputation become the prerequisites for an actor’s success, internationally and domestically.** In this context, following Ole Elgström’s definition, images can be conceptualised as mental pictures, composed of our cumulated experience-based “knowledge” of

¹⁴Peter van Ham, “Place branding: The state of the Art,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): p. 128. [http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20080300_cdsp_art_ham.pdf], accessed March 2016.

the surrounding world.¹⁵

Van Ham¹⁶ argues that when an international actor has a positive **external** image and reputation, this actor is able to:

- * attract investment, tourism and political power on a global scale;
- * attract more clients;
- * charge more for their products/services; and
- * generate overall economic/political advantages for itself.

When an international actor has a good **internal** image and reputation, which provide a sense of belonging and a clear self-concept, Van Ham argues that this actor is able to:

- * make its citizens “*feel better and more confident about themselves*”¹⁷; and
- * give a “*sense of direction and purpose to the organization’s own staff all over the world*”¹⁸ (e.g. diplomats representing the state abroad).

Despite being intangibles, **negative image and bad reputation lead to tangible material losses**, as a result of inappropriate policy, misallocation of resources and the under- or over-evaluation of performance. As a consequence, **image and reputation become valuable commodities** in international relations.

1.2. The dynamic character of image and reputation

Both state and non-state actors are eager to be visible on the international stage and seen in a good light. The key to securing visibility and to getting a positive response in a world characterised by the deficit of attention is a **powerful, positive and easy-to-recognise image and a good reputation**. It is essential to ‘stand out from the crowd’! It is good news if your state’s image

¹⁵ Ole Elgström, *Images and Strategies for Autonomy* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000): p.68

¹⁶ Peter van Ham, “Place branding: The state of the Art”

¹⁷ *Ibid*, p.131.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, p.132.

is already positive and recognisable – images are known to be resistant to change.¹⁹ However, under certain circumstances, image and reputation may change, and change rapidly.²⁰ They can remain positive over time only if they are built on **trust** and **customer satisfaction** (concepts elaborated within the context of public diplomacy by Peter van Ham).²¹

The **trust** dimension means that the quest for good image and reputation forces state actors to “pay more attention to the **politics of credibility**” in a world where they have to “share a stage with newly empowered non-governmental actors and individuals.”²²

If image and reputation build up excessive expectations among international partners that do not correspond to an actor’s capability to deliver, a **capabilities-expectations gap** may emerge. First observed by Hill²³ in the context of EU foreign policy, this gap encompasses the disillusionment and disappointment of a partner with the insufficient capability of the image-sending actor when that actor cannot match expectations drummed up by the sender’s image and promises.

Such a gap might lead to yet another negative outcome: an **expectations deficit**.²⁴ According to Tsuruoka, this follows repeated failure to meet expectations: the image of, and expectations for, the international actor in the international arena remain low, even when the power and influence of the actor grow. The two deficits, fed by images and perceptions, are arguably detrimental to the credibility of an international actor.

¹⁹Ole Elgström, *Images and Strategies for Autonomy* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000); Richard Herrmann, “Perceptions and Image Theory in International Relations.” In Leonie Huddy, et al. [eds] *The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*. New York: Oxford University Press (2013), pp. 334-63.

²⁰Images can have very different time spans; it can take a couple of years after dramatic circumstances (e.g. the collapse of the USSR and new images of the former socialist states that became members of the EU), decades (e.g. the gradual change in the image of regional integration in Europe), or even centuries (e.g. the image of Europe as a coloniser has slowly decayed) for an image to be built and rebuilt.

²¹Peter van Ham, “Place branding: The state of the Art”

²²Joseph S. Nye Jr, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go it Alone* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

²³Christopher Hill, “The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 31, no. 3 (1993): pp. 305-328.

²⁴Michito Tsuruoka, “‘Expectations deficit’ in EU-Japan Relations: Why the Relationship Cannot Flourish,” *Current Politics and Economics of Asia* 17, no. 1 (2008): pp. 107-126.

Customer satisfaction relates to the idea of **branding** (a conceptual link developed by Van Ham²⁵). Customer satisfaction is a critical component of brand equity, and branding is one of the key concepts in marketing literature. According to the *Small Business Encyclopedia*, “*your brand is your promise to your customer. It tells them what they can expect from your products and services, and it differentiates your offering from that of your competitors. Your brand is derived from who you are, who you want to be and who people perceive you to be.*”²⁶ Importantly, “*the added value intrinsic to brand equity frequently comes in the form of perceived quality or emotional attachment*” and “*consistent, strategic branding leads to a strong brand equity, which means the added value brought to your company’s products or services*”. It is crucial that the brand as a promise or proposition is “*delivered consistently at each point of customer contact, time after time*”.²⁷ The result of it is a loyal customer, and as Hassan argues, “*Loyal customers are the key factor of success in all organizations. They spend money, they recommend to others and they repeat buy from the same organization, as long as it delivers consistent value.*”²⁸

Literature on public diplomacy locates the concept of branding at the “*...intersection between media, marketing and brand asset management, on the one hand, and the world of international politics, on the other: two spheres with little contact with each other that share an interest in concepts such as globalisations, identity, values and power.*”²⁹ **Place branding** is now a reality for politicians all over the world, as they have to “*find a brand niche for their state, engage in competitive marking, ensure customer satisfaction, and – most of all – create brand loyalty.*”³⁰

²⁵ Peter van Ham, “Place branding: The state of the Art”

²⁶ Small Business Encyclopedia, “Branding,” [http://www.entrepreneur.com/encyclopedia/branding], accessed March 2016.

²⁷ Lynn B. Upshaw, *Building Brand Identity: A Strategy for Success in a Hostile Marketplace* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Son, Inc, 1995). As cited in Ali Hussein “Customer’s satisfaction and brand awareness Case: Bulsho Cooperative, Finland”, Haaga-Helia University of Applied Sciences, (2012), p.16. [https://www.theseus.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/52815/Ali_Hussein.pdf?sequence=1], accessed March 2016.

²⁸ Almoatazbillah Hassan, “The Value Proposition Concept in Marketing: How Customers Perceive the Value Delivered by Firms – A Study of Customer Perspectives on Supermarkets in Southampton in the United Kingdom”, *International Journal of Marketing Studies*, 4, no.3 (2012): pp. 68-87.

²⁹ Peter van Ham, “Place branding: The state of the Art,” p. 127.

³⁰ *Ibid*, p. 129

Every economic and political actor, state and non-state, now needs to include **brand building** and **reputation management** as part of their diplomatic efforts. According to Odins,

“Contemporary brands succeed by getting close to the dreams of their audiences. They promise a better world, and they strive to deliver one. Since nation-states today need to reengage popular support and understanding, they should use the power of branding to deliver a message about their value and values to the widest possible audience.”³¹

Combined, the attitudes of **trust** and **customer satisfaction** elicited consistently from external partners translate into positive images and reputation. An international actor – the sender of a diplomatic message – is then seen as a reliable, responsive, confident, committed and empathetic partner. Significantly, these images build a foundation for a **long-term loyalty**³² in the relationship among the receivers of the messages.

In conclusion, the **quest for image and reputation challenges traditional diplomacy**. Changing global paradigms require critical reflection on the public’s contribution to international relations:

“International relations today have [...] become public [...] they are paid special attention by many groups within the public which also demand their say in decision-making processes. Likewise, politicians who wish to see their foreign policies materialized need the support not only of their own citizens, but also of the foreign public.”³³

In this light, public diplomacy is seen to be a powerful vehicle to facilitate diplomatic relations by working with images and reputation at **the international, non-state level**.

* In the narrow view, public diplomacy deals with the actions of governments to inform and influence foreign publics.

* In the broad view, public diplomacy deals with the transnational impact of all government or private activities “from popular culture to fashion to sports to news to the Internet – that inevitably, if not purposefully, have an impact

³¹ Wolff Odins, cited in Peter van Ham, “Place branding: The state of the Art,” p. 129.

³² Peter van Ham, “Place branding: The state of the Art”


³³ Mladen Andrić and Andrea Gustović-Ercegovac [eds], 13th CEI Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum: Strategic Public Diplomacy (Zagreb: Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, 2012), p. 6.

on foreign policy and national security as well as on trade, tourism and other national interests.”³⁴

* The broad view brings us back to the consideration of soft power – the “ability to shape the preference of others.”³⁵

2. The process of communication and the role of images and perceptions in communication

An effective public diplomacy initiative depends on a successful communication strategy that can influence opinions, win arguments and change perceptions. Let’s look more closely at the **communication process** and the role of images and perceptions in this process.



³⁴Center on Public Diplomacy, University of Southern California, cited by Mark McDowell, “Public Diplomacy at the Crossroads: Definitions and Challenges in an ‘Open Source’ Era,” *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 32, no. 3 (2008), pp. 7–8. [http://www.eastwestcoms.com/images/Public_Diplomacy.pdf], accessed March 2016.

³⁵Joseph S. Nye Jr, “Public diplomacy and soft power,” p. 95.

³⁶Communication Theory (no date). [<http://communicationtheory.org/communication-loop-the-process-of-communication/>], accessed June 2016.

Figure 2 suggests that both the sender and the receiver have images of themselves and of the other party, and that these images influence communication. Therefore, a **successful communication strategy** must:

- * be aware of and take into account both the **self-image** and the **image of the other**,

- * be aware of and trace the **interaction** between these varying images within senders' and receivers' discourses; and

- * remember that image is **dynamic** at both ends – it may change **over short, medium and long periods of time**.

The schema presents a simplified linear model of communication. In reality, there are many factors that add and subtract elements to image building and identity formulation. For example, 'cultural filters' may cause receivers to decode ideas differently than meant by the encoders. As a consequence, culture remains a powerful factor in the dialogue and refractor of mutual perceptions.³⁷

While this handbook focuses mainly on *the image and perceptions held by others of our state or organisation*, it is important to remember the role of **self-images** in communication. We judge how others perceive us by comparing those views to how we see ourselves. For example, external perception could be respectful (the other recognises what you think is positive about yourself), and receptive (the other adopts those features from you that you yourself think are positive) and even flattering (the other sees you even better than you see yourself). However, external perception could also be selective (the other recognises some aspects of what you think is good about yourself, but rejects others aspects), dismissive (the other does not recognise what you think is good about yourself), or prejudiced (the other assigns to you negative qualities which are not present in your view of yourself).

This complex relationship between the *self* and the other (i.e. the sender and receiver of the message) can lead to a number of outcomes. According to

³⁷In the realm of political and normative cultures, often critical for the conduct of public diplomacy, cultural filters are seen to be “based on the interplay between the construction of knowledge and the creation of social and political identity by the subjects of norm diffusion” (Ian Manners, “Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40, no. 2 (2002): pp. 235–58, p.245). A cultural filter “affects the impact of international norms and political learning in third states and organizations leading to learning, adaptation or rejection of norms” (Catarina Kinnvall, *Cultural diffusion and political learning: the democratization of China*. (Lund: Lund University Press, 1995), p. 69.)

Peeren and Horskotte, interaction between external and self-images might lead an actor to reformulate its identity in a productive way and respect the different views of others, but it might also lead to an undesirable reaction, reinforcing negative aspects of the self.³⁸ The goal of a successful communication strategy (and an effective public diplomacy outreach in general) is to facilitate the former scenario.

One way to secure a respectful relation to the different views held by others (and possibly also the productive reformulation of identity) is through meaningful interaction based not only on a nuanced understanding of the self and the other, but also on a true dialogue and mutually productive collaboration.

3. Modes and levels of public diplomacy

In this section, we consider images and perceptions within two conceptual frameworks of modes and levels of public diplomacy.

3.1. Three modes of public diplomacy

Cowan and Arsenault propose a three-way classification of the **modes** of public diplomacy: **monologue**, **dialogue** and **collaboration**.³⁹

1) The **monologue** mode is defined as “*one-way communication to advocate foreign policy strategies.*”⁴⁰ It is a necessary, but limited mode of communication. It has become clear that a heavy reliance on monologue in the world of networks and interdependencies is no longer sufficient

³⁸ Esther Peeren and Silke Horskotte, “Introduction: The shock of the other,” in Silke Horskotte and Esther Peeren [eds], *The Shock of the Other: Situations Alterities* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2007).

³⁹ Geoffrey Cowan and Amelia Arsenault, “Moving from monologue to dialogue to collaboration: The three layers of public diplomacy,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616, no. 1 (2008): pp. 10–30. [https://issuu.com/usc_cclp/docs/annals/1?e=7630767/4717638], accessed March 2016.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

to warrant success to a sender's 'strategic communication'. In contrast, communication modes of **dialogue** and **collaboration** have become crucial.

2) The **dialogue** mode provides an *"opportunity to listen or allow[s] for feedback or critical responses from the audience."*⁴¹ Executed on personal or organisational levels, dialogue is seen as a *"method for improving relationships and increasing understanding, not necessarily for reaching consensus or winning an argument."*⁴²

3) Finally, **collaboration** involves *"initiatives in which participants from different nations participate in a project together."*⁴³ Collaboration efforts could attempt to *"solv[e] shared problems or conflicts, [...] advanc[e] shared visions, and [...] focus on the completion of a physical project"*.⁴⁴ Engaging foreign publics to participate in a concrete joint project to achieve a valuable outcome builds relationships and creates a feeling of trust.

Ideally, the three modes of communication should co-exist and be informed by each other. Despite its limitations, monologue is still necessary *"to convey an idea, a vision, or a perspective and to present it eloquently and clearly."*⁴⁵ At the same time, dialogue and collaboration present numerous challenges in their planning and execution, not least due to the lack of skills among practitioners, as well as a lack of funding.

3.2. Five levels of public diplomacy

Cull describes five **levels** of public diplomacy activities⁴⁶:

1) **Listening** is a prerequisite for all successful public diplomacy. Specifically,

⁴¹ Ibid, p. 16.

⁴² Ibid, p. 19.

⁴³ Ibid, p. 21.

⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 21

⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 13.

⁴⁶ Nicholas J. Cull, "Public diplomacy, taxonomies and histories," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616, no. 1 (2008): pp. 31–54. [<http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/public-diplomacy-taxonomies-and-histori-16570/>], accessed March 2016.

“listening is an actor’s attempt to manage the international environment by collecting and collating data about publics and their opinions overseas and using that data to redirect its policy or its wider public diplomacy approach accordingly.”⁴⁷

2) **Advocacy** means *“an international communication activity to actively promote a particular policy, idea, or that actor’s general interests in the minds of a foreign public.”⁴⁸*

3) **Cultural diplomacy** is an actor’s *“policy to facilitate the export of examples of its culture.”⁴⁹*

4) **Exchange diplomacy** involves an actor *“sending its citizens overseas and reciprocally accepting citizens from overseas for a period of study and/or acculturation.”⁵⁰*

5) **International news broadcasting** involves using media technologies to engage with foreign publics.

From these five levels, **listening** stands out; in reality, it is an integral part of the remaining four. Public diplomacy activities aim to allow the sender of the message to share the message widely. But what if no one listens? Surprisingly, systematic listening to international publics is often overlooked by the makers of foreign policy.⁵¹

From a practical point of view, in order to make the move from *monologue* to *dialogue* and collaboration, one needs to employ effective and systematic *listening* skills. *Listening* skills offer the opportunity to receive both critical and positive feedback and pave the way to productive participation in joint projects. *Listening* is an essential part of a real dialogue, which can lead to relationship building.

On the other hand, a lack of *listening* skills and a heavy reliance on *monologue*, especially coming from the most powerful nations, as argued by Leonard, may be viewed with suspicion by weaker counterparts and former colonies.⁵²

⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 32.

⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 32.

⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 33.

⁵⁰ Ibid, p. 33.

⁵¹ Ibid, 2008

⁵² Mark Leonard Public Diplomacy, London: Foreign Policy Centre (2002) pp. 6–7.

4. How to approach the study of perceptions and images in the framework of public diplomacy

This chapter suggests two inter-linked approaches for monitoring images and perceptions. These two approaches, overviewed by Gregory,⁵³ correspond to the work of two American thinkers – Walter Lippmann and John Dewey – who attempted to conceptualise the influences on public opinion (internal and external) in the 1920s. Gregory argued that Lippmann’s approach can be described as **top-down**: in his view, influence on public opinion originates from *“communication strategies by trusted authorities who would use credible symbols to enlist interest, establish common ground between sender and receiver, and seek to influence opinions and actions.”*⁵⁴ In contrast, Dewey’s vision is described as **bottom-up**: Dewey emphasises discourse and mutual understanding: *“truth and socially useful information occur in the give and take of debate.”*⁵⁵ These two schools of thought have profoundly influenced the conceptualisation and practice of modern-day public diplomacy, as well as studies of perceptions within the framework of public diplomacy.

Gregory postulates that according to the **top-down** approach, it is important to study voices of the ‘trusted authorities’ and imagery that comes through discourse produced by those authorities, which can include:

- * official policies
- * official rhetoric
- * reputable national news media
- * worldviews of individual political leaders
- * the opinions of policy-, decision- and opinion-makers in the spheres of domestic politics, foreign policy (including diplomacy), business, media, academia
- * educational materials (e.g. textbooks, high school and tertiary curricula)

⁵³ Bruce Gregory, “Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field”

⁵⁴ Ibid, p. 278.

⁵⁵ Ibid, p. 278.

For Gregory, the **bottom-up** approach emphasises studying the views of groups.⁵⁶ This involves examining general public opinion, the public opinion of specific groups (e.g. students, migrants and schoolchildren), civil society and social media.

These two approaches to studying the formation of public opinion are not mutually exclusive. They can happen simultaneously and feed into each other. In fact, the way in which they overlap matches very well with a modern understanding of public diplomacy, which combines traditional diplomatic methods (top-down) and the involvement of citizens, often through civil society organisations (bottom-up).

In the field of international relations (IR), studies of images and perceptions have been popular since the 1950s. In his review of image studies in IR, Mišík observed how external perceptions and images were first considered in the context of the standoff between the two superpowers – the USA and the USSR.⁵⁷ He argued that during the 1990s and the early 2000s, there was renewed interest in how to influence and change images in foreign policy in the context of post-Cold War times; shifting global architecture and globalisation; as well as new international threats (e.g. terrorism).⁵⁸ International relations scholarship of this period believed that images provide *“the key to interpreting the action”*; *“the mutual images held by actors affect their mutual expectations about Other’s behaviour and guide the interpretations of the Other’s actions.”*⁵⁹

The first decade of the 2000s featured an acute interest in the external imagery of one international actor: the European Union (EU). Chaban and Holland’s work on external images and perceptions of the EU in the world, and in the Asia-Pacific region in particular, was a pioneering project setting the scene in this field. Beginning in 2002, the EU Global Perceptions project originated in a study of how the EU was perceived in media, public and elite opinion in New Zealand. The study expanded across the Asia-Pacific region with Thailand, Australia and South Korea being added to the collaborative research project in 2004. In 2005, a partnership between the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF)

⁵⁶ Bruce Gregory, “Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field”

⁵⁷ Matúš Mišík “How Can Perception Help Us to Understand the Dynamic between EU Member States? The State of the Art”, *Asia Europe Journal*, 11, no.4 (2013): pp. 445–463.

⁵⁸ One of the latest comprehensive reviews of the images theory is in Richard Herrmann “Perceptions and Image Theory in International Relations.”

⁵⁹ Emanuele Castano et al., “The perception of the other in international relations: Evidence for the polarizing effect of entitativity,” *Political Psychology* 24, no. 3 (2003): pp. 449-450.

and the National Centre for Research on Europe (NCRE) expanded the project further to include a consortium of partner institutions in six locations across Asia: China, Hong Kong SAR, Japan, Singapore, Korea and Thailand.⁶⁰ The project has continued to spread, and by 2016, the project had studied EU images and perceptions in 20 Asia-Pacific locations. The geography of the project included Northeast Asia (China, Japan, Hong Kong SAR, Macao SAR and Korea), Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam), South Asia (India), Australasia (Australia and New Zealand), the Pacific (Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Cook Islands and the Solomon Islands) and the Russian Federation.

The transnational research project *EU Global Perceptions* led by Natalia Chaban and Martin Holland since 2002 includes, in 2016, 34 locations, embracing countries in the Asia-Pacific, Americas, Africa, and the EU's Eastern and Southern Neighbourhoods.⁶¹ This project focused on primary data from three discourses in each location:

- * semi-structured interviews with elites (political, business, civil society and media groups);
- * media content analysis of the press and television (and social media in the most recent projects); and
- * opinion polls of the general public.

In a later stage, the project also considered 'mirror' perceptions: *Asia in the Eyes of Europe* (2010–2012). The two projects within the framework of *EU Global Perception* larger project – *The EU in the Eyes of Asia-Pacific* and *Asia in the Eyes of Europe* – are at the basis of this handbook's methodology and empirical findings.⁶²

Studies of images and perceptions belong to the listening level of public diplomacy activities. Systematic study of images and perceptions through *top-down* and *bottom-up* monitoring of discourses can provide a nuanced and informed understanding of our own images and the perceptions of our international partners. This can point to opportunities for a powerful *monologue* able to convince the partner, as well as for a respectful *dialogue* and productive *collaboration* – the key prerequisites for successful diplomacy between Asia


⁶⁰ ASEF, "Asia in the Eyes of Europe."

⁶¹ Natalia Chaban and Martin Holland, "EU Global Perceptions," [http://www.euperceptions.canterbury.ac.nz], accessed March 2016.

and Europe, as well as within each respective region. Understanding images and perceptions also allows an actor to incorporate positive images and good reputation (and counteract negative images and poor reputation) in ongoing strategies to increase influence and facilitate connections with international partners. Finally, monitoring images and perceptions allows actors to track their evolution over time — another key piece of information in ever-changing world — and predict expectations critical for conduct of international relations.

⁶²See Natalia Chaban and Martin Holland [eds], *The European Union and the Asia-Pacific: Media, Public and Elite Perceptions of the EU* (London: Routledge, 2008); Natalia Chaban and Martin Holland [eds], *Communicating Europe in the Times of Crisis: External Perceptions of the European Union* (Houndmills Palgrave-McMillan, 2014); Natalia Chaban and Martin Holland, “Special issue: Changing external perceptions of the EU?: Visions from the Asia-Pacific,” *Baltic Journal of European Studies* 3, no. 3 (2013). [<http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bjes.2013.3.issue-3/issue-files/bjes.2013.3.issue-3.xml>], accessed March 2016; Natalia Chaban and Martin Holland, “EU external perceptions: from innovation to an established field of study,” in Aasne Kalland Aarstad et al. [eds], *The SAGE Handbook of European Foreign Policy* (London: Sage, 2015), pp. 674-687; Natalia Chaban et al. [eds], *The EU through the Eyes of Asia: New Cases, New Findings* (London: World Scientific Publishing, 2009); Natalia Chaban et al., “Images of the EU beyond its borders: Issue-specific and regional perceptions of European Union power and leadership,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 51, no.3 (2013): pp. 433–451; Chaban, Natalia et al., “Perceptions of normative power. Europe in the shadow of the Eurozone debt crisis: General public perspectives on European integration from the Asia Pacific,” in Annika Björkdahl et al. [eds] *Importing EU Norms? Conceptual Framework and Empirical Findings* (New York: Springer, 2015), pp. 57-78; Natalia Chaban and Ana-Maria Magdalena, “External perceptions of the EU during the Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis,” *European Foreign Affairs Review* 19, no. 2 (2014): pp. 195-220; Ole Elgström and Natalia Chaban, “Studying External Perceptions of the EU: Conceptual and Methodological Approaches,” in Veit Bachmann and Martin Müller [eds], *Perceptions of the EU in Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015), pp. 17-33; Martin Holland and Natalia Chaban [eds], “Reflections from Asia and Europe: How do we perceive one another?” *Asia Europe Journal* 8, no. 2 (2010); Martin Holland et al. [eds], *The EU through the Eyes of Asia: Media, Public and Elite Perceptions in China, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Thailand* (Warsaw: University of Warsaw, 2007); Martin Holland and Natalia Chaban (eds.), *Europe and Asia: Perceptions from Afar*, Nomos: Baden-Baden/Bloomsbury, 2014.

5-POINT SUMMARY



INTERVIEW

“ASIA-EUROPE TRADE REMAINS A VERY STRONG BOND”

Tommy KOH

Ambassador-at-Large,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Singapore

An influential Singaporean diplomat and statesman, Ambassador Tommy Koh was the founding Executive Director of the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF). In 2015, he shared his views with Richard Werly and Prof. Yeo Lay Hwee regarding the best ways to foster the Asia-Europe dialogue.

Q: You have been following the ASEM process since its inception in Bangkok, Thailand in 1996. You were also the first executive director of the Asia-Europe Foundation. What were, then, the main motives behind this transcontinental initiative?

A: Don't forget that Asia and Europe, at that time, I mean 20 years ago, were not in the same situation as they are now. The key question, as China was clearly beginning to emerge, was to attract European investments in this part of the world, and to make sure those two continents, sharing so many historical links, will continue to discuss and look for practical solutions. Europeans, on the other hand, were eager to «fight back» after the launch of the Asia-Pacific economic caucus, centred around the USA. To make it short, both regions needed each other. And soon, the Asian

financial crisis proved us right.

Q: Let us look at ASEM nowadays, 20 years after. Is there not a risk of flying too low, losing visibility and lacking an attractive formal agenda?

A: My main worry is about Europe. At the moment, beyond the usual trade discussions and interests, I feel that European leaders do not pay enough attention to Asia, probably because they are facing too many difficulties in their backyards. They know the Asian region is clearly important for the future of the world, but they have lost this personal commitment which is, very often, making the difference. As an informal club, as an organisation without a secretariat, ASEM relies very much on personalities, on leader-to-leader exchanges of views. Another factor that worries me is the fact that Asian students clearly prefer to go to Australia or the USA. Intellectual bonds are fading between Asia and Europe. It is time to revitalise them and effective public diplomacy campaigns can certainly help.

Q: You are advocating free trade and especially Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). Are you not concerned by the backlash those FTAs face within civil societies? Is this not an obstacle to make ASEM more popular?

A: Between Asia and Europe, trade remains a very strong bond. Probably the strongest as trade never comes alone. Businesses always carry behind a number of initiatives. They sponsor sports events, cultural events, exhibitions. The Silk Road, after all, was primarily about trade. Don't forget that trade is also a very good incentive to deeper knowledge of societies. Those who want to trade need to know the countries/societies they are entering, especially if they intend to invest heavily. So I still believe in trade, and I do think public diplomacy lessons can be drawn from trade. The backlash you are mentioning is a reality. It forces us, before all, to be more convincing in pleading for a productive ASEM.

Q: Recently, several European leaders have proposed a South China Sea mediation. Some have also suggested an ASEM involvement in this difficult strategic issue. Is it realistic?

A: Public diplomacy and traditional diplomacy shall aim at different goals. I think European and Asian leaders can find plenty of convergences to highlight their desire for an increased dialogue, but I have my doubts on bringing the South China Sea issue on the table. There is a serious risk of a military escalation in this part of Asia. Let us be careful about the diplomatic liquid we are pouring on it. We shall be certain to pour water to calm down the tensions.

Q: Overall, you seem to be pessimistic on the future of ASEM. Is it correct?

A: No, you are wrong. I am optimistic, but public diplomacy shall precisely be used to send the right messages to public opinion and media. I believe, for example, that

Europe shall advocate more thoroughly the rule of law. This is what we need in Asia for this region to prosper. Public diplomacy is about highlighting the best practices of our both regions. Rule of law is certainly something Europeans can be proud of.

**“I THINK
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DIALOGUE”**

CHAPTER 4:

HOW TO WORK WITH MEDIA CONTENT

Natalia CHABAN

Abstract

In order to better understand the perceptions of foreign publics, public diplomacy activities have traditionally focused on understanding media discourses. This chapter first discusses why it is important to study images and representations of your country in foreign news media, arguing that it influences both the perceptions of the elite (for example through the CNN-effect) and public opinion. Furthermore, the chapter identifies an intimate link between media and the conduct of public diplomacy, which dates back to the introduction of the telegraph in the 1920s. The Cold War era brought further insights in the power of mass media, while today the media's influence is primarily being shaped by technological transformations.

Subsequently, the chapter provides selected key theoretical frameworks, which help to understand the practical ways to analyse media images and their impact. After providing a short history of scholarly research on the influence of the media on public opinion and politics, Chaban introduces agenda-setting theory, as well as cognitive theory, which assumes that information and the way in which it is presented is central to culture, cognition and social behaviour. The chapter explains Entman's 'cascading activation framing' theory in further detail, as it provides an explanation on how the public framing of ideas about foreign policy and international actors are activated, supported, opposed and changed by leaders, elites, the media and publics

Finally, the chapter provides several key tools that can be used to produce a systematic and nuanced analysis of your country's images in the local media, including the topics of sampling, units of analysis and other methods of media examinations.

Please check the 5-point summary as well at the end of this chapter.

Introduction

As was explained in the preceding chapters, *listening* is an integral component of public diplomacy. Listening activities to better grasp the perceptions of foreign publics have traditionally focused on understanding media discourses. For example, embassies usually monitor regularly how the reputable national media in their host country reports on their home country, summarise the results and send them to their headquarters. Any problematic coverage is processed and reacted to either by a local diplomatic mission, by a central office or even by the government in question.

Embassies usually track reporting on their country in various media:

- * news (press, radio and television broadcasts, online news editions and websites);
- * specialised publications (political party or business newsletters, NGO press releases, community newspapers, etc.);
- * political shows/debates/in-depth analytical programmes in various media; and
- * entertainment programmes (films, theatre, etc.).

However, there is great variety among different political entities in their use of methods to observe media. For example, some embassies run highly systemic analyses, using specially trained experts and sophisticated software, while others simply perform a rather generic descriptive overview. The choice mainly depends on the availability of financial and human resources and the priority that the foreign ministry attaches to the effort of monitoring foreign public opinion and the media. Nevertheless, there are two main challenges for any institution wishing to monitor media for public diplomacy purposes.

The first challenge relates to the ways in which images and representations of your country can be tracked and analysed in a cost-efficient, systematic and nuanced manner, as well as to which media should be observed: reputable or tabloid press; influential or 'weak' media; and what about media sources in

different languages (in multilingual states)? The second challenge addresses the ways to influence these media images and representations. How to devise effective, easily-processed, credible and simple-yet-informative messages that appeal to local newsmakers and their public?

This chapter focuses on the first challenge and:

- * discusses why it is important to study images and representations of your country in news media;
- * identifies an intimate link between media and the conduct of public diplomacy;
- * briefly introduces selected key theoretical frameworks which may help in understanding practical ways to analyse media images and their impact; and
- * in the supplementary reading, offers several key categories that you can use to produce a systematic and nuanced analysis of your country's images in the local media.

The second challenge will be addressed in later chapters of this handbook.

1. Why study media?

Communication scholars are still debating the influence of the media on public opinion, but they agree that **the media has a stronger impact in setting the public agenda in the area of foreign policy, compared to domestic issues**. One of the reasons for the media's influence on public opinion on foreign policy issues is that most people have less first-hand experience with such issues than with domestic topics. For local audiences, most of foreign policy and international relations issues often seem to be more remote, more complex and less engaging than domestic ones, making it less likely that these topics enter everyday conversation between family, friends, neighbours and co-workers. As a result, many people are highly dependent on the news media for information about foreign events, actors and policies. Media representations of foreign actors make a significant contribution to informing and educating citizens and preparing them to join the domestic debate on foreign policy.

1.1. Influence at the elite level

In recent years, observers have also commented on the capacity of news media to **influence the formulation and conduct of foreign policy**. According to Peña, media has the potential to lead to modification of government policies regarding the events covered.¹ International news is claimed to impact foreign policy through the so-called **CNN-effect**, which suggests that policymakers react to the reality created by the news media, rather than to the reality itself.²

1.2. Influence on the public opinion level

The general public often lacks extensive knowledge on foreign policy issues and foreign relations; leading Van Dijk to suggest that, *“in the formation of public opinion about foreign issues, ordinary people remain largely passive targets of political text or talk.”*³ As part of this process, the mass media has a special role in **forming public perceptions** on foreign policy issues and foreign countries. Media representations of foreign events contribute significantly to informing and educating citizens on foreign policy and international relations issues. In addition to providing information, the media also offers analysis and evaluations, putting citizens in the position to judge other nations and the policies and actions of their government in the international arena.

According to Trevor Barr, an Australian journalist, *“we use media to construct*

¹Monica Peña, “News media and the foreign policy decision-making process, CNN or Washington,” *Razón y Palabra*, no. 32 (2003). [<http://www.razonypalabra.org.mx/antiores/n32/mpena.htm>], accessed March 2016.

²See Margaret H. Belknap, “The CNN Effect: Strategic Enabler or Operational Risk?” USAWC Strategy Research Project, 30 March 2001. [http://www.iwar.org.uk/psyops/resources/cnn-effect/Belknap_M_H_01.pdf], accessed March 2016; Steven Livingston, “Clarifying the CNN effect: An examination of media effects according to type of military intervention,” Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government, Research Paper R-18 (June 1997). [<http://www.genocide-watch.org/images/1997ClarifyingtheCNNEffect-Livingston.pdf>], accessed March 2016; Chanan Naveh, “The role of the media in foreign policy decision-making: A theoretical framework,” *Conflict & Communication Online* 1, no. 2 (2002). [http://www.cco.regener-online.de/2002_2/pdf_2002_2/naveh.pdf], accessed March 2016; and Monica Peña, “News media and the foreign policy decision-making process, CNN or Washington.”

³Teun A. Van Dijk, *Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach* (London: Sage, 1998).

our version of what the world is like, and what we regard as important issues in society depends in part on how the media choose to represent them.”⁴ In conclusion, media not only influences the views and perceptions of the local public and elite on foreign counterparts, but it is also a **national barometer** of attitudes and images towards others as well as the self.

2. Media and the conduct of public diplomacy

2.1. The 1920s

According to Gregory,⁵ the 1920s are the starting point for the study of modern public diplomacy. From this early date, public diplomacy practice and scholarship have been intertwined with the media.

In the 1920s, the daily press, which was the main source of political information, was complemented by “*industrial-age communication technologies*”; and “*with the telegraph, shortwave radio, and undersea cables, governments could communicate with foreign ministries, but also directly with the people in other countries*”.⁶ Political leaders now had a chance “*to influence not just other governments but the attitudes and actions of their citizens*.”⁷ For the first time, “*all the deciding elements of mankind could be brought to think about the same ideas, or at least the same names for ideas, simultaneously*.”⁸

⁴Trevor L. Barr, *Newmedia.com.au: The Changing Face of Australia’s Media and Communications* (Crows Nest, NSW Australia: Allen and Unwin, 2000), p. 16.

⁵Bruce Gregory, “Public diplomacy: Sunrise of an academic field,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616, no. 1 (2008): p. 276. [https://smpa.gwu.edu/sites/smpa.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Gregory_Annals311723.pdf], accessed March 2016.

⁶Bruce Gregory, “Public diplomacy: Sunrise of an academic field,” p. 276.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 276.

⁸Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York: Macmillan, 1922), p. 133. [<http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/6456>], accessed March 2016, as cited in Bruce Gregory, “Public diplomacy: Sunrise of an academic field,” p. 277.

2.2. The Cold War era

Gregory argued that during the Cold War era, media and political communication studies, such as Habermas's theory of communicative action, gained popularity. New communications technologies (the advent of television in particular) led communications scholars to introduce influential new ideas such as Marshall McLuhan's 'global village' and 'the medium is the message'. Gregory describes the work of Harold Innis, who suggested that "*communities could be understood as arenas of space not place, connected by symbols, forms and interests communicated over great distances.*"⁹

The emerging insights into the communication process and the power of mass media, as well as the limitations of both in changing attitudes, had relevance for public diplomacy practice. Gregory cites Habermas's study of the 'public sphere', which triggered new concepts in diplomatic practice stressing "*comprehension of cultures and attitudes, cross-cultural dialogue, people-to-people exchanges, and finding common ground in strategic communication.*"¹⁰ Research on such concepts as "*attentive and passive publics, links between media and word of mouth communication, the impact of distance and cultural differences, and the role of media in augmenting rather than changing attitudes*" all influenced public diplomacy practice particularly in the USA.¹¹

2.3. Changing world of global governance and networking

In Gregory's classification, the post-Cold-War period put public diplomacy practice into a new context. Public diplomacy now has to operate in the world of governance that "*occurs increasingly through global and regional associations, substate intergovernmental connections, 'countries within countries' (i.e., Quebec and Kurdistan), and the actions of nonstate actors in civil society.*"¹² It has to operate in the world of digital technologies and non-hierarchical social media, where information is abundant and the quest for public attention is fierce.

⁹ Bruce Gregory, "Public diplomacy: Sunrise of an academic field," p. 281.

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 281.

¹¹ Ibid, p. 281.

¹² Ibid, p. 284.

According to Gregory, “technologies are transforming diplomatic communication. Transparency, speed, volume, and sharply declining transport costs generate greater diversity and competition from third parties, including media. Paper and written messages matter less; electronically mediated images and sounds, body language, and backdrops matter more.”¹³ Hocking suggests that “formerly gatekeepers with considerable control over information and bargaining relationship, diplomats are becoming “boundary spanners” with less control but dealing with more issues and rapidly changing circumstances.”¹⁴ This radically changed media environment means that public diplomacy practitioners need to update their understanding of media and political communication, and they need to pay more attention to framing analysis.

3. Selected insights into the key theories

3.1. The link between public opinion and media

Walter Lippmann’s seminal work *Public Opinion*, published in 1922, profoundly influenced not only media and communications studies, but also scholarship on public diplomacy. For decades, two of Lippmann’s ideas caught the attention of scholars exploring the link between the media and public opinion: Firstly, the public follows the picture in their heads until they are informed they should think otherwise.¹⁵ Secondly, “*In the great blooming, buzzing confusion of the outer world we pick out what our culture has already defined for us, and we tend to perceive that which we have picked out in the form stereotyped for us by our culture.*”¹⁶ The confirmation of pre-existing attitudes through the media is only enhanced by the media’s tendency to tailor the news product to the tastes and preferences

¹³ Ibid, p. 284

¹⁴ Hocking, cited in Bruce Gregory, “Public diplomacy: Sunrise of an academic field,” p. 284. His work on multi-stakeholder diplomacy is discussed in Chapter 3.

¹⁵ Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion*

¹⁶ Ibid.

of the news consumers. Resorting to stereotypical images can facilitate a short cut to resonate with the readers, listeners and viewers of news.

In the 1940s, studies of the influence of media on public opinion focused on propaganda abilities. This was not surprising: the realities of World War II positioned media as a propaganda tool on both sides of the front line.

In the 1960s and 1970s, this focus shifted, and media research started to look into questions as ‘what news makes it into media publications?’ and ‘what influence does this selection process have on what the public thinks about these issues?’ For example, Johan Galtung and Mari Holmboe Ruge looked at factors leading to the inclusion of news in newspapers. In their seminal article they explored the structure of foreign news and famously stated:

“[...] the world consists of individual and national actors, and since it is axiomatic that action is based on the actor’s image of reality, international action will be based on the images of international reality. [...] the regularity, ubiquity and perseverance of news media will in any case make them first-rate competitors for the number-one position as international image-former.”¹⁷

Later research discovered **a set of factors that warrant a higher media visibility** of particular international actors. Westerståhl and Johansson¹⁸ analysed the coverage of international news in Sweden over seven decades. They identified that the importance of countries (e.g. population size and gross national product), as well as their proximity (geographical, commercial and cultural) to the country of news origin, were the most important factors of media visibility. Wu’s study of international news in 38 countries found that the most influential factors for international media visibility are trade volume, the presence of international news agencies, military and political clout and major incidents.¹⁹

¹⁷ Johan Galtung and Mari H. Ruge, “The structure of foreign news,” *Journal of Peace Research* 2, no. 1 (1965): p. 64.

¹⁸ Jörgen Westerståhl and Folke Johansson, “Foreign news: Values and ideologies,” *European Journal of Communication* 9, no. 1 (1994): pp. 71–89.

¹⁹ H. Denis Wu, “Systemic determinants of international news coverage: A comparison of 38 countries,” *Journal of Communication* 50, no. 2 (2000): pp. 110–130.

3.2. Agenda-setting theory

In his popular book on the press and foreign policy, Bernard Cohen wrote that the media “*may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about.*”²⁰ Armed with this idea, Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw devised an influential **agenda-setting theoretical approach**.²¹

The theory enticed hundreds of media and communication scholars with these premises:

- * Subtle but nevertheless powerful effects of mass media may lie in their **selection and presentation of certain issues** (and non-presentation of the other issues).²²
- * Increased visibility of a subject in the media raises the salience of this subject amongst the audience.²³
- * The salience of issues may transfer from one agenda to another (primarily from the news media to the public).

Studies in the 1970s focused originally on surveys of media agenda-setting at the national and local level (but not much on the international level), finding that media were more influential at the national, rather than the local, level.²⁴ At the local level, the public has others ways of obtaining information, through personal experience or personal contacts, whereas at the national level, the media is often the only source of political information. Interestingly, studies of *agenda-setting influence of international news appeared only from the*

²⁰ Bernard C. Cohen, *The Press and Foreign Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 13.

²¹ Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw, “The agenda-setting function of mass media,” *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 36, no. 2 (1972): pp. 176–187. [http://www.unc.edu/~fbaum/teaching/PLSC541_Fall06/McCombs%20and%20Shaw%20POQ%201972.pdf], accessed March 2016.

²² Patrick Roessler, “The individual agenda-designing process: How interpersonal communication, egocentric networks, and mass media shape the perception of political issues by individuals,” *Communication Research* 26, no. 6 (1999): pp. 666–700.

²³ Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw, “The agenda-setting function of mass media.”

²⁴ Philip Palmgreen and Peter Clarke, “Agenda-setting with local and national issues,” *Communication Research* 4, no. 4 (1977): pp. 435–452. [http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/67066/10.1177_009365027700400404.pdf?sequence=2], accessed March 2016

1980s onwards.²⁵

Studies in the 1970s assumed that the extent to which the media had influence had to do with personal factors as well. A new theory was introduced: **the dependency model of the effects of mass media**.²⁶ The leading hypothesis predicted that the less well-formed a person's opinions and attitudes were, the more influence the media could have.

Scholars started looking into how the audiences' needs for orientation on a political issue, interpersonal communication, real-world cues, issue sensitivity and issue quality all impacted the influence of the media. Scholars argued that it is vitally important to identify environmental effects that can intervene before, during and after media exposure. A fast-growing field within agenda-setting research started to focus on the extraneous factors of **real world conditions** (e.g. economic concerns, characteristics of a political system, media environment, etc.) and of **human cognitive autonomy** (e.g. political interest, motivations, need for orientation, degree of political sophistication, etc.).

3.3. Cognitive paradigm

In the 1980s and 1990s, scholars looked at how news media influences 'what to think', 'what to think about' and 'how to think about an issue'. The answers to these questions came from another theoretical approach – **cognitive theory**. This approach assumes that information and its patterning, processing and communication are central to culture, cognition and social behaviour.²⁷

²⁵ John T. McNelly and Fausto Izcaray, "International news exposure and images of nations," *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly* 63, no. 3 (1986): pp. 546–553; Michael B. Salwen and Frances R. Matera, "Public salience of foreign nations," *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly* 69, no. 3 (1992): pp. 623–632; Holli A. Semetko, et al., "TV news and U.S. public opinion about foreign countries: The impact of exposure and attention," *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 4, no. 1 (1992): pp. 18–36. [<http://ijpor.oxfordjournals.org/content/4/1/18.full.pdf>], accessed March 2016; Wayne Wanta and Yu-Wei Hu, "The effects of credibility, reliance, and exposure on media agenda-setting: A path analysis model," *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly* 71, no. 1 (1994): pp. 90–98; and Wayne Wanta et al., "Agenda-setting and international news: Media influence on public perceptions of foreign nations," *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly* 81, no. 2 (2004): pp. 364–377.

²⁶ Sandra Ball-Rokeach and Melvin DeFleur, "A dependency model of mass-media effects," *Communication Research* 3, no. 1 (1976): pp. 3–21.

²⁷ James Beniger "Communication – embrace the subject, not the field," *Journal of Communication* 43, no. 3 (1993): pp. 18–25.

Its central notion is the cognitive notion of **schema**, or simplified maps of how political facts and figures can be organised into a meaningful whole.²⁸

A central notion in the cognitive paradigm is the concept of **framing**. While there is no single accepted definition of framing, this chapter uses Entman's popular and widely accepted definition: "*to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation.*"²⁹ Researchers differentiate between:

- * **Media frames:** how the news is presented by the media, through choices of language and repetition of certain story schemas that organise and frame reality in distinctive ways;³⁰ and

- * **Audience frames:** how news is comprehended. A schema of interpretations that enables individuals to perceive, organise and make sense of incoming information.³¹

3.4. 'Cascading activation framing' theory

Entman argues that **framing** is essentially "*the central process by which government officials and journalists exercise political influence over each other and over the public.*" Moreover, for Entman, "*successful political communication requires the framing of events, issues, and actors in ways that promote perceptions and interpretations that benefit one side while hindering the other.*"³² These ideas led Entman to propose the **cascading activation framing** model, in which he explores contests over public framing of ideas,

²⁸ Doris A. Graber, *Mass Media and American Politics*, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1984).

²⁹ Robert M. Entman, "Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm," *Journal of Communication* 43, no. 4 (1993): p. 52.

³⁰ Jack McLeod et al. "On Understanding and Misunderstanding Media Effects", In J. Curran and M. Gurevitch [eds], *Mass Media and Society* (London: Arnold, 1991), pp. 235-266.

³¹ Zhongdang Pan and Gerald M. Kosicki, "Framing analysis: An approach to news discourse," *Political Communication* 10, no. 1 (1993): pp. 55-75.

³² Robert M. Entman, "Cascading activation: Contesting the White House's frame after 9/11," *Political Communication* 20, no. 4 (2003): p. 417.

as well as how these frames are supported, opposed and changed by leaders, elites, the media and publics.³³

As shown in Figure 1, the cascading activation theory tells us that powerful ideas spread from one location to another in the domestic network, from the national administration, down to other elites (including the media), to images or 'frames' disseminated via the news and finally to the general public.

Importantly, the ability to promote the spread of ideas on foreign policy is not the same at each level. According to this model, ideas that start at the top level – the national administration – are the strongest, followed by messages framed by national elite networks and journalists. As in a real cascade or waterfall, the flow is easier from the top downwards than in reverse. Entman argues that *“spreading ideas higher, from lower levels to upper, requires extra energy.”*³⁴

Public opinion is at the bottom of the hierarchy. It sometimes feeds back to influence elites. Media is the key avenue in spreading ideas from the public up to where they affect the thinking of elites and administration, although the flow of ideas from the public upwards is generally weak. According to Entman *“If the news creates impressions that the idea is held widely and intensely by large swaths of the public, it can affect leaders’ strategic calculations and activities,”* and more importantly, *“this perception of where the public stands itself becomes a matter of framing, an object of political power and strategy.”*³⁵ Despite the difficulty of the public to reach the elite and the administration, the public can still provide occasional feedback to influence elites’ views on external policies, mainly through the media. Adding to Entman’s arguments, social media and digital platforms might be strengthening the upward-flow mechanism, as it enables a large number of people to discuss, create momentum and feed back into the foreign policy debate.

Each level in the metaphorical cascade makes its own contribution to the mix and flow of ideas, yet the ‘cascading activation’ model emphasises the key role of the media in the spreading and activation of ideas on foreign policy


³³ Robert M. Entman, “Cascading activation: Contesting the White House’s frame after 9/11,” and Robert M. Entman, *Projections of Power: Framing news, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).

³⁴ Robert M. Entman, “Cascading activation: Contesting the White House’s frame after 9/11,” p. 420.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 420.

and international relations, both up and down the cascade. For spreading ideas downwards, the interaction between journalists and elites is of particular importance. For spreading ideas upwards, the media is a “pumping mechanism”³⁶ helping the public – the weakest group in initiating and spreading foreign policy ideas – to provide feedback to elites and administration. If the media creates the impression that an idea enjoys prominent public support, it “can affect leaders’ strategic calculations and activities.”³⁷

FIGURE 1: CASCADING ACTIVATION FRAMING MODEL IN SPREADING IDEAS ON FOREIGN POLICY³⁸



³⁶ Ibid, p. 420

³⁷ Ibid, p. 420.

³⁸ Entman, 2003, p. 419

The cascading activation framing model differentiates between frames that are capable to “stimulate support of or opposition to the sides in a political conflict”³⁹; and frames that fail to stir activation of the ideas. The former frames, according to Entman, are able to culturally resonate within and across different levels in the network; they are noticeable, understandable, memorable and emotionally charged. Furthermore, they are characterised by magnitude; they feature prominently and are often repeated.

While administration is distinguished from other elite networks due to its “independent ability to decide which mental associations to activate and the highest probability of moving their own thoughts into general circulation,”⁴⁰ it not easy to determine where the line between ‘elite’ and ‘journalist’ should be drawn, and who influences whom. For Entman,

*“The network of journalists consists of reporters, columnists, producers, editors, and publishers who work for the important national media. They communicate regularly with colleagues inside and beyond their own organizations. Informal networks of association among news organizations also set up a cueing system that runs roughly from the pinnacle occupied by the New York Times and a few other elite outlets to other national media, to regional newspapers, and to local papers and television stations. Administration figures and other elites maintain social and professional contact with upper-tier journalists, exchanging information off the record and on, at receptions, conferences, and elsewhere.”*⁴¹

Entman notes that “this interface between journalists and elites is a key transmission point for spreading activation of frames, and ... [a]rguably, a few top editors, correspondents, and editorialists exercise more sway over the spread of ideas than all but the most powerful public officials.”⁴²

Entman emphasises that all actors possess a number of cognitive limitations. Each party, guided by various motives, is a ‘cognitive miser’, working “in accordance with established mental maps and habits”, rarely undertaking “a comprehensive review of all relevant facts and options before responding.”⁴³ As such, their levels of competence and understanding vary. Pressure and

³⁹ Ibid, p. 417.

⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 420.

⁴¹ Ibid, p. 420.

⁴² Ibid, p. 420.

⁴³ Ibid, p. 420.

uncertainty rule, and there is a severe lack of time and motivation to mine for nuanced, complicated and multifaceted information about foreign policy actors and situations. For Entman, these cognitive limitations imply that *“what passes between levels of the cascade is not comprehensive understanding but highlights packaged into selective, framed communications.”*⁴⁴

In the words of Entman, *“As we go down the levels, the flow of information becomes less and less thorough, and increasingly limited to the selected highlights, processed through schemas, and then passed on in ever-cruder form. The farther an idea travels between levels on the cascade, the fainter the traces of the ‘real’ situation are – whether the actual perceptions, goals, and calculations of the president way at the top, or the true mix of public sentiments moving from the bottom back up to policymakers.”*⁴⁵

3.5. Common knowledge paradigm

Another influential approach is the **common knowledge** paradigm.⁴⁶ This approach explores how political information is organised and structured in the public discourses of different media and how that information compares with public and elite perceptions. It advocates the idea of constructionism and is informed by both **cognitive** and **agenda-setting** approaches. It looks at the interaction between the media and the public, rather than just the effect of the media on the public and includes the ‘what’ and ‘how’ of public thought, rather than just an opinion. Another key assumption of this approach is that people *“learn from their media encounters – perhaps not a lot each time, but the result of a habit of news attention is an accumulation of political information.”*⁴⁷

4. Moving from theory to practical application

So far, this chapter introduced the key role of news media in informing and

⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 421

⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 421

⁴⁶ Russell W. Neuman et al., *Common Knowledge: News and the Construction of Political Meaning* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1992). Chapter 1. [<http://www.wrneuman.com/works/commonk.pdf>], accessed March 2016.

⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 115.

educating both the general public and elites about foreign partners. In all its forms — press, television, radio or Internet — news media remains a key agent in spreading selected highlights about international relations and international partners, as well as foreign policy priorities and local attitudes towards partners in the region and globally. The chapter traced the long-standing link between media and public diplomacy efforts. We concluded that effective public diplomacy requires advanced skills in identifying and understanding those messages and frames about your home country that dominate local media. It also requires learning to create and disseminate prominent and culturally resonant messages and frames about your home country in the host country media.

The remainder of this chapter aims to help you put your theoretical knowledge to practical use through a systematic methodology for monitoring media. It presents and illustrates a list of key categories for media analysis. When it comes to creating and disseminating messages and frames about your home country, contacts and networking with local newsmakers and information gatekeepers is a key prerequisite. This is discussed in greater detail chapter 7.

BIG QUESTION #1: **How do you ensure that the media you monitor is a representative sample?**

In statistics and survey methodology, one of the basic premises is that you need to work with a **representative sample**: a small subset of items (individuals, materials, data) whose characteristics represent the full population. So how do you ensure the media you monitor is representative? The most typical answer is that you should aim for a sample that is as random (i.e. each item has an equal chance as others to be selected) and as large as possible.

However, in reality there are many media outlets to monitor, while your time, staff, resources and energy are limited.

On the one hand, your analysis needs to follow some strict procedures and provide a comparison between different types of media outlets. On the other hand, you need a sample that is fairly narrow in scope and nature in order

to facilitate a realistic execution.⁴⁸ To achieve this, it is necessary to select which media examples to observe. Criteria for this decision might include:

- * the reputation of the media outlet in a country (i.e. its level of influence)
- * circulation numbers or audience ratings
- * diverse ownership features
- * political diversity
- * national and regional distribution
- * a range of styles and formats (tabloid/broadsheet)
- * regularity (daily/weekly/monthly)
- * diverse genres (press/radio/TV/Internet)
- * linguistic diversity (in multilingual countries)
- * religious diversity (in relevant locations)
- * different time periods for monitoring (e.g. during 'peak' periods such as during your country's elections or a major UN convention; or daily over a period of years)

BIG QUESTION #2:

Which data units do you want to collect and analyse: articles, pictures, titles and/or sentences which reference your country?

There is certain flexibility in what you actually observe. The most typical unit of media content analysis is an **article** – with a title, subtitle, text body and accompanying pictures/maps/cartoons (plus readers' comments, if you are looking at the e-edition of a regular paper or an e-paper). The television news article as a unit of analysis usually includes an introduction by an anchor (often with a static picture on the topic in the background), followed by a video (sometime with photos inside the video), with accompanying audio text, and often an additional text appearing on the screen as captions. However, sometimes, you may need to make a more focused choice – for example,

⁴⁸ See Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi, with Kaarle Nordentreg, Robert Stevenson, and Frank Ugboajah (eds), *Foreign News in Media: International Reporting in 29 Countries* (Paris: UNESCO, 1985), p. 10. [<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0006/000652/065257eo.pdf>], accessed March 2016.

collect and analyse only texts (audio or written), or only photos/cartoons or only titles – depending on the task at hand and your analytical skills.

Once you decide on the media format, you will need to think about how to sample the media units. Here are several relevant questions to ask:

- * What are your key words (e.g. your country name, your capital, your country leaders and institutions, adjectives based on your country's name, i.e., Indian, Russian, French, etc.)?

- * Which sections of the media unit will you include? All sections, only editorials, only the foreign news section, only the domestic trade and business section, and will you include the sports section?

- * Which editions will you include? All days of the week? Only working day editions? Weekend editions?

- * Which search engines will you use? Will you manually collect the media data and work with the hard copies of the selected media outlet? Or will you use electronic search engines to access media data? Electronic search engines may be provided by the outlet, designated national e-news archives or an international search dataset (e.g. Factiva, PressReader). Do you have sufficient skills and funds to access these search engines?

Whatever choice you make, you need to keep in mind what you are leaving out. Each choice comes with its limitations.

BIG QUESTION #3: **How to analyse the content of selected articles in the selected media outlets?**

There are many ways to conduct a media analysis. This handbook presents one recommended method, using a limited number of categories that you can apply in a systematic way to analyse various types of media – press, broadcast and the Internet. These categories are:

- * overall volume and placement
- * news sources
- * degree of centrality
- * thematic frame

- * evaluation
- * actors
- * visual support

We will look at each category separately, complementing them with examples.

Category 1: Overall volume and placement

Theory tells us that a higher volume of coverage of a topic and a more prominent placement leads to better visibility for the topic. A larger volume of coverage of a foreign policy actor may transform into a higher salience of that actor.

Here are some ways to measure volume and placement of coverage:

- * How many articles reference your key search terms?
- * How many words/characters are there in each article?
- * How many square cm/minutes long is this piece of news?
- * In the press/Internet, did the article come with a picture(s)? How big is the picture? How many pictures are accompanying the article?
- * On what page did the article appear? On what part of the page? On the Internet, the home page, and in print media, the upper part of the front page, attracts more attention, conveys the idea of the importance and thus the salience of a foreign actor for the public. In what segment of a television news show did the coverage occur? Top stories are usually introduced in the beginning and revisited several times during the bulletin – by anchors and by a running line at the bottom of the screen.
- * How does the volume change over time (e.g. from one month to another; or before and after a key event)?

Category 2: News sources

Sigal notes that “sources make the news.”⁴⁹ According to a 1979 UNESCO report,

⁴⁹ Leon V. Sigal, “Who? Sources make the news,” in Robert Karl Manoff and Michael Schudson [eds], *Reading the News* (New York: Pantheon, 1986).

one of the most contentious aspects “of the entire debate on international news reporting has been the role of the Western news agencies as the dominant creators and “gatekeepers” of such news.”⁵⁰ Despite the increasing role of social media in making and disseminating news, and the growing popularity of non-Western news sources (e.g. Al Jazeera), Western news agencies remain influential sources of information worldwide. According to Van Ginneken, international news agencies “have a quasi-monopoly in providing prime definitions of breaking news in the world periphery. Even if they are not first on the spot, they are usually the first to inform the rest of the world.”⁵¹

Sources can be coded according to the following categories:

- * **International sources** (international news agencies, such as CNN, AP, and Bloomberg, and non-local journalists/authors who are published in a local newspaper)

- * **Local news sources** (home news agencies, e.g. the BBC in the UK and local correspondents: local outlet staffers either inside the country (i.e. editors, the regular opinion columnists, financial writers, desk journalists, etc.); or correspondents in foreign locations (i.e. in-house foreign correspondents who ensure their organisations have timely, tailored, international intelligence or freelancers and stringers located internationally)

- * **Mixed** (some news items combine international wire materials with analyses provided by a local author, e.g. Economic editor/Reuters)

- * **N/A** (if the sources are unknown or impossible to identify)

Information on the local news writers who most frequently report your country is an asset to public diplomacy as these individual could be among the priority target groups of your outreach.

Category 3: Degree of centrality

This category addresses the intensity of the representation of your topics (i.e.,

⁵⁰ Leon V. Sigal, “Who? Sources make the news,” in Robert Karl Manoff and Michael Schudson [eds], *Reading the News* (New York: Pantheon, 1986).

⁵¹ Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi, with Kaarle Nordentreg, Robert Stevenson, and Frank Ugboajah (eds), *Foreign News in Media: International Reporting in 29 Countries*.

the representation of your country in the news item), or degree of centrality⁵²: is it mentioned in passing, as a secondary theme or as a dominant theme? Here is a breakdown of the relevant terminology:

- * **Dominant theme:** the story focuses solely on your country.
- * **Secondary theme:** events in your country are described as equally important to other events in the story.
- * **Minor perspective:** your country is mentioned in passing.

Many media scholars exclude news stories with only a brief reference to the country in question. Other researchers, however, find it important to pay attention to all available information, based on the idea that each mention of a country contributes, even if just a little bit, to the readers' accumulation of knowledge about that country (think back to the *common knowledge paradigm* introduced in the theoretical part for this chapter). If an issue (or country) is predominantly represented with just minor references, this arguably undermines the overall media visibility of that issue, inducing the perception of insignificance and marginality.

Category 4: Thematic frame

Another aspect to analyse is the thematic frame within which the news is presented. As discussed in the theoretical part of the chapter, the choice of frames influences the reader's perceptions and the interpretation. Such frames can be coded, for example, as political, economic, socio-cultural, environmental and developmental frames, but not limited to these examples.

Category 5: Evaluation

The category of evaluation, measured through the coders' assessment of explicit judgements and the tone of reporting (textual and visual images), is

⁵²The notion of degree of centrality of news used here is similar to the definition used by Deirdre Kevin in *Europe in the Media: A Comparison of Reporting, Representation and Rhetoric in National Media Systems in Europe* (London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2003).

somewhat controversial and ambiguous. Yet, it is widely used in communication studies. The judgements and tone in reporting are considered to be tools to trigger emotional responses from the readers, and as such they have a strong impact on readers' interpretation of news.

Category 6:

Actors

An analysis of actors covered in a news story will clarify who is framed by local media as the most visible, and thus most salient, actor. Relevant questions to ask when making such an analysis include:

- * Who are the main actors in the news stories?
- * Which actors from your country are the most visible in the local coverage of your country?
- * In which contexts, and how are they evaluated?
- * Which local actors are reported to be the most interactive with your country's actors?

Information on the most visible local actors in the context of your country coverage may help your public diplomacy efforts, as well as your general diplomacy activities. You may consider approaching and engaging with those individuals on a regular basis.

Category 7:

Visual support

Visual images (photographs, maps, cartoons, diagrams or videos) help readers to process information by illustrating the main actors and events. They also attract attention to news items by increasing visibility, which may result in higher salience assigned by the readers to the issue covered in the news item. Visual images also provide information (for example, in cases where the audience does not actually read or listen to the news item).

Visual images may reinforce the textual message, or they may undermine it, when they do not match the thematic framing, evaluation or intensity.

When analysing visual support, you can ask:

- * How does the visual image relate to the text of the news item?
- * Is your country situated in a central position in the image?
- * How does this degree of centrality relate to the degree of centrality in the news item text?
- * Does the image of your country frame your country in the same way as the text does?
- * Do the visual images of your country carry any evaluation?
How does this evaluation relate to the evaluation conveyed in the text?

In conclusion, there are many different ways to conduct media analysis for the purpose of better understanding foreign perceptions of your home country. This diverse set of methods can be tailored to the specific needs of the embassy, depending on the political, social, cultural or financial situation.

5-POINT SUMMARY

1

The media has a strong impact in forming public perceptions.

2

The media has a long-standing link to public diplomacy efforts, dating back to the 1920s.

3

The 'Cascading activation framing' theory explains how the public framing of ideas about foreign policy and international actors are activated, supported, opposed and changed by leaders, elites, the media and publics.

4

Public diplomacy requires advanced skills in identifying and understanding messages and frames about the home country that dominate foreign media.

5

Public diplomacy requires learning to create and disseminate prominent and culturally resonant messages and frames about your home country in the host country media.

HANDLING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: HOW TO ENGAGE MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION PROFESSIONALS

Public Diplomacy is not only a matter of crafting the right message. It is also compulsory to disseminate this message adequately. Human Resources and Management are the keys. In Europe and Asia, experts shared their views with Richard Werly.

Welcome to the fantasy land of Public Diplomacy! Imagine yourself at the helm of a well-funded campaign to promote ASEM among ASEM 53 partners. Slogans are set. Key words are in place. Designers have provided your organisation with posters, brochures, templates and website artwork. Are you done? Certainly not. There you are, bumping up against what remains the chief obstacle: how will you handle such a campaign? Who will you recruit and bring on board to make sure your message reaches the hearts and minds of the public you target?

Former Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan is one of the right persons to talk to when it comes to the impact of public diplomacy for regional organisations. As a former foreign affairs minister of Thailand, Dr Surin Pitsuwan has overviewed a number of initiatives to promote his own country and later to enhance the image of the Jakarta-based ASEAN. His views? *“Public diplomacy brings*

us, diplomats, into somewhat uncharted territory. We are not used to experiment with direct interaction with the public. We are also very keen at crafting our messages precisely, while image building resorts very much on using clichés, and sometime caricatures.” We turn to Baroness Ashton, former High Representative for the European Union on external affairs and security. Lady Catherine Ashton did not have an easy time in Brussels during her tenure as High Representative. She had to oversee the building up from scratch of a European External Action Service, drawing resources from both the European Commission staff, and national diplomacies apparatus. Her conclusion, shared with us during the aftermath of an EU-China Summit in 2012: *“Public diplomacy has an immense merit as it forces diplomats to interact with other clusters of society. Diplomacy has always been secluded, even within national administrations. Forcing diplomats to listen and to share experiences is, in itself, quite an achievement.”*

Let us list here the key actors for a successful public diplomacy campaign. The first ones, undoubtedly, are the media. Without good media coverage – either traditional or online – you will encounter difficulties at reaching the wider public. Media are essential as they are the ones transmitting and disseminating the information you have carefully crafted to

suit your needs and your political agenda. But media are not easy to handle, especially in time of crisis. Is the information division within your respective MFA well equipped? If this is not certain, then our advice is to rely on a team comprising diplomats and public relations (PR) professionals, as they will be more prone to avoid media-diplomat confrontation. Leo Dobbs is a long-time veteran of the Agence France Press and Reuters in Asia, having been posted in Bangkok, Hong Kong and Phnom Penh. Now serving as editor of the website of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), he confirms: *“Diplomats are best at emitting information. Their job is to carefully write communiqués. But when it comes to be convincing, and to make sure that the reporters you talk with are the right ones for that specific mission, relying on dedicated PR teams proves often useful.”*

Image is the essential factor

Same feedback from Kavi Chongkittavorn, from The Nation daily newspaper in Bangkok, Thailand: *“I have been interacting with diplomats for the last four decades and I’ve noticed how panicked they may become when media are starting to challenge their views. The key to manage a public diplomacy campaign is to be able to answer tough questions. Your starting point shall not be: This journalist crowd will believe what I am telling them, but exactly the opposite: How can I make sure they do not dump my whole sets of arguments.”*

Image is the second essential factor: building a good image, after handling the media wisely. Suppose that you are in position to handle adequate means of dissemination. If you have an advertising campaign to broadcast, better make sure at first that you are not

being cheated by the TV channel or media group you are dealing with. Advertising is not only about your TV spot qualities. It is also very much about the timing, the cost of broadcasting, and the sequence. Are diplomats well trained to handle those issues? No. So do not hesitate to outsource. Philippe Le Corre, now a Washington-based visiting fellow for the Brookings Institution working on Europe and Asia, and who used to work for Publicis Worldwide, a large PR/advertising firm, says: *“Being cheated is very easy when you interact with television. They know you are eager to broadcast your message. And TV costs are high. So do not hesitate to rely on retired TV producers, who may give you the help you need in terms of setting the right contract and paying the right price”*. A Chinese TV veteran I met in Beijing on the sidelines of the 7th ASEM Summit in 2008 did explain to us, nevertheless, that professionalism is not always the criteria: *“Very often, especially in Asia, TV networks owners have their own contact within the administration and within government. You are not at all free to choose the network you want. But that is also something you should know how to handle.”*

Managing a public diplomacy campaign is therefore a specific mission. And it is far better when diplomats can share this task with outsourced consultants or professionals, who will remain under their authority but may provide the instant solutions you need. Because this is the last point you shall keep in mind: tough questions need quick answers. The more you wait, the more you lose time, money and credibility. Efficiency is the prime goal. The public diplomacy statecraft requires a flexible, diligent and efficient combination of talents.

CHAPTER 5:

HOW TO WORK WITH PUBLIC OPINION

Ronan LENIHAN

Abstract

Understanding public opinion is an essential component of successful public diplomacy, as practitioners must have up-to-date and accurate information on the attitudes and preferences of target audiences. In fact, public diplomacy can be described as a ‘diagnostic tool’ to evaluate the effects of policies and identify potential failures or gaps in public diplomacy campaigns. This chapter introduces techniques to gather, analyse, categorise, and contextualise information from public opinion surveys, polls, barometers, and other instruments in a systematic way. These techniques and resources will help you to develop your outreach efforts and to measure the impact of existing public diplomacy efforts.

The chapter first presents the history of surveying public opinion and explains the role of public opinion from the 1930s until today. At present, it is particularly important for public diplomacy strategies, as they increasingly focus on establishing a positive nation brand, for which the prime audience is the foreign public. The chapter furthermore suggests some ways to use public opinion data in public diplomacy, and provides tools to better understand the methodology of public opinion polls, in order to avoid the misinterpretation of data and wasted resources.

Today, practitioners can draw on a large set of public opinion polls and surveys, covering the public perceptions among foreign publics. To make sense of the wealth of the many different instruments, the second part of the chapter maps some of the key global, regional, bi-regional and specialist polls.

Please check the 5-point summary as well at the end of this chapter.

Introduction

This chapter introduces techniques to gather, analyse, categorise and contextualise information from public opinion surveys, polls, barometers and other instruments in a systematic way. These techniques and resources will help you to develop your outreach efforts and to measure the impact of existing public diplomacy efforts. Part 1 of the module presents the history of surveying public opinion, suggests some ways to use public opinion data in public diplomacy and explains how to understand public opinion survey data. Part 2 introduces some of the key global, regional, bi-regional and specialist polls, including case studies on several useful examples.

1. Introduction to public opinion

Understanding public opinion is an essential component of successful public diplomacy. Public opinion provides answers to questions such as:

- * How is your country perceived?
- * What are key issues for engagement with your country?
- * Are you seen as a credible partner or not?
- * What influence do you have on global affairs?

These valuable insights allow practitioners to develop and track an effective strategy to reach the public and aid in improving the image and engagement of their country abroad.

Chapter 1 introduced various definitions of public diplomacy. Common to many of these are the aspects of influencing, engaging and listening to foreign and (in some cases) domestic audiences. Besides exploring foreign media content – which was introduced in the previous chapter – analysing public opinion is a useful tool for **listening** in the context of public diplomacy and provides insight on how best to influence and engage.

One good method of understanding public opinion is through surveys of public attitudes, perceptions and understanding. Given the availability and prominence of public opinion data in global affairs, this module focuses primarily on the different survey instruments to gauge public opinion.

However, public opinion survey data has limitations. To run a successful public diplomacy campaign, a practitioner must have up-to-date and accurate information on the attitudes and preferences of target audiences. Survey data can provide this, but only up to a certain point. In the context of America's use of survey data in its public diplomacy in the Middle East and North Africa post 9/11, public opinion specialist Mark Tessler states that public diplomacy *"will succeed only if guided by a proper understanding of the attitudes and orientations of Arab and Muslim publics. Such an understanding requires attention not only to what people think but also to why they hold particular views."*¹

Essentially, public opinion data is a useful tool, but it is just one of many tools in the toolbox. As discussed in chapter 4, media analysis is essential for monitoring a country's image, while chapter 7 will expand on stakeholder engagement, another area of great importance in any public diplomacy effort. Chapter 4 introduced framing and 'cascade activation', where public opinion is shaped by the actions of elites and media and, at the same time, can influence policymakers and media gatekeepers.

Practitioners can now draw on a large body of methodologically rigorous scientific work covering, among other topics, local and domestic perceptions of other countries and a variety of global policy issues. The use of surveys in longitudinal research allows us to understand trends over time, rather than just capturing a snapshot in time.

Understanding these trends can assist practitioners to develop new public diplomacy campaigns and evaluate the success of earlier campaigns. However, it is essential to look at survey results within the appropriate political and cultural context and to understand why and how public opinion matters. Without this understanding, policymakers and practitioners will be unsure of which results matter and which can safely be ignored.

¹Mark Tessler, "Public opinion in the Arab and Muslim world: Informing US public diplomacy," in Joseph McMillan [ed] 'In the Same Light as Slavery: Building a Global Antiterrorist Consensus' (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University Press, 2006), p. 9. [<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=100760&lng=en>], accessed March 2016.

1.1. History

Modern-day public opinion surveying originates in the 18th and 19th centuries. From the early ‘straw polls’ in the USA, polling gradually became more prominent, with the ‘horse race’ polls on elections gaining in popularity.²

The early 20th century saw a spike in interest in both theorising the nature of public opinion and systematic collection of data on public opinion. The seminal work of Walter Lippmann and John Dewey (both introduced in chapter 3) in the 1920s put public opinion discourse in the spotlight.³ At the same time, the famous *Literary Digest* poll accurately predicted the winners of the US presidential race from 1920 to 1932. However, its influence waned following a significant breakthrough in public opinion surveying in 1936.⁴ Using a new methodology, George Gallup predicted Roosevelt’s landslide victory in 1936, flying in the face of the conventional polls of the time, most of which had predicted a loss for Roosevelt.⁵

This shift had an impact on the development of public opinion surveys in Europe before and after World War II. A European pioneer, Jean Stoetzel, Professor of Social Psychology at the Sorbonne, set up the Institut Français d’Opinion Publique (IFOP) in Paris in 1938. In 1939, one of its first polls, ‘Why die for Danzig?’, tackled the issue of appeasement of Germany and French foreign policy and showed that 76% of the public supported going to war over Danzig.

Following the war, the Allies used extensive public opinion surveys in Germany to steer the successful denazification process throughout 1947-1948. This was an important element in tracking attitudes in post-war Germany. It also

²The term ‘horse race journalism’ – which is mainly conducted during political elections – was introduced due to its resemblance to the coverage of horse races: emphasis is placed on polling data and public perception, rather than the policies of the candidate. “For journalists, the horse-race metaphor provides a framework for analysis. A horse is judged not by its own absolute speed or skill, but rather by its comparison the speed of other horses, and especially by its wins and losses.” (Anthony Broh, “Horse-Race Journalism: Reporting the Polls in the 1976 Presidential Election,” *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 44, no. 4 (1980): 514-529.)

³See Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York: Macmillan, 1922). [<http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/6456>], accessed March 2016; and John Dewey, *The Public and its Problems* (New York, NY: Holt Publishers, 1927).

⁴Peverill Squire, “Why the 1936 literary digest poll failed,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 52, no. 1 (1988): 125-133.

⁵George Gallup and Claude Robinson, “American institute of public opinion – surveys, 1935-38,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 2, no. 3 (1938): 373-398.

illustrated the use of public opinion as a tool in developing policy and tracking important trends other than election results.

Public opinion surveys were taken up later in Asia, perhaps in part linked to their primary use as tools to predict election results, and the different political systems across Asia. For instance, Japan carried out its first election poll in 1967, while other countries began undertaking social surveys in the 1980s and 1990s.

Following 9/11, American interest in public opinion surveys increased. This was due in part to the attention surrounding cross-national surveys on issues of concern to American foreign policy conducted by international research agencies such as Pew and Gallup. These surveys focused on issues such as democracy, intervention (in Iraq and Afghanistan) and values and perceptions of external actors (mainly linked to ‘anti-Americanism’).⁶

The Pew *Global Attitudes Project*’s widely publicised 2003 report illustrated that “the bottom has fallen out” of America’s support in the Arab and Muslim worlds.⁷ This report played a major role in galvanising public and policy attention to the usefulness of public opinion data: the scientific nature of the numbers (coupled with the low figures) captured public and policymakers’ attention. The ‘why do they hate us?’ debate brought public opinion data to the domain of public diplomacy, as the USA tried to understand how best to win ‘the hearts and minds’ war domestically and abroad.

The future of public opinion polling might become heavily influenced by the major developments in data analytics, due to the large amount of information stored on Internet servers concerning users’ perceptions, interests and preferences. New methods of analysing such data will be helpful in creating more depth to understanding public opinion and public perceptions about foreign countries.

⁶ See Gallup, “Perceptions of Foreign Countries,” [http://www.gallup.com/topic/perceptions_of_foreign_countries.aspx], accessed March 2016; and Pew Research Center, “U.S. Global Image and Anti-Americanism,” [<http://www.pewresearch.org/topics/u-s-global-image-and-anti-americanism/pages/2/>], accessed March 2016.

⁷ Pew Global Attitudes Project, *Views of a Changing World: June 2003* (Washington, D.C.: The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, 2003). [<http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2003/06/Views-Of-A-Changing-World-2003.pdf>], accessed March 2016.

2. The role of public opinion in public diplomacy

Public opinion data is a useful tool to help diplomats – and other professionals – navigate complexity. However, to use public opinion data effectively, diplomats need to understand the role such data plays in public diplomacy. Public opinion data can be best described as a **diagnostic tool**, allowing evaluation of the effects of policies and identification of potential failures or gaps in public diplomacy campaigns. Essentially, public opinion data can help identify ‘red-zones’ of contention or ‘green-zones’ of consensus. It is then up to the practitioners to decide on a path forward.

Marketing companies have been gathering knowledge on public attitudes and understanding for decades. In fact, a nation brand has more in common with the leading consumer brands of soft drinks or laundry detergents than you might think. Both are trying to portray a positive, consistent image to potential consumers (visitors, investors, etc.). **Place branding** is now a real concern for public diplomacy practitioners. Nation brand building and reputation management are influenced by a host of agencies and departments. Tourism and investment agencies may have the largest role in determining how a country is branded, but diplomats also need to be aware of, and play a role in, place branding. A country’s ability to work towards counteracting negative stereotypes and promoting a positive external image and reputation is key to its ability to influence foreign publics and opinion leaders, not only to generate positive attitudes in the political domain but also to promote businesses from the home country in the economic domain. According to a Futurebrand survey, consumers in seven major countries even feel that ‘country of origin’ is more important to them than price, availability or style.⁸

There are three main types of public opinion surveys that provide relevant data for diplomats: global/regional polls, specialist polls and proprietary polls. The question of which countries are included in global/regional and specialist polls is often determined by the sampling choices of the survey provider, which means countries can be chosen by their influence (population size,

⁸Futurebrand, *Made In: The value of Country of Origin for future brands* (London: Futurebrand, 2014). [http://www.futurebrand.com/images/uploads/studies/cbi/MADE_IN_Final_HR.pdf], accessed March 2016.

economic growth, role in global affairs), relevance to the issue (in the case of specialist polls) or arbitrarily (as a representative sample of a wider region or sub-region). For smaller countries, this can be a frustrating experience, as they are often overlooked.

Proprietary (or independently owned) surveys are most often used by medium to large organisations, due to the costs associated. Such surveys are usually carried out via major subscription-based surveys, distributed throughout government agencies, and conducted by commercial interest groups, NGOs or educational institutions, in conjunction with their own agendas. A relevant example is a survey commissioned by Bertelsmann Stiftung, a German business foundation, on German views of Asia.⁹

A word of caution is needed: with the vast amount of public opinion data available, there is a risk that this will be used as a substitute for real, nuanced understanding of the public attitudes in a country/region. Nicholas Cull comments that the preoccupation with public opinion metrics is reminiscent to *“rushing out into the forest every morning to see if the trees have grown.”*¹⁰ To take the analogy further, it is necessary to check the conditions for growth and the state of the rest of the forest, not just the trees.

3. Key questions

Whether you plan to use the results of an existing survey or design a proprietary poll, you need to ask some essential questions:

- * Why are we ahead or behind in various ratings (favourability, influence, leadership)?
- * What issues or policies should we talk about or not talk about?
- * What does the public really know, understand and believe about us or about the subject of the survey?

⁹Bertelsmann Stiftung, “Germans do not view Asia as a ‘yellow threat’,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, 11 February 2012. [<https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en/press/press-releases/press-release/pid/germans-do-not-view-asia-as-a-yellow-threat/>], accessed March 2016.

¹⁰Nicholas Cull, cited in Daryl Copeland, “Three P’s in search of a pod,” in Joshua S. Fouts [ed] *Public Diplomacy: Practitioners, Policy Makers, and Public Opinion* (Los Angeles, CA: USC Center on Public Diplomacy, 2006), pp. 20–30. [<http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/uscpublicdiplomacy.org/files/useruploads/u22281/PublicDiplomacyandPublicOpinion2006.pdf>], accessed March 2016.

- * When should we introduce new topics, policies and programmes for the desired impact?
- * How should we best explain our policies or ourselves?
- * Who are our most effective and credible spokespeople?
- * What language resonates with the public?
- * What messages are more or less effective?
- * How do we react to criticism or negative reports?

These questions are key aspects of any survey, be it an election race poll or a test of public opinion on global issues.

In addition, there are some important questions specific to public diplomacy campaigns. Public opinion survey expert Humphrey Taylor suggests that public diplomats need to look at many of the same questions as politicians and corporate leaders: the ‘why, what, when, who, and how’ questions.¹¹ He suggests some specific additional questions to help public diplomacy practitioners unlock key insights into perceptions about their country:

- * Who are the ‘influencers’ in the country? Who shapes opinions?
- * What are the opinions/attitudes of these influencers?
- * What would help to influence them?
- * What are the key nuances within the social fabric of the country, for example, are there differences between segments of society (religious, geographic, ethnic, demographic or linguistic groups) and do they need to be targeted differently?
- * What potential allies/supporters are available and how can they help improve the image of your country?

Gathering this kind of information is usually done using ‘close-ended’ questions in a survey (i.e., questions where respondents must choose from a given list of options). Open-ended questions (i.e., questions where respondents can enter their own responses), on the other hand, are a very useful tool to track the spontaneous perceptions of respondents. Word-association questions are quite common; for example, ‘What three words come to mind when you think of X?’ Respondents are usually asked to provide spontaneous, ‘on

¹¹Humphrey Taylor, “The practice of public diplomacy,” in Joshua S. Fouts [ed] *Public Diplomacy: Practitioners, Policy Makers, and Public Opinion* (Los Angeles, CA: USC Center on Public Diplomacy, 2006), pp. 48–67. [<http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/uscpublicdiplomacy.org/files/useruploads/u22281/PublicDiplomacyandPublicOpinion2006.pdf>], accessed March 2016.

the spot' replies, which helps to overcome filters and get a true idea of a respondent's perception. However, responses to open-ended questions are harder to categorise and analyse.

4. Understanding survey data

Whether you are analysing the results of existing surveys, or embarking on a proprietary public opinion poll, you need a clear understanding of the risks associated with these types of studies and the precautions needed. Clear expectations can help to avoid misinterpreted data and wasted resources. If you are planning your own survey, here are a few important issues to consider at the outset:

- * When setting out on a public opinion survey in any country, it is important to get local advice on which methods to deploy in that country. Many factors will affect your results, including the capacities of the local survey service provider, access to technology, response rates and trust in interviewers/survey companies.

- * Will the results of your survey be communicated effectively to top decision-makers? If you cannot be sure of this, then money spent on a survey and analysis may be wasted.

- * A longitudinal survey, tracking change over time, offers additional value to practitioners. At the same time, such studies need considerable time and resources and a sustained commitment by all parties, which might pose additional challenges.

- * To reduce costs, consider using 'coupling surveys': survey companies will often roll out multiple surveys or will add questions to existing surveys.

The following sections introduce some of the main issues that you need to be aware of when analysing survey data or planning your own survey.

4.1. The questionnaire: asking the right questions

Preparing survey questions requires much attention and precision, especially if the questions will be used in different countries and different languages. Each

translation needs to take into account the specificities of the local language and culture. For example, it may not be possible to directly translate verbal scales and qualifiers from one language to another (i.e., in English, 'extremely', 'very', 'somewhat', 'not at all').

Another concern is that public opinion surveys can actually create an artificial opinion among respondents who in fact have never thought about the survey topic before. We design surveys to ask questions which matter to us, but they might not matter to the respondents. Survey questions should be carefully designed in response to the local political and cultural discourse and vigorously tested to ensure consistency.

4.2. Understanding the sample

You need to pay attention to sampling (choosing your respondents). Normally, you will aim for a representative cross-section of society; however, this sample may be obtained in different ways.

- * **Probability sampling** involves random selection, where every individual in a population has an equal chance of being selected, and the probability of being selected can be accurately determined. Probability sampling is commonly used by large survey providers and is the most statistically sound method. This form of sampling allows for calculating the sampling error (i.e., the degree of difference between the selected individuals and the entire population).

- * **Quota sampling** divides the population into mutually exclusive sub-groups, and respondents are selected from sub-groups based on a specified proportion (e.g. 100 males and 150 females between the ages of 25 and 40). Quota sampling is empirically as reliable as probability sampling, but it does not have the same strong statistical underpinning as probability sampling, since the sampling error cannot be calculated. Quota sampling, however, is much less expensive. Among the public opinion community, it is considered more an 'art than a science'.

Besides the technical aspects of sampling, practitioners need to understand the nuances within a country, as significant linguistic, geographic, or cultural differences may exist in certain contexts. Understanding public sentiment 'outside the capital' is often of value to practitioners and should be considered.

4.3. Accounting for error

How accurate are public opinion surveys, and what are acceptable margins of error? In a large global survey, the margin of error (the degree to which the survey results may be different from the views of the entire population, calculated based on the sample size) is around +/-3%. This leaves a confidence interval of 95% accuracy. Essentially, this means that if 60% of survey respondents – for example, on an election poll – said they would vote for Candidate A, then if the same survey was carried out 100 times, we can expect 57 to 63% of respondents to say they would vote for candidate A in 95 of the 100 surveys. Of course, we assume that conditions and sampling methods in all 100 surveys are identical.

Margin of error is calculated based on sample size and equals 1 divided by the square root of the sample size. So, for instance, a survey of 1000 respondents (which is the standard for most global surveys) has a margin of error of +/-3%. A survey of 2000 respondents would drop the margin of error to +/-2%.

4.4. What else can influence the results?

* **Response bias** is the unwillingness of respondents to provide their real views, as they may not be ‘politically correct’. For interesting examples see the Bradley effect¹² or the Shy Tory factor¹³, where polling led to inaccurate election predictions.

* **Coverage bias** refers to carrying out surveys in the wrong format for the selected country and its effects on survey responses. For example, using online surveys in developing countries, surveying only urban areas or surveying at a particular time of the day can impact who responds, thereby misrepresenting the population.

¹² Rich Karlgaard, “Does the Bradley effect overrate Obama in the polls?” Forbes, 16 September 2012. [<http://www.forbes.com/sites/richkarlgaard/2012/09/16/does-the-bradley-effect-overrate-obama-in-the-polls/#60da53426073>], accessed March 2016.

¹³ Renard Sexton, “Election 2010: Tackling the shy tory problem,” The Guardian, 8 April 2010. [<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/apr/08/general-election-2010-polls>], accessed March 2016.

In summary, it is important to remember that all surveys and polls, whether they use probability sampling or not, are subject to multiple sources of error, and this may be difficult to quantify or estimate. These include sampling errors, coverage errors, errors associated with non-response, errors associated with question wording and response options and post-survey weighting and adjustments.

Now that you have a general idea about how public opinion surveys may be used in public diplomacy practice, the second part of this chapter maps some of the key surveys of relevance to public diplomacy in Asia and Europe.

5. Mapping the surveys

This section looks at some of the common survey types (global, regional, bi-regional, specialist) of relevance for public diplomacy. Under each type, we look at a number of specific surveys and briefly mention their methodologies, samples used and some landmark findings. There are several case studies detailing prominent polls and selected findings that may provide insights for practitioners in Asia and Europe. Please note that the list of surveys is not exhaustive and that the surveys listed have considerable variance in terms of their quality, statistical validity and time period.

5.1. Global polls

The use of global polls has increased over the past decade as survey companies react to the need for information and insight to improve policy- and decision-making in a complex world. Diplomats increasingly need to navigate immense complexity and make sense of vast amounts of information. In this environment, carefully selected and analysed information can help to paint a clearer picture and guide decisions. There are a number of global public opinion polls that might be useful for practitioners to use:

- * Pew Research Global Attitudes Project
- * Gallup World Poll
- * IPSOS Global @dvisor poll
- * Harris Poll Global Omnibus Survey
- * Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index

- * International Social Survey Program
- * Worldpublicopinion.org/Program on International Public Attitudes
- * Good Country Index
- * BBC World Service Poll

5.2. Regional surveys

Regional surveys track key issues in multiple countries in the same region and can provide comparisons of different countries, including comparisons over time. A regional survey can help regional and national organisations to track views and attitudes towards issues of public policy and also to gauge views on regional integration that can aid in building a better regional identity and more representative policies.

Perhaps the best-known regional survey is the **Eurobarometer**.¹⁴ It has spawned many similar regional monitors in Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and Africa.

Other smaller regional barometers have operated to date under the umbrella and support of the Globalbarometer project. The network includes the Latinobarómetro, which is arguably the largest regional monitor outside of the EU; the Arab Barometer; the Asian Barometer (including both East and South Asia); and the Afrobarometer. Many of the regional survey instruments lack the resources and consistency of the Eurobarometer, with results being inconsistent and lacking regular revisits (the last active publication on findings was 2013).

The **Asian Barometer**¹⁵ is a research programme on the public opinion of political values, democracy and governance across the region. The regional network includes research teams from 18 Asian countries. Based in Taipei, the survey focuses on citizens' attitudes and values towards politics, power, reform and democracy in Asia.

There are also many **sub-regional monitors**. These surveys usually run for a fixed time period, following a time of regional transition or conflict.

¹⁴ European Commission, "Public Opinion," [<http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/General/index>], accessed March 2016.

¹⁵ Asian Barometer, "Home," [<http://www.asianbarometer.org>], accessed March 2016.

One example is Gallup's Balkan Monitor, which carried out surveys in seven countries across the Balkans annually from 2007 to 2011.¹⁶

Eurobarometer: Taking Europe's pulse

Established in 1973, the Eurobarometer allows the European Commission to monitor the evolution of public opinion in member states. The barometer provides input for policy- and decision-making and evaluates perceptions of the effectiveness of policies among ordinary Europeans. The surveys and studies have examined a diverse list of policy issues, including enlargement, migration, health, culture, information technology, environment, the euro and defence.

The Eurobarometer uses a consistent methodology throughout its five survey instruments:

- * The standard Eurobarometer was established in 1973. Each survey consists of approximately 1000 face-to-face interviews per member state. It is conducted two to five times per year, with reports published twice yearly.¹⁷

- * The Special Eurobarometer reports are based on in-depth thematic studies carried out for various services of the European Commission or other EU institutions.¹⁸

- * The Flash Eurobarometer surveys are ad hoc thematic telephone interviews conducted at the request of any service of the European Commission.¹⁹ You may find the recent survey on preferences of Europeans towards tourism of particular interest.²⁰

¹⁶ Gallup Europe, "The Balkan Monitor: Database and Knowledge System," The Gallup Organization Europe, 2007. [<https://wbc-rti.info/object/document/7686/attach/TheBalkanMonitor.pdf>], accessed March 2016.

¹⁷ European Commission, "Standard EB," [<http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Survey/index#p=1&instruments=STANDARD>], accessed March 2016.

¹⁸ European Commission, "Special EB," [<http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Survey/index#p=1&instruments=SPECIAL>], accessed March 2016.

¹⁹ European Commission, "Flash EB," [<http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Survey/index#p=1&instruments=FLASH>], accessed March 2016.

²⁰ European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer 432 – January 2016: Preferences of Europeans toward Tourism (Brussels: European Union, 2016). [<http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/FLASH/surveyKy/2065>], accessed March 2016.

* The qualitative studies investigate in-depth the motivations, feelings and reactions of selected social groups towards a given subject or concept by listening and analysing their way of expressing themselves in discussion groups or with non-directive interviews.²¹

5.3. Bi-regional surveys

The term ‘bi-regional survey’ describes any survey that attempts to look at how one major region (or regional power) views another region (or regional power). Bi-regional surveys are somewhat unique in the field of public opinion surveys: most large surveys are global, regional or national in focus. However, there are three important surveys that fit the bi-regional description:

* **Transatlantic Trends** is an annual survey of US and European public opinion.

* The joint **EU through the Eyes of Asia – Asia in the Eyes of Europe** project focuses on Asia-Europe perceptions.²²

* The 2014 Anna Lindh Report, carried out by the Anna Lindh Foundation, featured a survey on intercultural trends among respondents in 13 European and North African countries.²³

5.3.1. Transatlantic Trends

The annual Transatlantic Trends survey began in 2002 and is conducted by the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) and a consortium of business foundations and diplomatic agencies. The study surveys a representative sample of 11 EU member states, Turkey and the USA. For the latest survey, TNS Opinion conducted polling in June and July 2014 using computer-assisted telephone interviews supported by face-to-face interviews in countries with lower telephone penetration. In all countries, a random

²¹European Commission, “Qualitative EB,” [<http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Survey/index#p=1&instruments=QUALITATIVE>], accessed March 2016.

²²ASEF, “Asia in the Eyes of Europe,” [<http://www.asef.org/projects/programmes/2365-ASIE>], accessed March 2016

²³Anna Lindh Foundation, *The Anna Lindh Report 2014: Intercultural Trends and Social Change in the Euro-Mediterranean Region* (Alexandria: Anna Lindh Foundation, 2014). [http://www.annalindhoundation.org/sites/annalindh.org/files/documents/page/anna_lindh_report14.pdf], accessed March 2016.

sample of approximately 1000 respondents was interviewed, giving a margin of error of +/- 3% with a 95% confidence interval.²⁴

Accompanying specialised surveys have also been carried out, including a survey on immigration from 2008 to 2011²⁵; one in 2014²⁶; a survey on leadership in 2010²⁷; and a survey on international trends in 2012, which focused on perceptions about Korea.²⁸

The Transatlantic Trends studies offer a range of valuable insights on US-European relations and occasionally include perceptions of Asia (and in particular China), mainly related to its power and leadership in global affairs. For example, the latest report states:

“Americans and Europeans largely shared the view that Chinese global leadership was undesirable as well as having a negative opinion of China itself; but a majority of Americans wanted to work with China bilaterally, while Europeans were split between engaging China bilaterally or working together with the EU.”²⁹

In addition, respondents saw the possibility of the Russian Federation emerging as a global affairs leader negatively. The survey provides some very useful insights into leadership in global affairs and European views of a rising Asia.

²⁴ German Marshall Fund of the United States, *Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2014* (Washington, DC: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2014). [http://trends.gmfus.org/files/2012/09/Trends_2014_complete.pdf], accessed March 2016.

²⁵ German Marshall Fund of the United States, *Transatlantic Trends Survey Series* (Washington, DC: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2008-2011). [<http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/series/00235>], accessed June 2016.

²⁶ German Marshall Fund of the United States, *Transatlantic Trends: Mobility, Migration, and Integration 2011* (Washington, DC: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2014). [<http://www.gmfus.org/publications/transatlantic-trends-mobility-migration-and-integration/>], accessed June 2016

²⁷ German Marshall Fund of the United States, *Transatlantic Trends: Leaders 2011* (Washington, DC: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2011). [<http://trends.gmfus.org/leaders/>], accessed June 2016.

²⁸ German Marshall Fund of the United States, *International Trends: Korea* (Washington, DC: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2012). [<http://trends.gmfus.org/international-trends-korea-2012/>], accessed March 2016.

²⁹ German Marshall Fund of the United States, *Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2014*, p. 5.

5.3.2. Asia-Europe perceptions

The *EU through the Eyes of Asia* project, which was introduced in chapter three, has been a valuable source to measure public opinion about the EU in Asian countries. The early phases of the study were carried out using a standard questionnaire format, but with different survey companies and using different methods. Due to cost constraints, the sample per country was 400 respondents, leaving the margin of error at +/-5% and a confidence interval of 95%.³⁰

In 2010, the *Asia in the Eyes of Europe* project was established. The public opinion questionnaire was based on a mix of open-ended and close-ended questions. The survey piggy-backed on a public opinion survey by the London School of Economics, carried out by UK-based Opinium Research, and used mixed samples with a total of 6155 respondents (Austria – 496; Belgium – 592; Denmark – 293; France – 906; Germany – 1033; Italy – 930; Romania – 451; UK – 1454) and a margin of error ranging from +/-5.7% in Denmark to +/-2.6% in the UK. The research was carried out using online surveys between June and August 2010.³¹

It is important to note that researchers treat the cross-comparability of the two studies loosely. Despite mirror methodologies, one study tracks the perception of 'Asia' – a less-defined vast geographic region – and the other tracks perceptions of the EU, a regional organisation with defined members, institutions and borders.

The findings gathered by the *Asia in the Eyes of Europe* survey provides rich findings on how Europeans see the wider Asian region and who are the power players in the region – something that has never been tracked previously. The survey used open-ended questions to elicit spontaneous perceptions among respondents. When asked, 'What three words come to mind when thinking of Asia?', respondents provided a diverse list of responses. Most responses were linked to social, cultural and religious factors, including references to Asian lifestyle, such as Buddhism, food, people and populations. Though mostly

³⁰ Natalia Chaban et al., *The EU Through the Eyes of Asia Volume II: New Cases, New Findings* (Singapore: World Scientific, 2009); see also Natalia Chaban and Martin Holland, "EU Global Perceptions," [<http://www.euperceptions.canterbury.ac.nz>], accessed March 2016.

³¹ Sebastian Bersick et al. [eds], *Asia in the Eyes of Europe: Images of a Rising Giant* (Sinzheim: Nomos, 2012).

positive, some negative words featured, such as 'poverty', 'child labour' and the racially charged 'yellow', in small frequencies in each country. The next highest response referred to specific countries, with China, Japan and India featuring most frequently. Other prominent categories included geography/distance, with responses focused on the size and beauty of the continent. This was followed by economic references: rising Asia, cheap goods and competition.³²

In 2012, the *EU through the Eyes of Asia* study conducted a new round of public opinion surveys in ten ASEM member countries across the Asia-Pacific, many of them being revisited for the 2nd or 3rd time, providing both cross-comparative and longitudinal data (Australia, China, Japan, India, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Russian Federation, Singapore and Thailand). The questionnaire featured open- and close-ended questions on the respondent's views of the EU, its institutions, their own countries' relations with the EU and the role of the EU in global affairs.

The public opinion element of the study was more robust than in previous rounds, with a sample of 1000 respondents per country (+/- 3% margin of error, and 95% confidence interval). TNS Global carried out the study online in March 2012. The survey tracked perceptions of the EU during a turbulent period as the EU dealt with the sovereign debt crisis. The data presented a significant shift in the image of the EU from previous studies. The main responses referred to the 'euro', 'EU' (the question referred to the 'European Union', and many responded with the acronym), and 'Europe', followed by references of the big three: Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and interestingly, Greece.

Bi-regional surveys are not easy to frame as regional geographic boundaries and definitions may be ambiguous, especially when matching a regional organisation such as the EU with a vast geographic region such as Asia. However, the value of such studies is based on the fact that regions often portray a shared identity to the wider world, whether they like it or not. There are obvious benefits in associating one's image with 'rising Asia'; similarly, it is difficult for EU members to shake the image of mass unemployment and recession that defined Europe in recent years. Understanding these trends

³²ASEF, ASEM Outlook Report 2012: Asia-Europe Relations at a Glance (Singapore: Asia-Europe Foundation, 2012), p. 127. [http://www.asef.org/images/docs/ASEM%20Outlook%20Report_Vol%201_Asia%20Europe%20Relations%20at%20a%20Glance.pdf], accessed March 2016.

and their nuances can contribute to communicating an effective message, and perhaps eventually to improving one's image.

5.4. Specialist surveys

Many specialist surveys track public perceptions and attitudes on specific global policy issues, security interventions, or micro issues of diplomacy and international engagement. Post 9/11, many of these studies focused on security matters. However, later studies have tracked attitudes towards contentious policy issues such as environmental degradation (GfK's Green Gauge)³³ and food security and quality (Special Eurobarometer 389).³⁴

Specialised surveys and survey providers can support practitioners in their efforts to better understand public sentiment and to translate this understanding into more effective communications. The sporadic nature of the surveys and the speed at which they come and go make it difficult to track these surveys, as they are not always on a public diplomat's radar. That said, knowing where to source them and how to analyse their findings could prove a precious commodity for practitioners.

³³ GfK, *The Environment: Public Attitudes and Individual Behavior: A Twenty-Year Evolution*. (Nuremberg: GfK, 2011). [http://www.scjohnson.com/Libraries/Download_Documents/SCJ_and_GfK_Roper_Green_Gauge.sflb.ashx], accessed March 2016.

³⁴ European Commission, *Special Eurobarometer 389: Europeans' Attitudes towards Food Security, Food Quality and the Countryside* (Brussels: European Union, 2012). [http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/survey/2012/389_en.pdf], accessed March 2016.

5-POINT SUMMARY

1

Understanding public opinion is an essential component of successful public diplomacy, as practitioners must have up-to-date and accurate information on the attitudes and preferences of target audiences.

3

Practitioners can draw on a large body of scientific work that covers local and domestic perceptions of other countries, as well as a variety of global policy issues.

5

Public opinion survey data has its limitations; it will only be useful when it is embedded in a proper awareness of the local political and cultural context.

2

Public diplomacy can be described as a 'diagnostic tool' to evaluate the effects of policies and identify potential failures or gaps in public diplomacy campaigns.

4

Practitioners need a clear understanding of the methodology of polls to avoid misinterpreting data and wasting resources.

INTERVIEW

Michael MANN

Head of Strategic Communications,
European External Action Service

A former spokesman for the European External Action Service (EEAS), Michael Mann is presently head of division, in charge of strategic communication for the European Union diplomatic arm. A veteran of the EU press room in Brussels, and a leading advocate of people to people exchange, he exchanged with Richard Werly on the Asia-Europe Public Diplomacy challenges ahead.

Q: Based on your own experience with the EU, can public diplomacy help to promote the Asia-Europe dialogue? Can the EU's successes be replicated?

A: Public diplomacy is an absolutely crucial part of the EU's overall approach to diplomacy and can make a huge difference in promoting people to people relations. That is precisely why the European External Action Service gives so much importance to its public diplomacy activities in Asia and throughout the world. The Strategic Communications Division, which I lead, works closely with our network of 139 EU Delegations and Offices around the world, supplying the raw materials and the budget resources to allow them to tailor public outreach activities to their local audiences. Activities vary widely from region to region and country to country – it is the

Delegations which have the local knowledge of which public diplomacy activities work best and what the key audiences are. But we have had huge success with activities such as music and film festivals, sporting events like football tournaments and fun-runs, exhibitions of all sorts from art to photography to information about European policies and values. We also work together very closely with the EU Member States' cultural institutes in third countries.

Q: The European Union allocates considerable financial means to its external communication. In the meantime, scepticism towards the European integration is growing. Is this effort paying off?

A: We live in a world of 24/7 news and information, in which many people, especially the younger generation, get their news and information instantly from their telephones. The EU has to try and keep pace with these developments, while at the same time remaining true to the fact that it is a multinational, consensual organisation, which is responsible to its taxpayers. We are getting much smarter at communication, we are plugged into the social media and we have become more nimble. We will never indulge in propaganda, and will focus on our public service duty to inform. And we will do it better and through using the latest communication

tools and techniques. And at the same time, we will take on those who peddle propaganda, precisely through presenting a positive, truthful and proactive narrative about the values the EU stands for.

Q: Are traditional diplomatic services properly equipped and trained to deal with public diplomacy?

A: Within the EEAS, as within foreign ministries across Europe, there are staff with specialist skills. Diplomats are employed to perform diplomatic functions, and many of them are excellent communicators. But, more importantly, all foreign services have specialist staff. The department I lead is made up of people with specific communication and information-sharing skills. We are there to help the diplomats to turn their diplomatic work, especially in crisis situations, into professional communication material, tailored to different audiences and disseminated through a range of different media. It is also no accident that we are the 'Strategic' Communications department of the EEAS: this reflects the fact that communication is now taken seriously as part of the process of policy development and diplomatic activity, and is no longer an afterthought.

Q: The United States devotes a lot of energy to public diplomacy, especially towards the Asian Region. Can Europe compete?

A: It's true that the USA is strong in public diplomacy, and invests heavily in promoting its image abroad. That is not to say that it does not face similar challenges to other countries and regional organisations. Where the USA has clear advantages in terms of resources, I would argue that Europe has an advantage in being more nimble in its public

diplomacy work. Sometimes small is beautiful! The EU, not least through the EEAS Strategic Communications Division and our network of Delegations, works extremely hard to promote its role as a Soft Power right across the globe. Guided by Headquarters, our Delegations have the local expertise and language skills to tailor our messages to the local audiences. We have introduced new tools and resources recently, such as the Partnership Instrument, to enhance our outreach. And if you look at the efforts we are putting into publicising the ASEM summit and a number of side events, as well as the myriad public diplomacy projects our Delegations in Asia carry out every day, you would see that we take this very seriously. Naturally, resources are not limitless and we could do more with more. But in terms of public diplomacy, there has been a sea-change over recent years.

Q: Public diplomacy efforts often bump on government changes. Very often, the incoming administration tends to undo what previous administrations have done.

A: Public diplomacy is by definition a long-term process, particularly in an age when Strategic Communication is taken extremely seriously. Building bridges with other countries and peoples, promoting culture and values, and publicising the good work carried out by the EU in third countries is a gradual and strategic process, with results measurable over years rather than months. Whoever the political leadership may be, the practitioners of public diplomacy remain in place and work to a long-term timescale. Clearly, political crises can have a negative effect on a country or organisation's image, but that is where the development of crisis communication techniques has come into play, alongside the longer-term techniques of public diplomacy.

CHAPTER 6:

HOW TO USE DIGITAL TOOLS AND SOCIAL MEDIA

DiploFoundation

Abstract

The Internet has deeply affected diplomacy over the last 20 years. New topics from the information and communication technologies (ICT) field have been placed on diplomatic agendas. ICT tools are increasingly used in everyday diplomatic work, and the Internet has created a new environment in which diplomacy operates. This chapter offers an overview of how the Internet affects the practice of diplomacy, and public diplomacy in particular.

The chapter first provides an in-depth look at several key digital and social media tools, including websites, blogs, Facebook, Twitter and Wikipedia and outlines their links to public diplomacy. Although these e-tools can have enormous potential for public diplomacy campaigns, they need to be used appropriately. The chapter argues that social media campaigns need to be properly organised, and it provides insights into how to use social media most effectively. The chapter then provides a brief overview of the use of e-tools by Ministries of Foreign Affairs in Asia and Europe.

Finally, the chapter outlines some of the challenges related to the use of e-tools in diplomacy. First, practitioners need to be aware of the security risks embedded in the use of ICTs. Second, in many cases, the full potential of ICTs can only be reached if their introduction goes hand in hand with changes in the structure and culture of the organisation. Whether the opportunities of e-tools will be seized will therefore largely depend on the approach taken by diplomats and diplomatic structures towards the changing environment.

Please check the 5-point summary as well at the end of this chapter.

Introduction

The Internet is the fastest-spreading technology in human history. It reached its 1st billion users in about 30 years (1975–2005), its 2nd billion in 2010 and its 3rd billion in 2014. By the end of 2015, the number of users reached almost 3.5 billion, providing access to about 46% of the world's population.¹ The Internet has revolutionised different spheres of life, both for those who already have access to it and even for those who still do not.

This chapter offers an overview of how the Internet affects the practice of diplomacy and public diplomacy in particular. It provides an in-depth look at a few key digital and social media tools for public diplomacy and some tips for their appropriate use. Finally, it outlines some of the challenges related to the use of e-tools in diplomacy.

1. Evolution of the Internet

The Internet is a very dynamic technology. Quantitative changes, such as the number of users, speed of access and volume of content, are closely interconnected with qualitative changes, which include new technologies and applications (e.g. shared document editing, interactive satellite maps, virtual currencies), new types of content and means of communication, and transformations in the spheres of life that are affected by the Internet – and nowadays the Internet affects almost all aspects of everyday practices.

Some of the key trends shaping the present and the near future of the Internet include:

* **Broadband connection:** the term 'broadband' refers to connection technologies that provide faster access to the Internet – typically at the speed

¹We Are Social, "Digital in 2016," 27 January 2016. [<http://wearesocial.sg/blog/2016/01/digital-2016/>], accessed March 2016.

of not less than several hundred kilobits per second. Although people still use slow telephone connections (dial-up) in many places to access the Internet, broadband connection has become a standard and is often taken for granted.

* **Mobile/wireless Internet:** studies show that mobile phones are quickly becoming the prevailing smart device; by the end of 2015, mobile broadband connections accounted for about 47% of total connections, and this number is expected to rise to 71% by 2020.² This trend has two important implications. First, for users in developing countries, mobile devices often provide a more affordable way to connect to the Internet than computers. Thus, the spread of mobile connectivity may be one of the key factors paving the way for the next billion Internet users. And second, the freedom from the limitations of fixed line Internet connections allows for the rise of a completely new set of uses (use of Internet while travelling, shopping, etc.).

* **Cloud computing:** Cloud computing is the practice of using online services (e.g. text editing tools such as Google Drive, web-based e-mail such as Yahoo!, or social media platforms such as Facebook) instead of computer programmes such as MS Word or Outlook, as well as storing information online (on remote servers) rather than on one's own computer. This allows users to work (check e-mail, work with documents, etc.) from any Internet-connected device. However, cloud computing has certain risks. First, users depend on being able to connect to the Internet to access their information. Second, information is no longer physically located with users, and becomes subject to the stability, resilience and security of the cloud providers. The issues of reliability, privacy and confidentiality grow in importance when you entrust your information to a company providing an online service.

With the quick pace of innovation in Internet infrastructure and services, it is difficult to predict future developments. It is relatively certain, however, that a few years from now, fast Internet will be available almost everywhere, and using it for all imaginable purposes will require only a very basic device (because all computing will be done, and all data stored, in the cloud). Moreover, the Internet will integrate so closely with many everyday activities that we will not think of 'using the Internet' as a separate activity – just as we don't think of 'using electricity' today. Diplomacy cannot remain untouched by these changes.

² GSMA, *The Mobile Economy 2016* (London: GSMA, 2016), p. 6., [<https://gsmaintelligence.com/research/?file=97928efe09cdba2864cdc1ad1a2f58c&download>], accessed March 2016.

2. The effects of the Internet on diplomacy

Most diplomats would agree that in the last 20 years, their work has been deeply affected by the introduction of ICT. First, new topics from the ICT field have found their place on the agendas of international meetings. Second, diplomats increasingly use new ICT tools to facilitate their everyday work. And third, the Internet and other technologies have created a whole new environment in which diplomacy operates.

2.1. New topics

The development of the Internet and related technologies brings new topics to diplomatic agendas. Some of these are technical in nature, but they have broad relevance for global governance. Others stem from interactions on the Internet, but they also have a broader impact: national and international telecommunications policies; mass surveillance (in focus ever since the US National Security Agency (NSA) affairs were brought to light by Edward Snowden); privacy and data protection; child-friendly content; openness (i.e., unrestricted access to all available content and services) and net neutrality (the principle of treating all data in the network equally, without any restrictions from Internet service providers and governments on content, sites, platforms); protection of intellectual property rights; market access for certain technologies; cybersecurity; and trade issues. The Internet has also given a new dimension to traditional diplomatic topics such as freedom of speech and other human rights, economic imbalances between nations, intellectual property and copyright and especially international security issues, in relation to the growing concerns of possible cyber-warfare and cyber-conflicts of global dimensions.

The discussion of new topics introduced to diplomatic agendas by the Internet is beyond the scope of this chapter; those interested are invited to have a look at Jovan Kurbalija's *An Introduction to Internet Governance*.³

³ Jovan Kurbalija, *An Introduction to Internet Governance* (Geneva: DiploFoundation, 2014), [http://www.diplomacy.edu/sites/default/files/An%20Introduction%20to%20IG_6th%20edition.pdf], accessed March 2016.

2.2. New tools

The Internet provides new tools for diplomatic work. It is difficult to imagine a modern diplomat who doesn't use e-mail, chat applications, electronic document collections, online databases and search engines. Videoconferencing and other forms of online participation are becoming ever more widespread. Many diplomatic services around the world are experimenting with social media and encouraging their employees to blog or use Facebook and Twitter. The potential of these e-tools for networking, professional training, negotiation and especially public diplomacy is growing. We will discuss the relevance of several of these e-tools to public diplomacy later in this chapter, as well as the challenges they pose for ministries of foreign affairs (MFAs).

2.3. New environment

Perhaps the most important impact of ICT on diplomacy is the changing environment of world politics. A detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this chapter; however, in brief, the Internet has boosted the number, variety and influence of multiple non-state actors in world politics: non-governmental organisations (NGOs), diasporas, corporations, interest groups, academics, influential activists including bloggers and tweeters, hactivists and terrorist networks. Many more voices and interests are involved in international policy-making and diplomacy, and taking these perspectives into account makes these domains more complicated than ever before.

The growing importance of non-state actors in world politics means that it is no longer enough for diplomats to work only with foreign governments; they also need to engage with a multitude of non-state actors. This places extra importance on public diplomacy, and in particular on working directly with the foreign public, beyond the official channels of state-to-state relations and international organisations. In the extreme case, to quote *New York Times* author James Traub, "*All diplomacy is public diplomacy.*"⁴ This means that diplomats should more actively engage with a variety of actors and 'speak their language' by using the same online communication channels as their counterparts, which is not always easy, since diplomats are often newcomers

⁴James Traub, "Persuading them," *New York Times*, 25 November 2007, [http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/25/magazine/25WWLN-lede-t.html?_r=2], accessed March 2016.

to the online arena that is already mastered by activists and other actors. Moreover, 'winning the hearts and minds' of citizens requires a different approach than that of pre-Internet public diplomacy.

The issue, however, is much broader than just using new tools or even using them effectively. A more important question is whether this new environment requires a change in the very nature of diplomacy and foreign-policy-making. Openness, sharing, collaboration and networking are some of the fundamental features of Internet culture and have strong positive connotations. Governments are increasingly adopting e-government applications to boost openness and transparency. Both Asian and European countries score strikingly high when it comes to offering e-government services; among the top ten of the 2014 *E-Government Development Index*, nine are ASEM partners.⁵

At the same time, the success of many diplomatic negotiations requires a certain level of privacy and closeness. As Jovan Kurbalija notes, "*While openness is a guiding principle of good governance, reality shows that most successful diplomatic deals have been done discretely.*"⁶ This becomes a challenge in the Internet era, with its demands for openness and emerging possibilities for publicly supported actions to ensure transparency, such as WikiLeaks⁷ or the recent PRISM scandal.⁸

Despite these contradictions, however, both diplomats and their peers in other

⁵ United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations E – Government Survey 2014 (New York, NY: United Nations, 2014). [https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/Portals/egovkb/Documents/un/2014-Survey/E-Gov_Complete_Survey-2014.pdf], accessed March 2016.

⁶ Jovan Kurbalija, "Digital diplomacy: what is new?" Reflections on Diplomacy, 22 July 2010, [<http://deepdip.wordpress.com/2010/07/22/digital-diplomacy-what-is-new/>], accessed March 2016.

⁷ WikiLeaks is a non-profit organisation that publishes classified state reports. It was launched in 2006, and within a year it had a database with more than a million documents. The documents are published on WikiLeaks' website. [<https://wikileaks.org/>], accessed June 2016.

⁸ The PRISM scandal is named after a surveillance programme operated by the US National Security Agency, which allowed officials to gather user data, including emails, chats and search history. Its existence was leaked by Edward Snowden in 2013 and published by The Guardian and The Washington Post: Dominic Rushe and James Ball, "PRISM scandal: tech giants flatly deny allowing NSA direct access to servers," The Guardian, 7 June 2013. [<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/07/prism-tech-giants-shock-nsa-data-mining>], accessed June 2016; Barton Gellman and Laura Poitras, "U.S., British intelligence mining data from nine U.S. Internet companies in broad secret program," The Washington Post, 7 June 2013. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html], accessed June 2016.

governmental institutions realise that not responding to the changes driven by modern information technologies is even riskier than altering the familiar patterns of behaviour towards greater openness. For governmental institutions, the cost of not adopting new tools and a new context of communication today is to lag behind in public debate and become increasingly ineffective in carrying out their duties. The question is therefore not whether but how to adapt to the new environment.

2.4. New challenges for public diplomacy

Nowadays, public diplomacy practitioners operate in an information environment transformed by:

- * The rapid availability of information to publics everywhere, where governments are often behind the game and certainly behind the 24/7 news media.
- * The abundance of visual information.
- * The virtually infinite quantity of information available with the expansion of the World Wide Web (WWW).
- * The transformation of the Web from a one-to-one source of information into a multidirectional forum for interactive debate.

The amount of information available and the speed with which it reaches the average user has increased dramatically. Most major broadcasters, from the BBC and CNN to Al Jazeera and Radio China International, have introduced webcasting to enable live access via the Internet to TV and radio news programmes and documentaries. The print media has also introduced electronic versions of their publications, available to the online reader many hours in advance of print copies. And thanks to social media, ordinary Internet users have also become reporters, providing 'live coverage' 24/7.

The trend towards instant and abundant information about world events is facilitated by the spread of mobile devices. Today, it is possible to follow breaking stories, receive alerts, view pictures and videos (often in real time) without using a computer. New technologies allow reports, photo, or videos to be transmitted instantly from any source, before officials are even aware

of their existence. The challenges for diplomats have multiplied with the advances in technology, as diplomats are now competing with instant news, visual and graphic, and can be caught unprepared by rapidly breaking stories.

3. Digital and social media tools for public diplomacy

There is a multitude of digital and social media tools that an institution can use for internal and public communication. NGOs and the private sector provide many examples of the potential of blogs and social networks to build support, exchange information and coordinate activities. Increasingly, governments and international organisations are joining this front; for instance, in 2012 the US State Department, a global leader in e-diplomacy, had more than 150 full-time personnel working on internal and external e-tools such as social media and wikis;⁹ the United Nations has also embraced Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and Flickr to enhance the outreach of its messages. According to a recent report, among international organisations in Geneva, the entities that use Twitter most effectively are the World Health Organization, the United Nations Information Centre and the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees.¹⁰

Social media has become overwhelmingly popular in both Europe and Asia. Southeast Asia is the world region with most social media users (altogether, more than a billion), whereas Europe is estimated to host about 400 million social media users. The percentage of the population using social media platforms is similar and accounts for approximately 40% in both regions.¹¹ With its users spending an average of 3.7 hours a day on social media, the Philippines is globally the most active on social media. Italy, at number 14, is the highest ranked European country, with an average of 2 hours per day spent on social media.¹²

⁹Fergus Hanson, "Revolution @State: The Spread of Ediplomacy," Lowy Institute for International Policy, March 2012, [http://lowyinstitute.richmedia-server.com/docs/Hanson_Revolution-at-State.pdf], accessed March 2016.

¹⁰DiploFoundation, Geneva Social Media Index (GSMI) (Geneva: DiploFoundation, 2016), [<http://www.diplomacy.edu/sites/default/files/Geneva%20Social%20Media%20Index%20-%20Report%202015%20full%20report.pdf>], accessed March 2016.

¹¹We Are Social, "Digital in 2016," slide 33.

¹²Ibid, slide 37.

Below, several key e-tools that are particularly relevant for public diplomacy are introduced. The explanations of the online platforms are accompanied by an analysis of ASEM members' web presence, developed by DiploFoundation's data-mining team.

3.1. Websites

For many MFAs, the development of websites was the first step in developing their presence on the Internet. Websites are mainly used for the dissemination of information about foreign policy. Representing the MFA online, it is important that the website looks attractive and functions easily. To boost interactivity, MFA websites have become increasingly integrated with Twitter, YouTube and other social media tools.

All MFAs of ASEM partners have websites, although their level of interactivity differs. All 51 surveyed MFA websites maintain a news (or an updates) section. However, the use of an RSS news feed (an important technology for sharing updated information) is not widespread. Furthermore, only ten ASEM member states have an information page about ASEM on their website. When it comes to the coverage of the other continent, nine MFA websites from Asia have a page dedicated to Europe, and nine European MFA websites maintain a dedicated page on Asia.¹³ Most MFA websites are bilingual, containing a version in English and one in the national language of the country.

3.2. Blogs

Since their emergence in the late 1990s, blogs have become immensely popular. An estimate from late 2013 says there are over 150 million blogs on the web,¹⁴ with currently almost 2 million blog posts written every day.¹⁵ Simply defined, blogs are an online self-publishing tool. Bloggers post short entries regularly to deliver information on a wide range of topics and to invite response in the form of comments from readers. Blogs usually aim to foster

¹³ DiploFoundation, ASEM Members Web Presence Analysis (Geneva: DiploFoundation, 2016). Results available from DiploFoundation on request.

¹⁴ Brandon Gaille, "How Many Blogs are on the Internet," WP Virtuoso, 20 November 2013, [<http://www.wpvirtuoso.com/how-many-blogs-are-on-the-internet/>], accessed March 2016.

¹⁵ For a live update on the number of blog posts published today, see Worldometers, "Blog posts written today," [<http://www.worldometers.info/blogs/>], accessed March 2016.

interaction between the author and readers, who may be a specific group or the general public.

The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) is among the leaders in diplomatic blogging, with a focus on public diplomacy and individual views. Over 100 of its officials and diplomats – including ministers and ambassadors – blog regularly from all over the globe. The FCO's guidelines for blogging correspond to the interactive potential of blogs; *“We want our blogs to be personal, real time, integrated with other things we're doing, responsive to comments, and written for particular (sometime niche) audiences.”*¹⁶

Blogging by diplomats raises questions about the relationship between the expression of professional and personal views on social media. Although the history of diplomatic blogging is fairly short, there are already a few examples of diplomatic conflicts directly associated with the use of personal elements in blogs by diplomats. For example, Jan Pronk, the UN envoy in Sudan, was expelled from the country following the comments he made in his personal blog.¹⁷ During the summer of 2006, Pronk's doubts about the effectiveness of the Darfur peace process and his criticisms of both the Sudanese government and the rebels were picked up by mainstream media. Three days after another critical posting on his blog in August 2006, Pronk was declared persona non grata by the Sudanese government and given three days to leave the country. The UN offered him no official backing.

Jan Pronk's story, or, to that end, the whole discussion on diplomatic blogging, is not a black-and-white issue. The immediacy and transparency of communication typical for blogs does not always provide an advantage in diplomatic practice. For example, Warren Hoge of the New York Times doubts that Pronk's actions were in the best interests of either the country represented or the issue he wanted to uphold:

*“One of the primary jobs of a diplomat is not to needlessly piss off an actor who has a seat at the negotiation table. By blogging about such a sensitive matter, Pronk gift-wrapped the Sudanese an excuse to expel him and delay dealing with the United Nations Security Council. How does this help anyone in Darfur?”*¹⁸

¹⁶ Foreign & Commonwealth Office Blogs, “About,” [<http://blogs.fco.gov.uk/about/>], accessed March 2016.

¹⁷ Jan Pronk, [<http://www.janpronk.nl>], accessed March 2016.

¹⁸ Warren Hoge, “Sudan orders U.N. envoy to leave country,” The New York Times, 22 October, 2006. [<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/22/world/africa/23nationscnd.html>], accessed March 2016.

Similarly, former UK ambassador Oliver Miles is critical of diplomatic blogging, arguing that ambassadors should not try to replace journalists: “*Their job is to advise their governments on policy [...] to carry out policy and on occasion to advocate and promote it publicly; and to provide a discreet and reliable channel of communication between governments.*” Blogging, he claims, does not support these aims. On the contrary, diplomatic blogging is bound to be risky: in order to attract readers, a blog has to be a bit ‘spicy,’ whereas diplomatic communication is typically cautious and bland, for good reasons.¹⁹

Despite doubts and risks such as these, many major MFAs, including the US State Department and the FCO, continue to encourage their officials to blog.

3.3. Facebook

Facebook is primarily a personal social media platform used to connect with friends and share updates (photos, event invitations, music, interesting readings and links, etc.). However, it is increasingly used for professional outreach as well. By creating institutional or public personal profiles, pages, interest groups or events, diplomatic institutions can gather visitors interested in their work, organise and share content and engage efficiently with their communities.

Now with over 1 billion daily active users, Facebook is becoming a key tool for public diplomacy. Both the US State Department and the UK FCO use Facebook for the dissemination of information. Some diplomatic Facebook accounts are highly popular, such as the US Embassy in Jakarta, with close to 660,000 followers. Nowadays, almost all foreign ministries have a Facebook presence. In addition, many individual public figures have their own Facebook pages where they (or their staff) interact directly with members of the public.

3.4. Twitter

Usually classified as a ‘microblog’, Twitter entries are short (140 characters), and often include links to relevant files; at the same time, microblogs are typically updated more often than traditional blogs – often several to a dozen

¹⁹ Oliver Miles, “Stop the blogging ambassadors,” *The Guardian*, 12 July 2010, [<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/jul/12/lebanon-israel>], March 2016.

times per day. Twitter users create a circle of ‘followers’ (which is not necessarily reciprocal: one user can follow the other without them following back), which allows for a high level of interaction (re-tweeting interesting posts by others, responding to them, mentioning other users in posts, etc.).

The specific value of Twitter for public diplomats lies in sounding the opinions of the community on various issues; engaging in discussions to present and explain positions; and identifying articles and readings on particular topics of interest (through following posts tagged with ‘hashtags’, for example #ediplomacy).²⁰

As of 24 March 2015, 86% of all UN member states have a Twitter presence, including 172 heads of states and heads of government. All 45 European governments have an official Twitter presence. In Asia, 81% of governments are on Twitter. US President Barack Obama (@BarackObama) is the most followed world leader, with over 71 million followers. In Europe, Pope Francis is the second most followed world leader with over 27 million followers on his nine different @Pontifex accounts. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi (@NarendraModi) and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (@RT_Erdogan) are among the top five most followed world leaders, with over 4 million followers each. The British Prime Minister (@Number10gov) is the most followed leader of the EU with more than 3 million followers, followed by Italy’s @MatteoRenzi, who has 1.7 million followers. The most followed foreign minister is India’s Sushma Swaraj (@SushmaSwaraj) with 4.6 million followers.²¹

3.5. Wikipedia

Wikipedia – the free, online, collaboratively written encyclopaedia – offers very interesting opportunities for public diplomacy, in particular for enhancing a country’s image. Wikipedia, the 7th most visited website worldwide,²² is a primary source of information about the history, geography, politics, institutions and international relations of different countries worldwide. It is often the first source users turn to when they want to learn something about another country.

²⁰ To learn more, we recommend *Twitter for Diplomats* (Malta: DiploFoundation, 2013), a short online book by Italian diplomat Andreas Sandre.

²¹ *Twiplomacy, Twiplomacy Study 2015* (Geneva: Twiplomacy, 2015), [<http://twiplomacy.com/blog/twiplomacy-study-2015/>], accessed March 2016. For a comprehensive overview of MFAs on twitter, see Diplo’s list on Twitter at [<https://twitter.com/DiplomacyEdu/lists/mfas-on-twitter>].

²² Alexa, “The top 500 sites on the web,” Alexa, 2016, [<http://www.alexa.com/topsites>], accessed March 2016.

The creation of articles on Wikipedia is a very interesting process. All articles are written by volunteers, and any Internet user can become an editor. This does not mean, however, that anything can be published on Wikipedia: the organisation maintains strict policies and guidelines. One of them is verifiability: all information included in an article should be supported by verifiable sources, such as books, published academic works or media news.

Another important policy is neutral point of view (NPOV). The NPOV policy means that all views about a particular topic should be fairly represented. The enforcement of policies like NPOV and the existence of constant peer review by Wikipedia editors create incentives to produce balanced articles.

Due to its wide use, Wikipedia can be a powerful tool for public diplomacy. Creating new articles on Wikipedia, or improving existing ones, should be part of each MFAs public diplomacy strategy.

4. Appropriate use of social media in public diplomacy

Social media tools are fairly new for diplomats; however their use is widespread in the business world. The following tips, mainly based on business practice, may help you decide whether and how to use social media in your professional activities. This advice applies well to governments and MFAs, although you will need to keep in mind the special nature and needs of your organisation throughout the campaign.

Social media use entails risks and limitations. Social media marketing campaigns usually do not immediately drive business (in particular, sales). They are more effective at brand building, reputation and relationship management, collecting feedback, creating communities and allowing customers to interact with each other. It is also worth remembering that most social media users have very negative attitudes to any 'covert' commercialisation; there's no surer way to ruin your (and your project's) reputation online than to be discovered trying secretly to 'push' your product or service. Once tainted, reputations in the social media world are very difficult to rebuild.

While reading these tips, keep in mind the basic differences between social

media campaigns run by businesses and those run by governments. A business campaign is primarily about advertising. A government campaign, on the other hand, is about informing – providing an authoritative version of the government’s position – and thereby about influencing. In many cases, a government campaign also aims to counter information put forth by others. In addition, a government social media campaign needs to be integrated into the institution’s overall public diplomacy strategy and supplemented by other, long-term activities. Foreign policies or political and cultural values don’t have the same limited shelf-life as commercial products.

We’ve all heard the maxims – there’s no such thing as bad publicity; or bad publicity is better than no publicity. In the case of social media, however, a poor campaign may be worse than no campaign at all. Because of the interactive nature of social media, starting any campaign exposes you to questions and criticism from other users, which from then on cannot be ignored.

So if, after considering all these risks and limitations, you decide to run a social media campaign, here are some tips on how to organise it.

4.1. Adopt a step-by-step approach

If you are new to social media, familiarise yourself with some less risky and easier tools before launching an all-out campaign. For example, start by adding multimedia and interaction to your website. Move on to blogs, and finally, try engaging with social media.

4.2. Define your target audience

The tools and methods you use will depend on what you want to achieve through your campaign. To better define the target audience, ask yourself the following questions:

- * Whom do I want to communicate with and why?
- * Who is likely to be most interested in my content and what I have to say?
- * What are people currently saying about my institution?

- * Which tools or online services does my target audience use and how do they use them (e.g. what are the popular discussion topics/content)?
- * Which websites does my target audience tend to visit?
- * What do members of my target audience have in common with each other?

4.3. Do not expect to control everything

Most likely, you will not be able to monitor and moderate all comments on your blog, Twitter or Facebook page (and far fewer on other pages and sites beyond your direct control). You need to find the right balance in terms of moderation – too much interference, and especially removing criticism, may have a strong negative effect on the popularity of your resource.

4.4. Allocate sufficient resources for the campaign

Quite often, social media campaigns with ambitious goals and scope are expected to run on a very limited budget and with limited human resources. In most cases, this is a recipe for failure: even though social media marketing may not be as expensive as TV advertising, it consumes a considerable amount of time and effort for everyone involved. The choice of staff involved is also very important. It is necessary to involve staff with experience and understanding of social media – often these will be younger staff members. However, the involvement of senior staff members in advising on certain comments and discussions is also needed, both to avoid risky posts and discussions and to help in changing the professional culture at all levels of the ministry.

4.5. Start with monitoring online commentary – and keep this as a priority throughout the campaign

Before you start any active online outreach efforts, it is important to chart the territory: examine what other users are saying about your organisation, issue or position. This will help you better design your social media strategy and give you the knowledge of which arguments to use and whom to contact during the campaign.

It is important to keep monitoring – one of the least useful things you can do is toss material or comments into a social media channel and never return to see what others think of them. Moreover, monitoring online media is important even if you don't engage in a social media campaign. Numerous tools can help you to monitor what's being said about your country online ('buzz monitoring'). Probably the most important things to do are:

- * **Sign up for Google Alerts.** Google alerts notify you about any relevant news item, newsgroup posting and webpages matching your query.

- * **Monitor blogs.** Some useful tools are: Technorati.²³

- * **Track conversations in community forums and message boards.** The tool to help you with it is BoardTracker.²⁴

Finally, with sufficient available human and financial resources, you could also think about conducting data-mining activities in order to uncover general sentiments on social media and the web. Combined, these activities can help you create a 'social media road map' – a map of the social Web as it pertains to your institution.

4.6. Create engaging content

Whether you create a 'viral video' for YouTube, publish a post on your blog, or comment on someone else's post, your goal is to make your content interesting and useful enough for others to pay attention to it and spread it further. If you try to pitch to bloggers (especially the so-called power users with much authority in the community), provide them with material that they will be interested in and will want to use. When responding to a blog post or comment, engage in meaningful conversation. If you cannot do this, then it might be better not to respond at all.

²³ <http://technorati.com/>.

²⁴ The BoardTracker is currently at the pre-launch stage. <https://www.boardtracker.com/>.

4.7. Disclose your identity and be sincere

Unless you are extra-confident about your ability to hide your identity (i.e., you are one of the top CIA, MI-6, or Mossad spies), do not try to pass yourself off as someone else. Users of social networks are very sensitive to being deceived and any evidence that you are playing foul will be investigated and reported. This may ruin both the campaign and your own reputation.

According to social media expert Lorna Li, “social media marketing is most effective when users in the community know you. The only way for the community to know you is if you spend a lot of time online and invest in managing your social web presence across communities.”²⁵ Therefore, it is best to avoid having an intermediary, even if you are a minister. Social networks require a personal approach and if you make time to respond to postings yourself, you will see better results.

4.8. Attract users to your site (don't limit your communication to external services)

YouTube or Facebook may be great starting points, but in most cases your task is to attract users to your own website, where they will be able to get more (and more favourable) coverage of your issue or institution. If you use social networks, share your own content smartly through links accompanied with short and provocative descriptions; yet try to put it in the context of other ongoing discussions rather than making it seem as marketing your own work.

²⁵Lorna Li, “6 Steps for creating a social media marketing roadmap & plan,” Lorna Li, 2008, [<http://lornali.com/online-reputation-management/6-steps-for-creating-a-social-media-marketing-roadmap-plan>], accessed March 2016.

4.9. Monitor your campaign in real time and react to all relevant content (especially negative)

By engaging in social media marketing, you expose yourself and your issues to a large audience that expects to be heard. If the people you address see that their comments (whether positive or negative) are ignored, your campaign will suffer. Negative comments should not be deleted, unless they contain hate speech or similar, and even in this case the moderator should clearly indicate the reasons why the comment has been removed. In all other cases, negative comments should be responded to in a manner that is as frank and as friendly as possible.

One useful way to learn is through looking at examples of social media campaigns run by experienced MFAs.²⁶


5. Social media use of ASEM partner MFAs

A recent DiploFoundation survey of social media use among the MFAs of ASEM partners shows a wide variety in the ways that different countries have adopted and embraced social media platforms. European MFAs are generally more inclined towards using social media tools. Twitter is especially popular in the diplomatic services of European countries. Asian and European countries use Facebook almost equally, which is probably related to the high level of popularity of Facebook in Asia. A major difference exists with YouTube, which European MFAs use significantly more often than Asian ones in their public diplomacy activities. The use of other platforms, such as Pinterest, Google+ and Instagram, is marginal among ASEM partner MFAs.²⁷

²⁶ e.g. see Adam Bye, "Our digital diplomacy in 2014," Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 19 December 2014, [<http://blogs.fco.gov.uk/adambye/2014/12/19/our-digital-diplomacy-in-2014/>], accessed March 2016.

²⁷ DiploFoundation, ASEM Members Web Presence Analysis (Geneva: DiploFoundation, 2016). Results available upon request to DiploFoundation.

FIGURE 1: THE SOCIAL MEDIA USE OF ASEM MFAS²⁸



On all four surveyed social media platforms, the percentages of MFAs that are represented on the respective platform are higher in Europe than in Asia. Asian MFAs are more frequently represented on Facebook than on YouTube, while in Europe, Twitter is the most frequently used social media platform. In Europe, YouTube is more frequently used for diplomatic representation than Facebook, and the video-streaming platform has almost reached Twitter’s number one position.

When engaging with European and Asian social media dynamics, one should bear in mind an important difference. Even though the absolute number of social media users in Asia is much higher than in Europe, they might not constitute a balanced representation of Asian society, due to the limited Internet penetration in the region. As digital divides usually follow the lines of existing socio-economic cleavages, social media users might over-represent men, the wealthy, and the

²⁸ DiploFoundation, 2016

urban populations, while potentially excluding women, the poor and rural citizens. For example, the gap between male and female users in Asia-Pacific is estimated to be 17.6%, whereas this number is about 8% in Europe.²⁹

6. Challenges

There are a number of challenges and risks involved in using digital and social media tools in public diplomacy:

6.1. Security

Diplomats need to be aware of security risks and use e-tools cautiously and intelligently. Security considerations may seem trivial at first. Unlike many other activities (e.g. online visa applications), engaging in discussions on various social media platforms does not require data exchange with any information systems of the MFA. Any Internet-connected computer (even one physically disconnected from an internal network) may be used for this purpose; therefore this activity does not present a direct risk to the internal information systems of the organisation.

However, when one looks at more than just network security, certain important risks come to the forefront. For example, an official account may be compromised. In that case, the person who gets access to the official account in a social network, blog, forum or any other social media can either openly post inappropriate materials or try to discredit the true owner of the account by posting incorrect but seemingly authentic information.

The fact that diplomats will often be familiar with e-tools from their private lives might also be a source of vulnerability for the diplomatic service: users may find it difficult to separate the use of the same tools for private and work purposes. Using work e-mail or Facebook accounts for private communication (and vice versa) might lead to some undesired consequences. As discussed above in relation to blogging, diplomats are not journalists and have different prerogatives in what they can and cannot publish online, be it in their personal capacity or anonymously.

²⁹ International Telecommunications Union, *Measuring the Information Society 2015* (Geneva: ITU, 2015), p. 8.

6.2. Changes in professional culture

In many cases, the full potential of ICT tools can be reached only if their introduction is accompanied by certain changes in the structure and culture of the institution. Some of these changes are naturally driven by the use of ICT tools, while others need to be initiated by the organisation's leadership before or along with the integration of new tools.

In many foreign ministries, public diplomacy has traditionally relied on official communications, press releases, press conferences and printed material, backed up by subsidised broadcasting, cultural and educational exchanges and scholarship programmes, if financial resources allow for such add-ons. The principles of interactivity and openness to questions and even criticism are often alien to structures that were traditionally responsible for public diplomacy and are now charged with 'e-diplomacy'. The complicated processes of approvals and 'vetting' of any public comment that are common in diplomatic practices may make it impossible to respond to developments in social media in a timely fashion and lead to losing the attention of the audience to other, more agile, commenters.

The strategy that is often needed to win the attention and loyalty of the audience involves establishing a balance between the personal and the organisational and may therefore conflict with the rules and regulations of the organisation. In most organisations, especially in the diplomatic field, personal views are rarely expressed – even many 'off the record' comments are organisationally managed in some way. Social media tools, on the other hand, are intensely personal; they require participants to act in their personal capacity, without hiding behind organisational brands. In a diplomatic setting, such absence of 'filters' may lead to both reputation and security problems.

The culture of interactivity and transparency embodied in blogs and other social media is very different from the more closed and hierarchical culture of traditional diplomacy. As Frederick Jones, former editor of the official US State Department blog, noticed: *"A lot of diplomacy has to be conducted behind closed doors. The challenge we face is striking a balance between having informed and interesting comment and giving diplomacy the space it needs. Diplomacy*

*is not transparent by nature. Blogs are.*³⁰

How can we find a balance between these two cultures? While many authors are doubtful about the applicability of social media to diplomacy (and public diplomacy as part of it), others suggest that the Internet culture of openness, interactivity and two-way communication may transform the very way public diplomacy operates. Former US Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy James K. Glassman described this upcoming change as ‘public diplomacy 2.0’. According to him, the State Department “*would like to see the government as a facilitator and convener [...] What we want to do is encourage a conversation in which we are part.*”³¹ This means supporting online activities by anti-violence, anti-extremist organisations, especially in troubled regions, without necessarily preaching the US story to them. The implementation may fall short, but the ideology behind such initiatives is revolutionary: to cede control of information and to build an open channel for criticism and alternative points of view.

This new environment means new challenges for diplomacy, but it also provides new opportunities. Whether these opportunities will be seized largely depends on the approach taken by diplomats and diplomatic structures (such as MFAs) towards these changes.

³⁰ Frederick Jones, quoted in Matthew Lee, “State Department Starts ‘Dipnote’ Blog,” *The Washington Post*, 25 September 2007, [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/25/AR2007092500145_pf.html], accessed March 2016.

³¹ James Glassman, quoted in Amy Harder, “Clinton State Department Looks to Boost Online Presence,” *Nextgov*, 11 February 2009, [<http://www.nextgov.com/defense/2009/02/clinton-state-department-looks-to-boost-online-presence/43104/>], accessed March 2016.

5-POINT SUMMARY

1

The Internet has deeply affected diplomacy over the last 20 years: new topics from the ICT field have been put on diplomatic agendas, ICT tools are increasingly used in everyday diplomatic work and the Internet has created a new environment in which diplomacy operates.

3

Social media is increasingly used by Asian and European MFAs, which need to bear in mind the social media preferences and culture of the intended public.

5

The full potential of ICT tools can often only be reached when their introduction is accompanied by changes in the structure and culture of the organisation.

2

Social media and other Internet tools have enormous potential to facilitate public diplomacy.

4

Social media tools need to be used cleverly, with appropriate human and financial resources and with an eye on security considerations.

INTERVIEW

Afsané BASSIR-POUR

Former Director of the United Nations
Regional Information Centre for
Western Europe

A long-time journalist and New York based correspondent for the French daily *Le Monde*, Afsané Bassir-Pour has been serving as the director of the United Nations Regional Information Center (UNRIC) in Brussels, covering the European Union. Especially concerned with making the UN more visible and popular among the European public, she shared with Richard Werly some of her thoughts regarding the impact of public diplomacy.

Q: Being a journalist, and having served as a correspondent at the UN Headquarters in New York, did you notice radical changes in the way international organisations and agencies are now promoting themselves?

A: In large international organisations there is no such a thing as ‘radical changes,’ especially in communications. Change is always very slow. That said, with the advent of social media even the UN has had to adapt the way it communicates to the public. It has presence on all social media channels; it has gone 100% paperless. UN.org is one of the most visited websites on the planet in spite of the fact that very few resources, human and financial, are dedicated to online communications. One of the main problems of UN communications is multilingualism, with six official languages

to work in every day, it slows down the speed that is essential for social media.

Q: Public diplomacy covers a number of fields, from advertising campaigns run by specific countries or organizations, to think-tank/academic events. Does it pay off, when diplomats venture outside their traditional role and try to involve various stakeholders?

A: Without a doubt. Not only does it pay off, it is essential. Personally I think that courses in public diplomacy should become compulsory for diplomats. I say that because I believe that communications with various stakeholders should be one of the main components of the work of organizations such as the UN and the EU.

Q: The emergence of Asian countries within the UN system is a given fact. Are we witnessing the emergence of an Asian soft power?

A: The emergence of Asian countries is indeed a given fact everywhere in economic organizations, and trade organizations, not so much at the UN, except of course for the fact that for the past ten years Mr Ban Ki-moon from South Korea has been at the helm. That is because the centre of power at the UN remains the Security Council, with China being the only Asian permanent member, not much, given the public diplomacy or soft

power for that matter. It is when other Asian powers assume the rotating Security Council seat that they can influence the work of the Council, by, hopefully introducing innovative clauses in resolutions. That said the results of leveraging soft power is often very slow.

Q: Europe seems to run from one crisis to another: the migrant crisis following the financial turmoil in 2008-2011. We are also witnessing a rise of anti EU populist movements. Can a better communication, and a better explanation of the European integration, mitigate this existential crisis?

A: Personally I think that absence of comprehensible, coherent and innovative communication strategies, and of communicators, is one of the main sources of Europe's current crisis and the rise of anti-EU sentiments amongst the public. People simply do not understand the European Union or what it does. The same goes for the UN, the general public does not know the importance of both these organisations in their daily lives. It is of course much easier to communicate from a populist platform where all you do is reject and point out the deficiencies, than to explain the daily workings of very intricate bureaucratic systems. But it can be done. One of the problems is that very often people put in charge of communications know next to nothing about communications. They are bureaucrats who, more often than not, do not understand the very fundamentals of communicating in the 21st century, let alone communicating to the youth.

Q: A number of UN agencies have brought on board celebrities to defend and promote their causes. Is this celebrity diplomacy paying off?

A: Yes and no. The idea is absolutely brilliant;

because celebrities have star power and people, especially young people, who should be our main target, pay attention to celebrities. At the UN the result has been mixed. Some celebrities have done amazing work; the latest example is the activism of the actress Emma Watson for UN Women. But she is one of the rare ones, out of over 300 Goodwill Ambassadors; I would say 10% have been truly useful. That said, having been inside the system, I must add that the fault is also very much the bureaucracy at the UN itself. The system, as far as Goodwill Ambassadors go, needs a complete re-haul. Also I think we should move into the domain of young influencers, YouTube influencers for example, in order to, once again, reach young people. As for the EU, I believe it is time to start a Goodwill Ambassador programme; they could certainly do with some serious star power!

Q: You are also a founding member of Cartooning for Peace. Cartoonists are key actors of freedom of expression. They touch the hearts of the readers. Shall an Asia-Europe cartoonist exhibition be organised to promote the Asia-Europe dialogue?

A: I am indeed very proud to have worked on creating the link between the UN and Cartooning for Peace. This year, 2016, will mark the 10th anniversary of Cartooning for Peace. It is worth celebrating with a number of exhibitions, including of course an Asia-Europe exhibition. Political cartoonists remain the most loved journalists because they say very important things with humour and a few lines of the pencil.

CHAPTER 7:

HOW TO INTERACT WITH STAKEHOLDERS (ADVOCACY)

Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF)

Abstract

Public diplomacy initiatives have shifted from image management to relationship building. In this context, stakeholder groups have become increasingly important. This chapter looks at how to identify, map and engage with key decision-makers, policymakers and opinion-makers and shapers from media, civil society, the private sector, academia and the government. It outlines how to select, approach and engage in dialogue with relevant stakeholders to communicate your positions and to influence and build networks for information gathering and future initiatives.

The chapter first explores reasons for stakeholder involvement in public diplomacy strategies, arguing that stakeholders are particularly effective in giving a campaign relevance, credibility, constancy, consistency and cordiality. The chapter then provides a number of steps to help practitioners to identify and engage with the right stakeholders. Stakeholders need to be carefully chosen, and such decisions depend on the stakeholder's strengths and limitations, as well as the purpose and audience of the public diplomacy campaign.

Finally, the chapter identifies key stakeholder groups – the media, academia, business and civil society - and outlines the opportunities and challenges related to their involvement in public diplomacy strategies.

Please check the 5-point summary as well at the end of this chapter.

Introduction

This chapter looks at how to identify, map and engage with key decision-makers, policymakers and opinion-makers and shapers from media, civil society, the private sector, academia and the government. It outlines how to select, approach and engage in dialogue with relevant stakeholders to communicate your positions and to influence and build networks for information gathering and future initiatives.

Recent years have seen a shift in the focus of public diplomacy initiatives from image management to relationship building. In this context, the important role that specific stakeholder groups play, as vectors for information and also for key messages and core values, cannot be underestimated. Identifying the spheres of influence and potential policy impact of each stakeholder group is crucial to developing a feasible, mutually beneficial and sustainable cooperation strategy.

This chapter:

- * explores the reasons for public stakeholder engagement and involvement in any public diplomacy strategy;
- * equips participants with the tools to identify suitable and relevant stakeholders for engagement in the context of public diplomacy; and
- * explores the potential impact of specific stakeholder groups (academia, media, business and civil society) on public diplomacy strategy.

1. The importance of stakeholder engagement

Working with local stakeholders can help ensure the success of your public diplomacy strategy or campaign. As shown in Table 1, our notion of public

diplomacy has evolved over recent years from a propaganda-heavy approach to one that prizes long-term cooperation with credible and influential local stakeholders.

TABLE 1: THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

	Propaganda	Public Affairs	Strategic Communication	People-to-People	Cooperation
Definition	Influencing through hard-sell messaging	Influencing through managing information flow	Influencing through dialogue and targeted communication	Influencing through sharing culture	Influencing through developing partnerships
Main purpose	To 'sell' an image or idea to the public	To inform public about an issue, policy or programme	To seek buy-in and influence opinions	To create a sense of familiarity and empathy and to influence behaviour	To increase mutual inter-dependence and foster common initiatives
Key question addressed	'What do I want them to remember about us?'	'What do I need them to know?'	'What do I need them to understand?'	'How can I get them to like us?'	'How can we work together?'
Relationship with stakeholder groups	They are recipients of the messages disseminated	They are vectors for the spread of information	They are multipliers of influence	They are spokespersons for my culture and community	They are strategic partners in a mutually beneficial enterprise
Key concern	Image management	Information dissemination	Opinion-shaping	Familiarisation	Relationship-building
Perception	Out-dated	Traditional	Two-way	Cultural	Sustainable

Although there is a fundamental assumption that the ‘evolution’ of public diplomacy is linear, from propaganda to partnership, there is in fact a broad range of possibilities in between. Aside from propaganda, all of these methods are currently employed in various public diplomacy contexts, often in combination.¹ As we shift from image-management towards relationship-building, however, long-term, sustainable, mutually beneficial and ethical relations with local stakeholder groups will play an increasingly important role in ensuring the relevance, credibility, constancy, consistency and cordiality of bilateral relations. Through carefully selected and attentively nurtured stakeholder partnerships, we can elevate our outreach and awareness efforts from mere public relations to effective public diplomacy.

1.1. Understanding partisan perception

Before starting to work with stakeholders, it is important to consider ‘partisan perception’. This refers to our tendency to systematically process information in favour of the biases we already possess. For example, studies show that we fail to accurately judge the intelligence, motivations and capacities of groups or individuals whom we deem to be different or in opposition to us. We also tend to see ourselves as more talented, more ethical, more logical and more correct when dealing with others.²

Public engagement efforts may fail because of errors in judgement associated with partisan perception. For example, you might over-explain or pitch key messages too low, and come across as patronising. You might underestimate the complexity of cultural or social traditions, resulting in communications or activities that could be seen as trivialising the host community’s culture. You might hold exaggerated perceptions of the local community’s position on a certain topic, leading to overly cautious or insufficiently prudent engagement strategies.

Working with local stakeholder groups in the context of your public engagement

¹Of course, propaganda methods are still used by many states. However, it is not recommended as a public diplomacy activity, which heavily depends on listening to foreign publics, instead of blatant one-way communication.

²James K. Sebenius, “The Negotiator’s Secret: More than Merely Effective,” Harvard Business School, 10 September 2001, [<http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/2480.html>], accessed March 2016.

efforts offers the distinct advantage of an internal perspective accorded by your local strategic partner. This minimises the impact of your partisan perception and can help you to interact with the local public in a way that is better calibrated to the image of themselves.

1.2. How can local stakeholders help?

There are several key ingredients that help make a public engagement campaign towards a local audience successful. Local stakeholders can help you with all of these.

- * **Relevance:** crafting a relevant key message is crucial to ensuring buy-in on any policy issue. Every society has people or organisations with large networks and the ability to influence and shape opinion. Invest the time, energy and resources needed to persuade appropriate influential stakeholders to support your positions or policies and to help you shape your key messages so that they resonate strongly with the local audience.

- * **Credibility:** as a representative of a foreign nation, you might not automatically have the credibility to convince local audiences of the issues and values at the core of your public engagement campaign. Well-known and respected local stakeholders who are experts in their fields may have the authority to speak on your behalf.

- * **Constancy:** constancy is vital in any public diplomacy strategy. The same message, reinforced subtly but relentlessly through various channels, engenders significant buy-in without the scepticism that is inspired – understandably – by overt propaganda. In this regard, continually building on and developing relationships with a diverse group of core stakeholders that supports your policy can ensure that it is given public prominence.

- * **Consistency:** choosing the right key message to emphasise in your strategy is of utmost importance: it is a commitment that will last the entire campaign. Local stakeholders who have an interest in the success of your campaign can help both with crafting the message and with publicising it consistently.

* **Cordiality:** Cultivating a humane, cordial and personalised relationship with key stakeholders will help to ensure that they can act as ‘ambassadors’ for the values you want the local audience to associate with you.

2. Identifying and engaging key stakeholders

A number of processes and steps can help you to identify and engage with the right stakeholders and to work towards a successful public diplomacy initiative.

2.1. Understanding your strengths and limitations

Before embarking on any public diplomacy initiative, you need to honestly appraise your assets. These include financial resources, existing successful public diplomacy campaigns, policy areas in which you have excellent relations with the host country and local stakeholders with whom you have good working relations. You also have to be honest with yourself about the limitations you face. These could include limited financial and human resources, poor visibility in the host country, unfavourable public opinion and weak stakeholder networks within the host country. The form, intensity, duration and eventual outcome of your public diplomacy efforts depend on your strengths and limitations.

2.2. Identifying stakeholders to work with

The following questions may help you determine which of the many possible local stakeholders you should try to work with. In all cases, identifying your objectives and targets remain the keys to produce adequate PR and visibility tools.

What is the primary purpose of my campaign?

* **To sell an image or idea to the public:** A local partner might be helpful, but not essential. Most tourism campaigns fall into this category.

* **To inform the public about an issue, policy or programme:** Look for stakeholders with a wide but not necessarily deep reach, for example mass media, TV stations, magazines and newspapers.

* **To seek buy-in and influence opinions:** Partner with stakeholders who have credibility, authority and a relatively wide and deep reach, for example academic institutes, news media, journals, trade magazines and, increasingly, bloggers.

* **To create a sense of familiarity and empathy and to influence behaviour:** Work with stakeholders with highly visible platforms to which the public feels a sense of belonging, for example activist groups, theatre/art/music groups, sports teams and other practitioners of the arts or cultural activities.

* **To increase mutual interdependence and foster common initiatives:** Seek stakeholders who share similar values and ideals. Look for those who are engaged in projects similar to those that you would undertake or who may benefit from cooperating with you: businesses, academic institutes, issue-based civil society groups and high-profile celebrity activists.

What kind of audience do I want to reach with my message?

Successful public diplomacy initiatives begin with a precise definition of the audience to be reached. In particular, you need to know:³

The audience segments you are dealing with: an audience can be segmented or classified in a number of ways, for example by geography, age, religion, income, policy knowledge or education. The more details you have on your target audience, the more effective your communications will be. Within the audience group that you have identified, is there a sub-group that

³Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Public Diplomacy and Advocacy Handbook (Canberra: Australian Government, 2011), Part 4, Section 11. [<http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/people-to-people/public-diplomacy-advocacy-handbook/Pages/part-one-managing-public-diplomacy-programs.aspx>], accessed March 2016.

you would prioritise (based on your objectives)? Prioritising your audience groups can help you craft more precise key messages that resonate better.

How much the audience already knows about your issues: does the audience have existing knowledge and opinions about the policy issue? Are opinions homogenous within the audience group or mixed? Are opinions extreme or moderate? Knowing the answers to these questions will help you pitch your key messages at the right level.

How the audience prefers to receive information about the issue: are face-to-face meetings on this policy issue effective, or are people unwilling to speak directly about it? Can you use written materials, or are there language, education or other barriers? Does the audience have a strong and trusted oral tradition or informal communication network? Is the authority of the speaker an important factor for your audience? Does your audience respond better to powerful and memorable messages and slogans or to subtle, lengthy and well-elaborated arguments? Are local television, radio and print news media seen as objective? Is there a strong culture of online engagement in the form of independent websites and a vibrant local blogosphere? Knowing this will help you determine the form, style, quantity and depth of the information you should provide.

Who are the key stakeholders that I cannot afford to ignore?

There may be some stakeholders you need to work with due to their interest in the policy issue and their potential influence in fostering a favourable climate on that issue. The matrix in Table 2 shows some criteria you could use to select these essential stakeholders.

Is there congruence with any existing initiatives from which mine can benefit?

Mapping existing initiatives in your policy area undertaken by key stakeholders will give you an idea of the scope you have for developing meaningful partnerships with them. The most long-lasting and fruitful partnerships occur when both parties stand to gain.

TABLE 2: IDENTIFYING KEY STAKEHOLDERS

High Influence	
<p>High Influence but low interest: Keep regularly informed with strategic information.</p>	<p>High Influence and high interest: This is your key stakeholder group. Cultivate cordial relations and keep them informed of all initiatives. This is the ideal group with which to develop partnerships and long-term projects.</p>
Low Interest	High Interest
<p>Low Influence and low interest: This is not an important stakeholder group for this policy issue.</p>	<p>Low Influence but high interest: Keep regularly informed of activities and initiatives.</p>
Low Influence	

2.3. Credibility and ‘likeability’ of stakeholder partners

From all the civil society organisations, media outlets, businesses and academic institutes out there, only a handful will have the knowledge, credibility and network suited to your public outreach needs. Even fewer will share your values and possess the authenticity, optimism and empathy required to be effective purveyors of your image and message. From these you need to choose credible and likeable stakeholder-partners who can help you reach a wider audience that is already predisposed to accepting the message that you jointly deliver. Table 3 presents some questions to help you select appropriate stakeholder partners.

TABLE 3: CHOOSING CREDIBLE AND LIKEABLE PARTNERS

Credibility		
Knowledge and expertise	Authority and status	Network and resources
Is the stakeholder knowledgeable in the field?	Is the stakeholder seen as an authority by your target audience?	Does the stakeholder possess adequate financial resources?
Can the stakeholder contribute local knowledge or insights to your campaign?	Is the stakeholder's authority derived from a legal/ethical/legitimate source?	Does the stakeholder have adequate human resources at its disposal?
Is there public recognition of the stakeholder's expertise?	Is the stakeholder's status or profile likely to complement and reinforce (and not overshadow) the message you wish to convey?	Does the stakeholder possess a large and efficient network through which information may be disseminated?
Likeability		
Authenticity	Optimism	Empathy
Does the stakeholder come across as authentic to the general public in the mass media or social media?	Does the stakeholder have a positive and optimistic image that you would like to associate with the message you are trying to convey?	Is the stakeholder perceived by the audience to be accessible and benign (not distant, aloof or elitist)?
Does the stakeholder openly state the values for which it stands?	Is the general public positive or optimistic about the stakeholder's role in society?	Is the stakeholder perceived as empathetic to the local audience's needs, hopes and fears?
Does the stakeholder have a reputation for delivering on its promises?	Is the stakeholder optimistic about the future and its partnership with you?	Does the stakeholder have a track record of communicating ideas effectively to the target audience?

2.4. Planning and evaluating stakeholder partnerships for mutual benefit

2.4.1. Set goals and objectives

Set one common audience-centric goal: when working with local stakeholders on public advocacy efforts, each activity should have one specific audience-centric goal that all stakeholder-partners agree on. This goal should not be about what you or your partner want to achieve, but rather what you would like your target audience to take away. This goal should be clear from the outset and should be the yardstick against which you measure the outcome and impact of your advocacy effort.

Set non-conflicting secondary objectives: it is crucial that you and your stakeholder-partners are open with each other about objectives for entering the partnership. In most cases, helping your stakeholder-partners achieve their goals will also help you achieve yours.

For example, imagine that your objective is to raise the profile, credibility and popularity of pursuing tertiary education in your country through organising a joint Master's programme with a local university, allowing students to spend a semester in each country, with fees subsidised by funding from your country. Your university partner's objective for getting involved in this joint venture will obviously be different. They might have decided to partner with you in order to publicise their Master's programme and to offer their students greater international exposure. In this scenario, the partnership is likely to work well as the objectives of each partner are not contradictory or conflicting.

Make your goals SMART:

- * Specific
- * Measurable
- * Achievable
- * Relevant
- * Time-bound

2.4.2. Focus on the process and not just the outcome

Maintain an equal relationship: avoid unilateral decision-making unless expressly authorised by your stakeholder-partner. For the partnership to be sustainable, all stakeholders' non-conflicting secondary objectives must be met. Don't underestimate the importance of the partners' needs.

Meet regularly: face-to-face meetings and informal gatherings can help you understand stakeholders' and target audiences' needs, concerns and working methods. It may also give you direct access to your stakeholder-partners' networks.

Conduct periodic progress reviews: it is important for all stakeholders to periodically assess the progress and success of the initiatives you have undertaken. In order to do this, consider setting SMART interim goals.

Monitor your joint public profile and your individual public profiles: in public diplomacy, public perception of your office, your personal conduct, your partnerships and your initiatives is critical. When partnering with local stakeholders to implement advocacy initiatives, it can be useful to consistently monitor how you and your partners are portrayed in the media. Having a good idea of public sentiment towards you can help you gauge your audience's receptivity to the policies, ideas and values that you are trying to communicate. It is also in your interest to monitor how your stakeholder partners are portrayed in mass and social media and how they are perceived by your audience.

2.4.3. Evaluate jointly and plan iteratively

Conduct impact assessments and evaluations: at the end of any public engagement or advocacy initiative, it is essential to assess the extent of the impact on the target audience. In addition, it is helpful to conduct an evaluation of the partnership with local stakeholders. Evaluations can be done

by externally hired organisations, which have the benefit of being neutral and therefore more objective. At the same time, external consultants may lack a proper understanding of the context in which the MFA works, and they may demand significant financial contributions.

Treat all your activities as learning opportunities: be committed to incorporating audience and stakeholder feedback into future partnership plans. This iterative approach towards partnership will lead to smoother working relations, more tangible outcomes and more effective public diplomacy initiatives in the future.

3. Stakeholder groups

This section gives a brief overview of four important and interlinked groups of stakeholders.

3.1. Media

Mass media still plays an important role in public diplomacy. Television, radio and print media allow access to a vast audience and are effective tools for generating awareness of policy issues, conveying specific strategic messages, correcting misconceptions regarding your country or culture, as well as hinting at larger ideas or values that are important to you. Cultivating good relationships within the media may result in good editorial coverage in support of your policy. However, mass media is primarily a one-way communication channel. No matter how carefully you craft your message, it may not be received by your target audience in the way you intend.

As discussed in chapter 6, social networks and blogs offer two-way channels of communication that reach an equally vast audience, but in a more nuanced and interactive fashion. Indeed, social media is arguably becoming the most important tool for public diplomacy today. Allowing diplomats and MFAs to reach the citizens of other countries in real-time and at a low cost, social media creates virtual spaces for interaction and the exchange of information, ideas and values – the driving forces behind any public diplomacy initiative.

3.1.1. Opportunities

You can decide on whether or not to outsource a campaign: depending on the financial and human resources at your disposal, you might wish to outsource your campaign to a PR firm. This approach can work for small embassies with appropriate budgets, and when the timeline for the campaign is particularly short. This method also works well for messaging that is consistent and not too confrontational or politically sensitive.

You can be everywhere at once: with mass and social media at your disposal, your message can reach a wide audience and become almost ubiquitous. Being aware of the different sub-groups within your larger target audience will allow you to tailor your communication strategy to each sub-group's needs and expectations. For example, messaging for a TV campaign and for Facebook cannot be identical – it must fit the medium and also the expectations of the primary audience of that medium. Even if you outsource your media relations, your office must take responsibility for crafting your message and monitoring its impact. Not only does social media offer you increased contact with the general public, it also changes the nature of that contact: you can directly reach your audience without going through a media outlet as an intermediary.

You can convey more than facts and dry information: effective public diplomacy is about more than just pushing policy information and data. Carefully crafted narratives and personal stories that support your policy stance or that reinforce positive perceptions of your country can shift target audiences' mind-sets and create an image or challenge deep-rooted prejudices. Using mass and social media as multi-sensory platforms for storytelling can be a powerful yet palatable way to convey not just facts but aspirations, ideals and values.

You can build dynamic networks: the multiplier effect associated with social media is unprecedented. If your message resonates with its online audience, they can become the network you need to inspire further dialogue or action. With key stakeholders or stakeholder groups as nodes in your ever-expanding networked community, you can test policy issues faster, gather feedback more accurately, generate discussion more effectively and gain buy-in more effortlessly than ever before.

You can inspire responsible and respectful action: through online and offline social networks, your mediated messages can inspire action on relevant policy issues. This is why it is important to remember that you are accountable for any actions you initiate, and that you need to take care that your messaging is both responsible and respectful of the host country's laws and norms.

3.1.2. Challenges

Talking too much and listening too little: social media, and even mass media, are effective tools for public diplomacy only when they are regarded as two-way channels of communication: you cannot just talk, but you must also listen to interlocutors. With mass media, traditionally seen as a channel for one-way communication, the impulse to push key messages out there quite aggressively can be hard to resist. It may be helpful to remember that a systematic analysis of mass media reports on your policy issue, embassy or country can provide you with much-needed feedback on the success of your public outreach campaign. For example, changes in the imagery used to describe your country could tell you about significant shifts in the mind-set of your target audience and its potential receptivity towards your policies.

Differentiating between local and foreign media: monitoring news stories in the local media will give you an insight into what might be of interest to the local population and help you to pitch your story accordingly. In your effort to be relevant to a local audience, however, do not forget that your story may also be picked up by foreign media networks. If this happens, could it be misconstrued? Will your intended messages also be relevant on a global scale?

Investing too little in social media: using social media for government public diplomacy can be harder than you expect. The resources required to manage social media profiles and implement an effective social media strategy are often grossly underestimated. For example, if you use Facebook and Twitter in your outreach strategy, updating them must be an official task, assigned to capable individuals who understand the objectives and desired outcomes of the campaign and who know how to engage appropriately with an audience using social media.

Investing too much in social media: do not rely exclusively on social media: these platforms can only complement real-world public diplomacy.

Face-to-face meetings, public events, printed materials, embassy visits and a host of other instruments should remain at your disposal when constructing a strategy for public engagement.

Measuring the impact of your media strategy: media can be a vital stakeholder in any public diplomacy effort. Measuring the impact of a media strategy can be challenging, however, and requires planning and appropriate assessment tools.

3.2. Academia

Academia, including colleges, institutes of higher learning, research centres and other entities, has long been associated with public diplomacy. Faculty and students, as future opinion leaders, are important agents of influence within their own communities. Academic and professional links that have always played important roles in the progress of science and technology are now multiplying more quickly and widely due to the Internet and government initiatives to foster long-term ties with other governments and academic institutes around the world.

Competition in the academic realm constitutes a significant dimension of competition among states: the image of higher education within one's country, the ability of a country to attract the best brains to its institutes and the impact of its institutes' research endeavours on the scientific community and on business are all indicators of a country's academic prowess.

The sizable budgets maintained by many countries for international scholarships, academic exchange programmes, hiring foreign faculty and opening overseas campuses of state-funded universities all point at the importance of the academic sector in the context of public diplomacy. From student exchange programmes that offer face-to-face contact between nationals of different countries to help diminish stereotypes and ultimately facilitate inter-cultural communication, to the funding of cutting-edge research that can put one's country on the map and boost business, the academic sector is far from stuffy and elitist. It constitutes one of the most valuable groups of stakeholders with whom a diplomat could engage.

3.2.1. Opportunities

You can engage with youth and create a lasting foundation for dialogue and partnership: youth constitute a highly vocal, connected and volatile segment of society, often neglected by traditional public diplomacy initiatives. Engaging with students through exchange programmes and other education initiatives lays the foundation for future policy dialogue. It also cements their impression of your country at a young age, potentially making them more sympathetic to your concerns. Foreign citizens who have interacted with yours since their youth are more likely to agree with and promote your public diplomacy goals, of their own free will, in their own lives.

You can connect domestic and foreign communities directly through exchange programmes: people-to-people interactions foster a sense of community across borders, increase mutual interdependence and decrease the likelihood of antipathy, discrimination and conflict between nations. Based on the principals of reciprocity, inquiry and respect, international student or faculty exchange programmes can offer both societies the opportunity for dialogue and exchange, and result in the creation of powerful ideological, commercial and personal ties.

You can position education and research accomplishments as part of a strong place branding strategy: investing in international education programmes and infrastructure is a whole-of-government effort, while it generates a whole-of-society benefit. The attractiveness of your country's universities or overseas campuses, the originality and integrity of its laboratories, the rigour and reputation of its PhD programmes and the quality and relevance of its language programmes can all be the trademarks of its overall 'brand'.

3.2.2. Challenges

Avoiding being perceived as 'neo-colonialist': in international education initiatives, the perception of 'brainwashing', propaganda and surreptitious cultural domination is anathema. This is a particular challenge in the establishment of overseas university campuses. The best partnerships are those that ensure that local needs and concerns are met through the

international education programme. Try to guarantee that all international education initiatives conducted in the name of public diplomacy: a) are conducted in collaboration with credible and respected local partners; b) respond to local issues and concerns while remaining cognisant of the larger global context; c) accord recognition for the accomplishments of the local community; and d) offer real benefits to the local host community and culture.

Consistency with other state policies: as mentioned earlier, any international education initiative is a whole-of-government effort. International education programmes must complement other state policies in order to serve as public diplomacy assets. For example, an international initiative to increase foreign student intake in your universities must be designed in the context of the prevailing economic situation, the projected economic landscape in the years to come, the most likely growth sectors, projected employment statistics, the availability of internship opportunities for foreign graduates of your universities, the number of work permits/visas likely to be issued and immigration policies. Similarly, the success of overseas education initiatives will be subject to such considerations in the host country.

3.3. Business

Previously viewed as a peripheral activity best left to commercial secretaries and specialists from other departments, the building of trade and economic relationships has returned to the centre of diplomacy. Just a few decades ago, commercial diplomacy was seen as a ‘black hole’ by diplomats pursuing a fast-track career and paled in comparison with political work. But if we go back to the origins of diplomacy, we see that trade provided the first motivation for inter-state contacts and agreements.

Businesses contribute to the shaping of the image of a country and, at the same time, they are among the main beneficiaries when that image is good. It is largely through business-related activities that countries get a return on their investment in soft power or public diplomacy activities. It is assumed that with a good image, business will be easier, although there is no pre-determined or direct link between the image of a country and the success of its businesses abroad. In short, while public diplomacy can contribute to the success of businesses, it is for businesses themselves to ensure that their image appeals to their customers.

3.3.1. Opportunities

You can engage with the entire business community as part of your public outreach strategy: cooperation with businesses is a well-established element of public diplomacy. But in addition to the companies themselves, there are also business associations, industry lobbying groups, as well as parliamentarians, academics, the media, science and technology specialists, plus local constituents like regional and other subsidiary political entities that have a direct stake in stronger economic exchanges. The latter types of local groups are especially important when reaching out to local businesses and when employment generation and other local economic benefits are involved. A distinction should be made between companies and entrepreneurs, which are primary actors in economic relations, and chambers of commerce, which are intermediaries.

You can engage with and involve your own nationals who occupy key positions in business overseas: experts on technical cooperation assignments and business representatives stationed overseas can be engaged in brainstorming and organising outreach activities. They can lend credibility and neutrality to governmental diplomacy activities and also ground policy aspirations in local economic realities. Business stakeholders can offer a much-needed ‘reality-check’ to diplomats seeking to engage in public diplomacy.

You can engage with or involve large companies with complementary corporate diplomacy strategies in your public diplomacy efforts: large companies in host countries sometimes have complex corporate diplomacy strategies developed with support from and in support of, the overall public diplomacy framework of their country of origin. Corporate diplomacy initiatives, in the form of industrial lobbies for example, can target governments, inter-governmental bodies, international organisations, NGOs and other businesses. This can make them huge assets and powerful allies when their strategies match yours. However, they can also compete against the ‘official’ business diplomacy and sometimes even undermine national interests if not properly engaged.

You can measure returns on investment: governments invest considerable amounts of money, financed by public contributions, with the aim of supporting

internationally expanding businesses. This should, in turn, bring increased international economic integration, growth and employment for the home and host countries and generally improve bilateral business relations. In business diplomacy, some quantitative indicators of success are trade volume, foreign direct investment (FDI) stock and patent filings.

3.3.2. Challenges

Establishing a direct link between image and business success: a good global image may facilitate business-related activities, while a bad global image may have no negative impact whatsoever on business revenue. Conversely, a thriving business climate between two nations may not be an adequate indicator of cordial and open diplomatic and people-to-people relations. While it is tempting to draw parallels between good public diplomacy and good business, and attribute causality to them, it could be counter-productive to make simplistic links. What is certain is that maintaining a positive image or boosting the image of your country overseas, by working with businesses on campaigns that are beneficial to both your country and your host country, can help improve the business environment.

Global value chain management is changing the way the efficiency of public diplomacy can be assessed: while quantitative indicators of the success of your business diplomacy initiatives do indeed exist, they are becoming increasingly inadequate when it comes to painting an accurate picture of how much value cooperation with a state, multinational corporation or other business actually adds. The different elements of the cross-border value chain (research and development, design of products, services, or processes, production, marketing and sales, distribution and customer service) tend to blur the link between a specific country or company and the real value it adds to a product or service.

Working in a very complex environment: the myriad of stakeholders in the business world (from both the foreign country and yours) can be daunting. The needs, interests, and demands of small and medium enterprises, large local businesses, multinational corporations, chambers of commerce, trade federations, government bodies, trade unions, media, opinion leaders, economists and other academics and relevant civil society groups all have to be considered.

Corporate diplomacy and the pressure it exerts: the lobbying capacity of multinational corporations and other large business entities cannot be underestimated. When the corporate diplomacy goals of large company stakeholders do not align with yours, they can seriously challenge the policies, ideas and values that your public diplomacy efforts embody. Large businesses take their corporate diplomacy seriously and invest large sums of money in creating reserves of goodwill from the community through advertising, corporate social responsibility initiatives, development activities, social projects and other means that may closely resemble your country's public diplomacy efforts in terms of format, but not necessarily in terms of substance or message. In assessing the host country's receptivity to your message, it is critical to be aware of conflicting messaging from the private sector.

3.4. Civil society

Civil society constitutes the fourth and arguably the most diverse group with whom a diplomat may engage. Civil society organisations (CSOs) can be incredible shapers of public opinion as they are seen to represent the heart, soul and values of society. NGOs, special interest groups, activists, artists and celebrities, charities, diasporas, religious or cultural groups, think-tanks, philanthropists and many other groups have deep roots in the community and enjoy the trust of various segments of society.

By using the Internet, CSOs are increasingly able to influence opinion at international level. A public engagement effort between your country and the host country may have an unexpected impact on the region or on societies on the other side of the globe due to the tremendous reach of your civil society partner. Among the 40,000 or more internationally operating NGOs, many are powerful enough to shape international discourse on human rights, to shame corporations for their environmentally unsustainable practices and to mobilise millions in protest of policies they deem unacceptable. States must acknowledge the indisputable fact that they share the stage with these non-state actors; they must find a way to work with them or risk finding themselves in an adversarial relationship.

Civil society is often associated with cultural diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy has been credited with boosting economic cooperation between nations and with helping nations achieve their national security aims. It enables such outcomes

by exposing the people of a foreign nation to the institutions, ideas and values of yours, thereby influencing public opinion, fostering greater understanding and building trust. Essentially, cultural diplomacy aims to build a reserve of goodwill that can be drawn from in times of crisis and when support for economic, security or other policies is needed.

In cultural diplomacy, unlike with traditional diplomacy, there are no immediate expected outcomes. Cultural diplomacy follows a slow and steady approach, focusing on the long-term and less on specific policy issues. Cultural diplomacy aims to introduce social and political ideas, values and norms to the host country in an accessible and enjoyable way so that they may take root and flourish over time. Cultural diplomacy initiatives have the added advantage of being accessible to young people and to non-elite groups.

Cultural diplomacy may foster mutual understanding among nations, bolster other diplomatic initiatives, improve overall public opinion and engender goodwill between nations. This in turn generally results in greater economic cooperation, reduces chances of violent conflict and forges stronger political ties.

In your cultural diplomacy strategy, you can involve and incorporate the entire cultural landscape of your country including the performing arts, visual arts, literature and poetry, languages, fashion and costumes, the beauty industry, inter-cultural or inter-religious dialogue initiatives, educational programmes or exchanges and much more. Nevertheless, a successful cultural diplomacy campaign ultimately depends on the respect for the host country's culture, creativity, interactivity and accessibility.

3.4.1. Opportunities

You can connect to difficult-to-reach segments of society through the networks of CSOs: a unique and important aspect of CSOs is their ability to reach youth, women, non-elites and marginalised groups in the host country. On the other hand, working with CSOs can help you gain a network, visibility and support also on an international scale, among individuals and groups who share the same values and ideals.

You can count on your stakeholder-partners to do your lobbying

for you: you can avoid hard-sell tactics associated with propaganda, the appearance of elitism associated with a business diplomacy approach and accusations of cultural imperialism or neo-colonialist tactics by partnering with credible local CSOs that share your values and objectives. With their understanding of local sentiment and their knowledge of local needs and concerns, CSO partners can significantly aid your public diplomacy efforts. In addition to helping you set feasible goals, measure audience receptivity, access local networks, fine-tune your messaging and disseminate information, they can also put pressure on their own governments as citizens and part of the electorate.

You can focus on long-term goals, bigger ideals and basic values in the context of cultural diplomacy: while other public diplomacy environments (especially business and media) tend to operate at a very quick pace, building goodwill through cultural diplomacy in the civil society sphere takes time. In general, long-term cultural diplomacy efforts have four objectives:

- * to encourage contact between the peoples of the two nations;
- * to assist in nurturing an environment in the host nation in which your policies will gain acceptance;
- * to generate a sense of familiarity and goodwill towards your nation that is strong enough to make conflict with it seem unattractive; and
- * to stockpile an intangible reserve of goodwill, generated through positive people-to-people interactions, that can help to sway public opinion in your favour in the unlikely event of a crisis or conflict.

It can be argued that in a crisis, the success of all other public diplomacy initiatives is dependent on sustained effective cultural diplomacy.

3.4.2. Challenges

Resist the temptation to control the message: in this day and age, a government cannot produce and disseminate books, music, films, art and other cultural material with any measure of credibility. CSOs are therefore helpful partners for creating and disseminating sincere and relevant material for public education or information. Your role is simply to create opportunities for CSOs that share your ideals to get their message across. In such a situation, you cannot control the message, or the way it is interpreted by your target

audience. You can simply try to influence through observing, interacting with, understanding and enabling your CSO messenger.

Accept the potential for controversy: the views of the people, as represented by the CSOs, may not match the view of the government of your host country. In fact, quite often the citizens of a foreign country will largely support your policy, while their government is firmly against it, or vice-versa. In such situations, ask yourself if what is needed is buy-in from the larger public, or official acceptance of a particular policy. In the context of cultural diplomacy, cultural activities as innocuous as fashion shows or dance performances can be interpreted in a range of ways and can even be seen as offensive to some vocal segments of society. Your control of the outcome of any effort is limited. Spending less time trying to anticipate the outcome and more time trying to understand the concerns of the different segments of your target audience may tip the scale in your favour.

Resist the temptation to replicate initiatives in other contexts: the impact and outcome of engagement with civil society, especially through cultural diplomacy activities, is incredibly difficult to measure with any accuracy. While there is generally consensus that CSOs can be vital stakeholders in any public diplomacy effort, there is less clarity on what the indicators of a successful engagement process would look like. What worked in one locality may not work in another. What worked at one time may not work at another. What worked for one policy issue may not work for another. Resist the temptation to apply engagement formulas, and take the time needed to get to know the concerns of each CSO stakeholder-partner with regard to the policy issue in question.

Cultural diplomacy has no specifically intended tangible outcome: you may not even know if it is working. You will only know that your cultural diplomacy efforts have failed when you have an international crisis and people in the host community do not have enough goodwill stockpiled in your arsenal to give you the benefit of the doubt. The military imagery is intentional: the goodwill gained slowly and incrementally through cultural diplomacy is often a better deterrent to violent conflict than an arsenal of weapons. Finding the budget to stockpile weapons, however, still tends to be easier than finding the resources to organise ‘fluffy’ cultural activities that will help stockpile intangible goodwill.

5-POINT SUMMARY

1

The involvement of stakeholders in public diplomacy strategies is important in boosting a campaign's relevance, credibility, constancy, consistency and cordiality.

3

When selecting stakeholders, always bear in mind the purpose and audience of the PD campaign.

5

Stakeholder groups that are particularly relevant for public diplomacy are the media, academia, business and civil society, which all have their own opportunities and challenges.

2

Public diplomacy practitioners need to carefully identify suitable stakeholders, bearing in mind their strengths, limitations and level of credibility among the audience.

4

To plan and evaluate stakeholder partnerships, practitioners need to set clear goals and objectives.

CREATIVITY AT THE CORE OF SUCCESSFUL ASIA-EUROPE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Bringing new ideas and concepts to promote ASEM shall be a constant feature, while keeping in mind the pillars of public diplomacy argues Richard Werly.

It is a feature that one cannot miss when travelling through emerging Asia.

At department stores, very often, exhibitions and animations are held to offer clients an activity to enjoy with their kids and families. Those “mall events” are part of the local culture, and though they may sound strange and bizarre to a European audience, they are of prime importance for brands, as they target the public where they are, and bring joy and smiles while at the same time performing efficient marketing. Let us not be mistaken here: Asia-Europe public diplomacy shall not turn into “mall diplomacy”. But these Asian-style commercial events can serve as a reminder: a good brand must be on the offensive. It must create the buzz and be present where people meet and talk to each other. Malls are usually places for commercial products. Universities, public squares, cultural centres – but also some carefully chose department stores – may be able to host public diplomacy events.

In all cases, differentiated creativity is needed. I sat for a long while with French designer Philippe Starck, a long-time global player who used to work for Asian clients. He emphasised the need to make brands more appealing by crossing lines and borrowing from other fields. Arts are a prime source of inspiration. Sports can help us rethink our attitudes. Consequence: bring more art festivals and sports events into public diplomacy. *“The good brand nowadays is the one you recognise instantly,” added Starck, as we were talking about his long experience with the Peninsula Hotels in Hong Kong. “Branding indexes, based on figures, are less important than brand recognition.”* I shared this view later with Ambassador-at-Large of Singapore and one of the founding fathers of ASEM, Tommy Koh. His comment? *“Public diplomacy is about achieving more visibility and increasing the soft power of the concerned country or organisation. But the style of the campaign, the design of the slogans and logos, shall take into account the objectives. You don’t use the same features to promote trade and investment, or to attract tourism.”*

Ambassador Claude Blanchemaison, previous chairperson of ASEM Board of Governors, knows what it takes to be creative while remaining a seasoned diplomat. In Viet Nam, while he was Ambassador of France, he

gave great attention to the development of the French cultural institutes. Why? *“Because they connect us with young generation and with those who think and are looking for creative opportunities,”* he explained over a coffee in Paris’ famed “Deux Magots” café. Creativity, we all know, does not fall from the sky. Institutions can be used to invite artists, or to take writers in residence. ASEM would certainly be enhanced if it gets more cultural fame. Why not launching an ASEM literary prize I once asked Ambassador Delfin Colome, a former ASEM Executive Director who sadly has passed away. His reply? *“We definitely need cultural lobbyists working in favour of ASEM. ASEM would certainly do better in the eyes of the people and also in the eyes of our members if we had, besides the ministerial meetings, an annual public diplomacy gathering examining the trends of the day.”*

Comparing countries to airport

Creativity in public diplomacy is supposed to be finely tuned to the times we are living in. The social media scene, too often, is dominating among the young generation. But there is much more to do than raising your visibility on Twitter. The key to a successful public diplomacy is to mix all elements. On the countries brand index favoured by decision makers, those nations at the top of the list are the ones seen as prime destinations for the intellectual elite, the tourists, and the investors. The more you broaden your appeal, the more you get influence. And do not make the mistake of thinking that business is not a source of creativity. It is. The Swiss watch making industry is a prime example, as it embodies performance, style and leisure. I once talked with Tyler Brulé, the famed editor of Monocle magazine,

while he was transiting through Singapore’s Changi airport. Brulé is a revered consultant, hired by governments to help them re-think their PR and public diplomacy policies. His Fast Lane column in the Financial Times is a must read. What is his take on branding indexes? *“I would compare countries to airports,” says this high-flying editor. “The airports we like to spend time in are the ones who are efficient and comfortable. Airports are excellent introductions to a country’s reputation, taking into account for sure the financial means of those states.”*

Let us continue on the airport metaphor. Why not have an Asia-Europe corner in each of the ASEM countries’ main airports? Airports are about connectivity and people-to-people exchange. They are about speed, efficiency, transit and discovery. Let us come back here to our mall anecdote at the beginning: Asia and Europe shall be present in the places where it matters for people and decision makers. And that cannot continue to be only the premises of traditional foreign ministries.

**“THE KEY TO A
SUCCESSFUL
PUBLIC
DIPLOMACY
IS TO MIX ALL
ELEMENTS.”**

CHAPTER 8:

HOW TO MANAGE A PUBLIC DIPLOMACY CAMPAIGN AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Richard WERLY

Abstract

This chapter provides a toolkit for properly managing a public diplomacy campaign. The chapter first puts the public diplomacy campaign into a broader context and discusses the relation between public diplomacy and lobbying. Outlining the tools and skills needed for public diplomacy, it then introduces the tendency of many ministries of foreign affairs to outsource public diplomacy to external agencies.

The remainder of the chapter focuses on the day-to-day practice of public diplomacy and dealing with relevant actors and stakeholders. The chapter is written in the form of a toolkit with five key lessons. First, choose the right people for the job; bearing in mind that public diplomacy requires a different set of talents and skills than traditional diplomacy. Second, set the right goals; public diplomacy is about trust, which is generated by clear and credible objectives. Governments need to be able to fulfil objectives, and these objectives need to enjoy broad acceptance among the public. Third, when working with advertising agencies and PR firms, it is essential to ‘decode their language’ and understand their positions to avoid being fooled. Fourth, budgeting and financial evaluation is essential when outsourcing a public diplomacy campaign or event. And finally, think differently and dare to present ideas that are ‘out of the box’.

In sum, the chapter highlights the risks of expecting too much when outsourcing public diplomacy activities, making the point that much can be done internally with proper staffing, and that at every stage of a successful campaign public diplomacy objectives should be kept in mind.

Please check the 5-point summary as well at the end of this chapter.

Introduction

Public diplomacy has become a key element of the traditional diplomatic arsenal. Because it shapes images – a key factor of our time dominated by high-speed communication – and because it defines, more or less, the limits, outreach and soft power of our governments and institutions, public diplomacy finds itself at the heart of today’s diplomatic activities.

Consequently, public diplomacy priorities are progressively dominating our countries’ foreign affairs agendas, and there is always a tough contest within domestic administrations to allocate it the right amount of money. **Influencing perceptions abroad is sometimes hard to sell back home to budget decision-makers within foreign ministry headquarters**, both because of the difficulty of measuring the tangible impact of public diplomacy activities and because it is a diplomatic activity in uncharted territory, with which not everyone within the MFA might feel comfortable. Nevertheless, like it or not, public diplomacy matters.

In a June 2013 speech, Tara Sonenshine, outgoing US Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, stated:

“I have come to think of the work I do as ‘bottom line diplomacy’ because the allocation of resources is an important part of any equation – not only because of our continuing economic recovery but because we need to justify public expenditure to our only governing board – the American people. And we have clear results that demonstrate value.

But let me make something clear: Bottom line diplomacy isn’t about reducing everything to how much it costs. It’s the opposite. It’s about expanding our perspective so we see – and reap – the long-term benefits for our own citizens. In other words, bottom line diplomacy is the fusion of economic statecraft and public diplomacy. [...]

Bottom line diplomacy, then, is about building and strengthening the hyphen between the flow of money and the productive index of people. [...] Public diplomacy today is about the movement of ideas.”¹

You might think of this entire handbook as an introduction to ‘bottom line diplomacy’, offering an overview on how to operate it within your own administrations or organisations.

Public diplomacy means that diplomats have to venture out of their traditional field of work by engaging media, activists, spokespersons, public relations advisers and others. To do this, diplomats must be fully equipped. This handbook offers the first layer: a basic ‘survival kit’.

Before going in further detail, let’s briefly look back to previous chapters, which have touched on practical aspects of public diplomacy and which provide the basis for the recommendations in this chapter.

Chapter 1 indicated the limits of public diplomacy and image building. It explained why a public diplomacy campaign cannot replace a proper diplomatic strategy. Above all, public diplomacy remains a marketing tool and it requires content in order to sell.

Chapter 4, focusing on media content, covered interaction with the media and hinted at the management of a proper media/public relations campaign. Don’t forget that traditional media analysis remains of utmost importance to understand the issues at stake and to build your own strategy. The listening factor is crucial, and listening activities should be conducted before mounting your own public diplomacy campaign.

Chapter 7, especially in its section devoted to cultural diplomacy, covered issues crucial to image building and place branding. Universities, museums and student exchanges have become solid tools to promote the image of your country or organisation.

¹Tara Sonenshine, “Bottom Line Diplomacy: Why Public Diplomacy Matters,” U.S. Department of State, 18 June 2013, [<http://www.state.gov/r/remarks/2013/210771.htm>], accessed March 2016.

1. Context and objectives

A good public diplomacy campaign cannot be implemented without proper professional instruments and qualified dissemination agents and operators. These agents need the ability to spread your message, and, at a certain stage, to get access to key decision-makers for your administration's envoy or officials. For example, spending time with US senators might be worth hundreds of hours of negotiation when it comes to influencing the US administration.

Here it may be useful to point out the close interaction between public diplomacy and lobbying. These activities usually work hand in hand, although they are distinct. Public diplomacy aims to shape/reshape the image of your country or organisation and to promote your essential values, norms and standards. Lobbying consists of employing adequate resources to open doors and gain access to decision-makers. While public diplomacy aims to engage with the public, lobbying is often hidden from the public view.

Lobbying is absolutely compulsory in countries like the USA, and more recently in the heart of the European Union capital, Brussels. Use lobbying carefully: beyond the traditional connection factor – you might use well-connected nationals of your country or members of your diaspora to get access to local politicians or decision-makers – lobbying often implies gifts or paid services. Consequently, corruption issues might surface, as demonstrated in previous lobbying scandals in Washington.²

A good and effective public diplomacy mix usually brings together different sets of talents: advertising, public relations, branding and lobbying are among the most obvious ones. **Public diplomacy objectives also force operators to deal with a mixed set of tools to show the best of your country or institution:** economic relations, trade, tourism, heritage preservation and cultural activities, among others.

Ministries of foreign affairs or international trade rarely have staff members

² An example is the Jack Abramoff case in 2005, who pled guilty to “fraud, tax evasion and conspiracy to bribe public officials,” read more in Washington Post, “Investigating Abramoff – Special Report,” Washington Post, 2011. [<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/linkset/2005/06/22/LI2005062200936.html>], accessed March 2016.

with strong experience or skills in all of these different areas. Sadly, as they are considered to have limited importance, these dimensions are often handled by junior diplomats or even temporary employees and consultants.

The tendency is to outsource public diplomacy to part-time professionals with relevant credentials. Several international firms, mostly based in the USA and the UK, dominate this field, taking advantage of the universality of the English language. The four big auditing firms (PwC, Deloitte, EY, KPMG) and their consultant offspring are often employed, as they are in a position to guarantee acceptable results. In addition, high-level public relations agencies such as Burson-Marsteller, Hill+Knowlton, Edelman, Weber Shandwick, APCO, Fleishman-Hillard, Bell Pottinger and others have, over the years, been hired by governments and local authorities to help shape their brands.

While these firms are certainly very well equipped in skills ranging from drafting press releases to preparing briefs for visiting ministers, they will soon bill your government for several millions dollars per year, especially when their activities include international forums, seminars, symposia, media trips, etc.

A typical 'successful' outcome will be your minister or superior securing participation at the World Economic Forum in Davos, which claims to be the intellectual/networking hub of the globalised capitalist elites. Appearances on the BBC's Hardtalk or on CNN's top talk shows will certainly be seen as campaign victories; so would a Time Magazine cover story. The Philippines' outgoing President Benigno Aquino requested, when he was a presidential candidate, such a cover story from a public relations consultant before hiring his firm. More specific to Asia-Europe relations, a typical goal for a public diplomacy campaign of an Asian government or organisation would be to acquire visibility and contacts in Brussels.

Keeping these goals in mind, this chapter focuses on the day-to-day practice of public diplomacy and dealing with relevant actors and stakeholders. Being a veteran journalist of 20 years, who has been commissioned several times by foreign ministries and non-governmental organisations to produce editorial materials, I am writing this chapter both as a handbook, based on my own experience, and as a platform for debate.

In the context of Asia-Europe relations, this module also highlights the risks of expecting too much, too soon, when outsourcing to consultants and leading international branding agencies. This chapter makes the point that much can be done internally with proper staffing, and that public diplomacy objectives should be kept in mind at every stage of a successful campaign.

Too often, diplomats and civil society stakeholders believe that communication is the key. We disagree. Communication is, and shall remain, **a tool**, as brilliantly demonstrated by Daniel Boorstin in *The Image: A Guide to Pseudo Events in America*.³

2. Toolkit lessons

Toolkit lesson 1: Choosing the right internal cast

Public diplomacy brings together diplomats, civil servants and international relations experts in order to deal with a completely new set of tools and targets. The focus of a public diplomacy campaign is not to achieve a concrete result like adding or amending a sentence in a text under negotiation or sorting out a ceasefire between two parties. Instead, the expected outputs of such a campaign are difficult to put in figures and very often depend on external circumstances: image, appreciation, recognition and broad acceptance by the targeted public or audience. Public diplomacy is, in essence, a fluid discipline. It requires practitioners, above all, to adapt their role, mission and techniques to the needs of the time. The choice of external partners, from advertising agencies to branding agencies and public relations consultants, should also be viewed in this context.

For these reasons, public diplomacy requires a different set of talents and expertise than traditional diplomacy. Talented diplomats and foremost experts in fields like international relations or international law may not have an aptitude for public diplomacy. Traditional foreign ministry hierarchies

³Daniel J. Boorstin, *The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America* (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1992).

and typical performance evaluation may not apply well in this field. Public diplomacy is a horizontal, cross-cutting discipline that is trying to find its footing in ministries or administrations that are accustomed to vertical structures.

A certain degree of autonomy is essential in a public diplomacy campaign, which implies interacting with external, non-diplomatic actors: media, NGOs, business circles and others. Along with the obvious actors, it may be important at the start of a campaign to bring in additional expertise from anthropologists, sociologists or other academics who may have a deeper knowledge of the audience and the subjects you intend to touch on.

You may think of a public diplomacy campaign as a 'crossing lines experience' that often has a cultural dimension attached to it. Never underestimate feelings, cross-cultural clichés, historical roots or cultural antagonisms. In public diplomacy, success comes with mutual understanding.⁴

Therefore, the first criterion when forming a public diplomacy task force is **mind-set adequacy**. By and large, officials in charge of public diplomacy should be **proactive** (skilled in anticipation), **reactive** (skilled at proposing arguments and solutions when a crisis erupts), **interactive** (at ease in dealing with the public), and **friendly** to academia and civil society. A good cast is a solid basis for a successful campaign.

You may bring in outsiders from other fields to help promote a public diplomacy campaign. For example, some countries retain a kind of reserve diplomatic service, with professionals serving as 'diplomats at large' when requested by their foreign ministries. Plugging into that pool of experts may prove useful. You might even suggest the creation of such a pool to your own diplomatic corps.

Your country's diaspora has the potential to be a powerful means of delivering messages, and accessing and influencing local media. The diaspora can also serve as a benchmark to test your ideas and see whether they fit into the host country culture. It can be useful to convene, at an early stage, meetings with relevant members of the diaspora to test their

⁴A classic example concerns General MacArthur, who was assigned to rule Japan after the Pacific war, and relied heavily on anthropologist Ruth Benedict's masterly study *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (Ruth Benedict, 1967, pp. 297-298).

willingness to cooperate and get their first reactions to your proposals.

Toolkit lesson 2: Setting the right goals

Public diplomacy is different from publicity or mere advertising for several reasons:

- * There is nothing to sell but political arguments and diplomatic positions.
- * Relevant budgets are often far below what private sector players devote to selling their products.
- * Public diplomacy deals with moving targets rather than with clear socio-professional categories like young women, families, skilled workers, unionists, pensioners, etc.

It is crucial, therefore, to avoid falling into the ‘advertising trap’. National policies are not for sale (lobbying may lead officials to bribe others, but this is another story).

Advertising, put simply, relies on taste. Advertising firms spend millions to convince you that certain products ‘taste’ good (suit you, make you feel good, etc.). Advertising is about feeling good when buying and consuming a product. Remember the Marlboro man campaign that sold billions of cigarettes worldwide? It was not about smoking; it was about freedom, cowboys, horses and wilderness: the message was that smoking would make you that kind of man.⁵

Public diplomacy, on the contrary, is about **trust**. When dealing with external actors, diplomats should never forget this key word. The aim of a successful public diplomacy campaign is to persuade your target public to trust your ideas, platform or arguments. However, public diplomacy in itself is not a short cut to trust. The creation of trust ultimately depends on the arguments, campaign and initiatives that are employed to create an environment where the public,

⁵See Stanford School of Medicine, “Stanford Research into the Impact of Tobacco Advertising – Marlboro Men,” Stanford University, 1958. [http://tobacco.stanford.edu/tobacco_main/images.php?token2=fm_st085.php&token1=fm_img2057.php&theme_file=fm_mt006.php&theme_name=Filter%20Safety%20Myths&subtheme_name=Marlboro%20Men], accessed March 2016.

governments and business leaders will trust that you are a reliable partner.

Trust is different from taste. You may not represent the best government in your region or in the world. People are aware of that. For example, the USA has plenty of critics, but it still attracts trust. Establishing goals that inspire trust is a key element in a public diplomacy campaign, and this must be done before hiring any external advisers. Trust is created through:

- * Clear goals and arguments: there can be no trust without understanding.
- * The capacity of your government/country to fulfil your objectives: there can be no trust without a certain degree of strength and respect.
- * The legitimacy of your arguments/position: we trust those whose positions make sense.
- * The broader acceptance of your objectives: trust is easier if you feel the other government defends a goal that matters to your life or country, too.

Therefore, after having chosen the right cast, setting the right goal becomes the second step. It is not only about asking the basic question: What do we want to achieve? It may also be about choosing between two or three diplomatic priorities: Am I going to go global with my fight against global warming? Or am I going to put resources towards the court case pending at the International Court of Justice?⁶ Very few countries have the luxury of entertaining permanent, global, horizontal public diplomacy efforts. Very often, constraints in budgets, human resources and available expertise lead countries to choose one or two crucial issues on which they hope to make a difference.

At this stage, you may engage public diplomacy experts to contribute to the discussion. Can this objective be 'sold' to worldwide public opinion or the media? What will be needed to achieve these goals, especially if a timetable is attached (e.g. a pending court case)? The success of a public diplomacy campaign very much depends on its design prior to its effective launch. Easier said than done? Well, not after this chapter.

Keep in mind the need to simultaneously get access to stakeholders and decision-makers. Building a strong network of connections, through various lobbying efforts, is one of the keys of a successful public diplomacy campaign.

⁶For example, the Thailand vs. Cambodia case concerning the Preah Vihear Temple; a territorial issue that became a global cultural controversy with the involvement of UNESCO (International Court of Justice, 1962).

Toolkit lesson 3: Decoding the language of the agencies

Public diplomacy is a big business nowadays. Advertising agencies and public relations firms are eager to provide governments with ready-to-stage symposia, International forums, public relations campaigns, Eurovision concerts⁷, not to mention sponsored media trips, etc. They will mention respected media professionals ('We can get the BBC or CNN on-board'), venues to make your minister feel like a star ('Sir, you are invited to attend this symposium in Cannes, France'), or public diplomacy materials that make your government publications look like rubbish ('We can produce a superb coffee-table book that will seduce your visitors with your country's beauty'). The advertising agencies have all the best names and designers in their address books. They have the talents, the skills, the resources and the contacts. And the top firms can guarantee results. They can call on former politicians, lobbyists and diplomats. They have the needed leverage. At some point, for reasons of efficiency, timetable and capacity, you will have to deal with them. Although working with such agencies is expensive and difficult to afford for small and developing countries with limited budgets, they can offer a guaranteed return on investment, which may make it an attractive option.

Still, a reality check is worthwhile from the very beginning. The more money you have, the more agencies will come knocking at your door: advertising agencies that have worked for international brands with 'tremendous success'; public relations firms that have managed to place interviews in the most respected newspapers and TV outlets; brand experts producing impressive lists of 'branding tools' or criteria. Are you planning to stage a public diplomacy campaign? Beware!

This is why, before venturing into this public diplomacy galaxy, it is essential to decode their arguments and proposals. Hire the agencies, yes. Be their fool, no. Keep the following advice in mind. The decision to outsource a public diplomacy campaign should be based on a clear scoreboard:

* Don't hire an international agency or a foreign-based consultant to tell you what to do, hire them to tell you how to do it. Individual consultants with a

⁷ Think of the classic Azerbaijan 2012 example, when the Azeri government spent a lot of money to host the contest in Baku (Center for Economic & Social Development, 15 April 2012).

deep knowledge of your country, especially if they have a long personal history in the country and speak the language, are the ones to consult at the first stage of the campaign. They will help you set the tone, draft the arguments, put the campaign on track. Afterwards, you will only need the locomotive to pull the train.

* Don't believe those who pretend to have all the required expertise. The 'all in one' campaign is often a trap. Agencies are like people: they can't be good at everything. Look at their track record: are they good with media, public outreach, branding, market studies, polling?

* Request one of the senior partners as account director, rather than a junior manager. As **trust** is the key word, it requires a long-standing relationship and understanding. The account director should frequently visit your country to provide updates. Form a partnership, as well as a client-supplier relationship. Once again, it is about human trust, not taste.

Toolkit lesson 4: Pay the agencies well, but don't be fooled

Budgeting and financial evaluations will very soon become essential if you decide to outsource a public diplomacy campaign or event. From the very beginning, watch out for corruption. Public diplomacy, because it brings in experts whose services are difficult to quantify, and because it depends strongly on your ability to get access to stakeholders, is often prone to corrupt deals or under-the-table approaches. You may find yourself in a situation where you are asked to work with a specific advertising agency or consultant. This is a warning signal. Do a crosscheck anytime you have doubts about the expertise of your interlocutor and the reasons they were hired.

Here again, decoding is essential. There is a price tag attached to everything. These agencies pay their experts, staff and consultants very high fees. Keep the following recommendations in mind:

* Small budgets cannot produce large results if they are used poorly. Outsourcing public diplomacy campaigns to leading agencies is a rather expensive decision. Well-connected consultants do not come cheap and this

is understandable. But do not forget that you can do many things in-house if you identify competent people in your administration and team them up with local or international consultants. A media trip can be arranged by your local embassy with the help of a media/public relations expert as coordinator. A good book on a specific topic can be produced at affordable costs by correspondents with in-depth knowledge of your country.⁸ Small budgets can produce results if they are properly allocated.

* Large budgets, nevertheless, **have more chance of bringing** massive results. Moreover, there are times when bargaining over the budget might become a disadvantage, especially in crisis situations. Do not bargain in crucial times! Spend big when the challenge or objective is worth it. When a diplomatic battle erupts, the winning party is often the one that managed to impose its arguments quickly and make its positions visible and recognisable. Financial risks can pay off in public diplomacy, too.

A good way to balance a budget and to obtain the best results is to draft a public diplomacy mapping. This, of course, can be costly too, as it means inviting journalists and other experts and interacting with them. Such a mapping should be done both at home and abroad with the help of your diplomatic missions. It should go along the following lines:

- * Identify 'friends' in media circles: veteran correspondents, journalists who speak your language and are familiar with the issues, etc.
- * Identify 'enemies' or critics: those who deal with your opponents, those who relay their views, etc.
- * Identify the fields in which your country has an established credibility. This is called the 'assets list'. Which strings can you pull?
- * Identify the regional forums or symposia taking place either in your country or nearby. Spot the subjects to which you may add value.
- * Identify key officials, either in international organisations or national governments, who can pass on your messages and be your country's advocates.

If you work with an agency, this should be the first checklist you ask them to produce, and it can be completed in a matter of three months.

⁸ For example, the author of this chapter, acting as publisher, produced *Travel Green Thailand* (Richard Werly, 2013) and *Travel Different Thailand* (Richard Werly, 2010) for Thai embassies abroad.

Toolkit lesson 5: Think different!

The essence of public diplomacy is persuasion, and preconditions for persuasion are communication and understanding. Trust comes as a result, when your partners and interlocutors are convinced you are defending their interests as well as yours, and when they feel that what you say also makes sense for them and their audience. In short, convergence of views is the best recipe for trust. That is why selecting the right partners and advisers is so important.

Thinking different, or thinking ‘out of the box’ is critical. Public diplomacy is fluid and, if a crisis erupts, is prone to turbulence. The possibility of facing a crisis of confidence should never be underestimated. Below are some examples of this ‘think different’ policy.

The aim of this public diplomacy handbook, focusing on Asia-Europe relations, is the result of a ‘think different’ approach. You are not reading this book to see domestic problems, issues and solutions, but to try to foster convergence and common views. You are asked to pay attention to each other’s arguments and initiatives. Following this line of thinking, we encourage you in the future, before any Asia-Europe public diplomacy effort, to consult colleagues from both continents and to pay attention to perceptions.

If you are in the position of paymaster for a public diplomacy campaign, you have the opportunity to think different. You will have to go through budgetary process and probably tenders, as well as manage calls for applications or calls for projects. Here are few tips:

Beware of complex tenders: those who have responded to EU requests for proposals understand how much effort they require in terms of hours and attention. Don’t let the administrative process hamper your creativity and willingness to achieve results. Public diplomacy works well when there is a fluid, informal understanding between the parties involved. Excessive bureaucratic transparency – when standards impose calls for applications, complicated tenders, etc. – is not always compatible with public diplomacy, as some consultants manage to get the contracts thanks to their inside knowledge of the machinery rather than because of their talent and capacity.

Go against the official line: the best public diplomacy argument may not be the one framed by your headquarters or your minister. Try to come up with an alternate set of arguments and help your team consider the pros and cons of any approach. Public diplomacy is about trust, but also about doubts. Express your doubts when you start to elaborate the campaign objectives.

Make journalists an asset rather than a target: journalists often know a subject as well as those who brief them. Adopt an inclusive policy with clear guidelines. If you bring in journalists and academics at an early stage in your campaign, they can help you make a difference.

Do not underestimate the role of print media in shaping ideas: a sound public diplomacy campaign is not just a matter of image building. It should be backed by academic studies, surveys and other materials that can only be properly disseminated by print media, news websites or blogs. Public exposure needs to be backed up by facts and solid arguments, so it lasts.

3. Asia-Europe: ideas for the future

Public diplomacy is about common interests and goals. It is about making sure that your target public sees you as a friendly partner with converging interests, rather than as a threatening competitor. In the context of Asia-Europe relations, here are some ideas for cooperative projects.

Asia-Europe: reframing regional integration together: in light of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) goal for 2025, the process of regional integration is becoming a feature common to both regions and a topic for useful exchange of views and experiences.⁹ Asia needs to think about its regional integration. Europe needs to re-think its model. The aim should not be to import the European values and model to Asia, but instead, to see what each continent can offer to the other in terms of experiences and shared values.

⁹ASEAN, ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025 (Jakarta: The ASEAN Secretariat, 2015). [<http://www.asean.org/storage/images/2015/November/aec-page/AEC-Blueprint-2025-FINAL.pdf>], accessed March 2016.

Imagine that you are planning an Asia-Europe campaign or pavilion. In light of the upcoming Asia-Europe summit in Ulaanbaatar, what would you see as the main initiatives/examples to display in order to convince the public and decision-makers that the relationship between the regions has potential and can bring good?

Asia-Europe heritage links: this may sound naïve, but there is much to improve in the field of heritage preservation. Asian cities are particularly concerned. Europeans have know-how. The Bangkok EU Delegation recently produced a map/guidebook on colonial heritage buildings in Thailand¹⁰, as well as a 'European Heritage Map and Cultural Calendar of Thailand'-smartphone application.¹¹ This is an interesting attempt to highlight Europe-Asia interaction, and a clever use of modern Internet tools in public diplomacy activities.

Asia-Europe cooperation for more transparent Internet governance: in the field of digital policies and diplomacy, US domination is becoming a sensitive subject. Can Europe and Asia work together to achieve some results? Industrial partnerships can be forged. Creativity from both continents can be fostered. The convergence of digital policy issues, including Internet infrastructure, cybersecurity, e-commerce, privacy and data protection, multilingualism and many others can foster the digital connectivity between Asia and Europe.

¹⁰ See [http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/thailand/documents/page_content/ehm_map_page_en.pdf], accessed March 2016.

¹¹ See [http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/thailand/europeanheritagemap/index_en.htm], accessed March 2016.

5-POINT SUMMARY

1

Choose the right people for the job, as public diplomacy requires a different set of talents and expertise than traditional diplomacy.

3

When working with advertising agencies and PR firms, it is essential to decode their language and understand their positions.

5

Think different! Consult a wide range of colleagues from both Asia and Europe and pay attention to images and perceptions.

2

Set the right goals: public diplomacy is about trust, generated by clear objectives, the capacity of the government to fulfil objectives, legitimate arguments and a broader acceptance of your objectives.

4

Budgeting and financial evaluation is essential when outsourcing a public diplomacy campaign or event; find a good balance between budget and results.

INTERVIEW

Johannes MATYASSY

Head of the Asia and Pacific
Division, Federal Department
of Foreign Affairs of
Switzerland

As one of the initiators of Presence Switzerland, a public diplomacy arm of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland, Ambassador Johannes Matyassy knows a great deal on the best ways to win hearts and minds and gain influence. He exchanged views casually with Richard Werly in Bern, Switzerland, after celebrating the ASEM Day on 9 March 2016.

Q: Is public diplomacy an efficient instrument when promoting a country's interest?

A: Yes, absolutely, it is necessary for states to promote their soft power, because a good amount of soft power is useful when implementing foreign policy. It is also important to participate in the discourse about a country and contribute to the shaping of the public image. Public diplomacy is one of the instruments that we have at our disposal to do this, and our external network is an important means to convey our messages to stakeholders. We have to reach out to our stakeholders and tell them what we do, but also gain their interest for what we are doing, and appeal to the stakeholders' emotions and their feelings.

Q: Can ASEM be a forum where members promote their agenda more actively?

A: ASEM is not only a catalyst. It is also platform where members can discuss how to foster

the flow of goods, services, people and ideas between Asia and Europe in order to enhance mutual prosperity and stability. This is what we understand under the term connectivity. The theory goes that increased connectivity, in all senses of the word, contributes to prosperity. The concept of connectivity is a bit vast and as such maybe less apt to a campaign. I guess it has to be represented by something more tangible.

The Silk Road, with its connotation of an ancient trade route – imagine: camels, horses, loaded with riches and spices, travelling through the vast stretches of land between Europe and Asia –, is certainly an element of connectivity which is easy to imagine. It can be used as a metaphor for connectivity. The “New Silk Road” does exactly this. I think that the “New Silk Road” is a good metaphor, but it is already used by China. I guess ASEM has to find its own metaphor.

Q: Is country branding something you do care about at the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs?

A: Each country has its own individual strengths, there are not only geographic, economic and cultural strengths. At the centre of a country, there are always human beings. They all have their own particular strengths. And country branding aims to visualise the strengths of a country to make it attractive to others. I guess this is a good thing.

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CONCLUSION

Asia-Europe's Future is Asia-Europe's Image.

As connectivity increases between Asia and Europe in the years to come, ASEM will need to foster mutual understanding and popular support.

Centuries ago, travellers and traders used to roam about Asia and Europe making a fortune out of their audacity. At that time, courage was the key; mutual ignorance was largely the reality.

The challenge of today is the opposite. We do not need to struggle to make Asia known to Europe or vice-versa, but we do need to correct false impressions and perceptions. Courage is still needed, but mutual understanding is the most important feature. To avoid a clash of civilisations triggered by fanatics, ASEM partners shall make their utmost efforts to prove that diversity pays off and brings tangible rewards. Asia-Europe's future lies with Asia-Europe's image.

This handbook, through well-documented chapters written by experts in public diplomacy, has tried to cast a light on best practices and best lessons, offering diplomats and stakeholders a summary of what can be done and what can be improved. But nothing can replace personal commitment and fresh ideas. This handbook shall be seen as a starter. From here begins the bumpy road of a more coordinated and more efficient Asia-Europe public diplomacy.

The future of ASEM depends very much on each ASEM partners' willingness to shape it differently. So, when turning the last pages of this handbook please keep in mind that our aim was not only to teach, but also to trigger the interests of diplomats, governments, and any organisations practicing public diplomacy. We wanted to make it a useful toolbox, in line with ASEF's constant efforts to promote people-to-people exchange.

Public diplomacy is a live art. Only your own contributions, suggestions and discussions can make this handbook a relevant and useful resource to lift the spirit of ASEM for the next decade.

Email us your ideas and suggestions to info@asef.org, or post your feedback with #ASEF #Diplomacy @aseforg (Twitter) and @AsiaEuropeFoundation (Facebook).

About the Contributing Editor



Richard WERLY is presently Paris-based correspondent for the Swiss daily *Le Temps* (www.letemps.ch). Formerly a correspondent in Bangkok, Tokyo and Brussels, he is an Associate Fellow of the DiploFoundation (Geneva) and the EU Centre (Singapore). He has contributed to initiating the Asia-Europe Public Diplomacy Training Initiative.

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May this handbook serve as a recognition of their hard work.

About the Asia-Europe Public Diplomacy Training Initiative

Since its inception in 2013 the Asia-Europe Public Diplomacy Training Initiative has implemented 4 tutored online courses and 3 face-to-face workshops in Geneva, Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok. Nearly 200 young diplomats and civil society actors have benefitted from both online and face-to-face trainings.

The Initiative has been set up by the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF), the DiploFoundation, and the National Centre for Research on Europe (NCRE), to help promote and facilitate skills training for diplomats and civil society actors.

 <p>www.diplomacy.edu</p>	<p>DiploFoundation (Diplo) is an independent non-profit organisation established in 2002 by the governments of Switzerland and Malta. In 2009, DiploFoundation featured in the World e-Democracy Forum's list of 'Top 10 who are changing the world of Internet and Politics'. Diplo has received wide recognition for its work, including consultative status with the United Nations. Diplo's activities include training officials including diplomats and others involved in international relations; providing specialised and effective academic programs for professional diplomats; strengthening participation of non-state actors; providing capacity development programmes and using and developing tools for e-participation in global governance. www.diplomacy.edu</p>
 <p>NATIONAL CENTRE FOR RESEARCH ON EUROPE</p>	<p>In 2000, the forerunner to the National Centre for Research on Europe (NCRE) – the Centre for Research on Europe – was founded at Canterbury. In 2002 a grant from the European Commission was awarded and at this time the Centre became the NCRE. It remains the only EU-dedicated tertiary level centre in New Zealand. Since then, the NCRE has developed significantly in both academic and outreach activities, involving a variety of roles and mechanisms. It has also established an effective form of collaboration with four other New Zealand universities (Auckland, Victoria, Otago and Lincoln) and one Australian university (Melbourne) during this time. Above all, the NCRE has begun the essential process of encouraging and promoting a new generation of New Zealand graduates who have a high level of expertise and interest in the European Union (EU). www.europe.canterbury.ac.nz</p>

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ASEF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY HANDBOOK

The ASEF Public Diplomacy Handbook, “*How to Win Hearts and Minds*”, presents theories and cases analysed by public diplomacy practitioners and insights from interviews with high-profile experts. The Handbook provides diplomats, ministries of foreign affairs, public diplomacy training and research institutes, as well as individuals and not-profits with best practices, lessons learned and practical tools. The Handbook will help them improve images and perspectives of their respective countries and organisations and win the support of target audiences.



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